continued from above .....

So why did it happen? Here are my personal views, and I think it was a combination of these factors, at different strengths among each sheik.

1) The "Taliban" effect. The tribes flipped because it was in their interest to. They saw what life would be like under AQIZ and didn't want any of it.

2) Power. AQIZ became more powerful than the tribes. The tribes decided that this wasn't good, and maybe the Americans aren't so bad.

3) Fatigue. The locals were tired of their families being killed, justified and unjustified. Most just wanted some law and order and a job.

4) Recognition that the US would eventually leave. They watch the news too, and realized that sooner or later the US would be leaving. Extrapolating from that, the real question is what would happen once the US left. They fear the central government and Shia militias. Losing their best fighters to US firepower only weakened their long term position if it comes to a civil war.

5) US Forces learned. US Forces employing COIN doctrine that respected local power structures. We weren't trying to create their society new, we sought to work with rather than against traditional tribal structures. 1 MEF (MajGen Zilmer) and 2 MEF (MajGen Gaskin) were 110% supportive of our efforts and gave us all we needed, especially in non-kinetic resources.

6) The wind was blowing our way. Tribes and Iraqis have a long history of siding with whoever it seems will be the winner, and changing that in an instant. Securing the population from company outposts and ridding the criminal element bought a lot of goodwill, and convinced many that the US would win the tactical battle in the short term.

The risks:

1) Tribes flip back. This would mainly happen if we failed to back them against AQIZ or the central government. Hence Bush's visit to Anbar last week, demonstrating political support.

2) Arming the Sunnis for an upcoming sectarian war.

3) The Sunnis still do not trust the central government in the least.

4) Having empowered the tribes, they act more as mafia type organizations than semi-legitimate governments for the local populace, creating a corrupt and unpopular local government that will channel the population to support AQIZ against the sheiks.

Hon. Schumer has some points. The tribes flipped for their own reasons. But the awakening could not have happened without our support. As Ken stated earlier in the thread, this was attempted but not exploited in 2004, and elsewhere. Bottom line a strategic window opened, and 1/1 AD was smart enough to exploit the window of opportunity. The results are where they are today. We didn't kill those mortar teams hammering our FOB's, they flipped. In essence, that is the goal of both Sun Tzu and COIN theory, defeating your enemy without having to combat him. By co-opting him my FOB is just as safe, except if the guy flipps back. But isn’t that how you win most COIN actions, by convincing the other guy not to fight?

But some pundits are right. While a great tactical and operational success, it only has meaning if the Root Cause of the insurgency is addressed, which requires political reconciliation. All that work is for nothing if the country isn't able to come back together. But that's beyond a BCT's scope.

As a final note, 1/1 AD endured 89 KIA in Ramadi (IIRC +/- a few), and over 500 wounded acheiving the above. It was not easy, and very kinetic at times. A high US price was paid for the Anbar awakening.

Now I have to go and “play cars”