The existence of Sadr is key because he causes competition with Dawa-SIIC for the allegience (sp?) of Iraqi Shiites. Thus, he prevents the Iranian parties from operating unopposed in the South. If he were already removed, nothing would stand in the way of Dawa-SIIC from monopolizing the scene in the south and secede, especially because the Sunnis show no signs of compromise from a government they see of Iran puppets. However, if Sadr were to form an alliance with the Sunnis, then this would restore the necessary (but not sufficient) cross-sectarian cooperation that could make a national government work. At this point, we need to 'flip' Sadr and strike a deal as we withdraw, giving him what he has publicly demanded for the duration of the war. We have kept the pressure on the Mahdi because its rogue elements are attacking us, but these free-lancers are getting their support from the Iranians, and not from Sadr. Because of this, Sadr has been maintaining a low profile since the beginning of the surge because the Iranians are provoking us to go after him. This is what he realized finally this week, and why he is reorganizing his militia. If we were to give him some space, he could form a center of Iraqi politics that works with the Salvation Council and other neighborhood militias and begin to build a Iraqi response to radicalism rather than a purely sectarian one.