Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
You are redefining as you go along. Your comparison with Normany says that if the Germans had won the war, our losses would have been real disasters. The Soviets used airborne operations well before Afghanistan. Grenada was not pure airland and neither was Panama. And in the latter I had friends taking rounds. Crete was Pyrhhic no doubt; it still achieved the objective.

As for the speed bump analogy and counterattacks, Normandy was in that regard a success. No one in the airborne community then or now advocates use of airborne operations at the operational level of war without a link up. In any case, the parachute or the helicopter are delivery means, not means of fighting. Once the force is in, it does not matter how it got there. Bastogne was by truck and it was a defensive deployment to retain a crossroads using light infantry. The speed bump held.

Best

Tom
Tom,
Regarding redefining,let me say "Tu quoque." My original post indicated I was discussing large scale operations.
"Vertical" envelopment operations, like Market Garden, are a by-product of technology. I cannot think of one truly successful operation of this type. (emphasis added)
The 101st at Bastogne was not a vertical envelopment. How you get there does matter--part of the Market Garden problem had to do with failure of aerial resupply. Think how differently things might have gone had 1st Para and the Polish Bde been able to truck in and carry a lot of antitank weaponry with them.

I also didn't say anything about the Germans winning the war. When I said
had the Germans stopped the amphibous landings on the Normandy beaches
I had visions of Anzio in mind.



Regarding the Normandy speed bump, the last time I checked, the only real adversary for the US airborne forces at Normandy was the recently formed 91st Air Landing Division and maybe some rear area elements of the 352d Infantry Division. Any fighting was a battle of near equals, except the Allies had massive air superiority, which was pretty much the case throughout operations in the West. The Germans have much to say about their hatred of the Allied "JaBos" (CAS aircraft) in personal memoirs and such. On 6 June, the German's counter attacked with 2 bns of their 6th Airborne Regiment. Significant German armor was only encountered 7 days later (June 13th) and then the paratroopers were quickly reinforced with CCA, 2nd AD.

Regarding Bastogne, I suspect that had the Germans flung their panzers at the defense in a single coordinated attack rather than in piecemeal efforts, we would have had a different result. BTW, Bastogne was not defended by a pure light infantry force. The 101st was reinforced with remnants of the 9th AD retreating from its initial drubbing along the Ourthe River and by CCA, 10th AD as well. The real battle was the delaying action against 2d Pz Div by 1/506 Inf and 10th AD tanks on 19/20 Dec near Foy. The Bastogne encirclement only lasted for about 3 days. Air support was available on the 23rd and relief from Creighton Abrams' 37th Armor came on the 26th of December.

I had friends taking rounds in Panama too. But, by their description, it was not much worse than the shootout at Waco, TX with David Koresh's folks.

I seem to remember that Soviet airborne ops (if you want to call sliding off the wings of planes into snowbanks airborne ops) against the Finns were a resounding failure. I know of no other efforts by them in the Great Patriotic War.