Social Contagion theory

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, The case of the college students becoming guards was a popular topic when I was in college in 1976. It is pretty much a total fraud. They picked college students and told them to "act" like correctional officers. They did not go through any type of employment screening process like would have happened in the real world nor did they go through any type of academy and a probationary period which would have happened in the real world.

However their is study that was published in military review on how to spot psychopathic behavior. If I can find it I will post the link.

Here it is.http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/e...CUR_DOCUMENT=2

[goesh]

Another thought that came to mind was the situation on the upper plains of the US during the Great Depression and the foreclosures of family farms. This was very serious because there were no viable means of sustanence for these farm families - no welfare, no commodoties, no food stamps, no jobs etc. Two tactics were employed to combat this with no readily identified leadership behind the actions:
1.) When sale time arrived, farmers would show up and not allow anyone else in except farmers, who would then buy equipment and livestock at bid for mere pennies and return them to the original owners.
or
2.) Several famers would bring mares in heat and 3-4-5 other farmers would bring stallions to the sale. When massive draught horse stallions get to fighting over mares in heat and going after them, people and objects are going to get hurt and the sale would be totally disrupted.

This tactics seemed to crop up out of nowhere and rapidly spread so one could say there were 'cell leaders' but no leaders of prominence.

Were these acts of violence? Not to me but to others, yes. I think the viability of the paradigm of contagion V leaders is best served when violence is defined in harsh terms.

[marct]

There's been a debate in history for a long time over social forces vs. "Great Men" that may be applicable here. Goesh's points about emerging social protests certainly illustrate that, in some instances, people self organize and "through up" "leaders".

In other cases, "leaders" seem to exacerbate social problems while providing a "solution" (TomOC, I'm thinking of the Social Constructionist literature here, e.g. Joel Best, Specter and Kisuse, Darwin Bromley, etc.). Probably the best (no pun intended) article in this strand of thought is

Best, Joel (1987) Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children Problem, in Social Problems 34(2), 101-121

Most of the reason I really like this article is that it provides a simple, yet surprisingly useful, way of analyzing the mechanisms of the spread of an idea / perception.

Marc

[Tom OC]

The social constructivist paradigm is weak because it fails to give any obdurate (how I've longed to use that word in some forum) status to norms and roles. And forgive me if I'm stomping all over someone's favorite paradigm here, but people like Joel Best see norms as always emerging and roles as constantly entered and exited. They see society as always in flux, a fiction if you will, that only exists in peoples' minds. Hence, contagion for them is only useful as a concept which explains consequences of action, not as a concept which helps understand the causes of action. It's almost as if interactionists are trapped in studying second-order and third-order interactions. Take the typical interactionist approach to what defines a social problem; i.e., the five stages of deviatization:

1. defining (some problem as deviant)
2. prospecting (for some scientific fact)
3. claims-making (over who "owns" the problem)
4. turf-battling (over who gets to solve the problem)
5. designating (the solution in law or ritual)

Social constructivists hardly ever get past a discussion of stage three. I've taken an interest lately in extending these stages to what constitutes the securitization process from an international relations standpoint, and have found the constructivist paradigm lacking in that area too. It seems what the whole rhetoric of fear crowd is missing is what attribution psychologists call "veridicality" or what Walter Stephan (2000). "Intergroup relations" pp. 333-336 in A. Kazdin (ed.) Encyclopedia of psychology. Washington DC: APA calls "realism" as in realistic threat assessment. This constitutes the role of leaders to realistically characterize the threat and not cater to symbolic overtones. Interactionists firmly believe symbolic communication is more powerful than realistic communication, and that is both their virtue and vice. Long ago in criminology, the non-Marxist conflict theorist, Austin Turk, tried to point that out to them, and another criminologist, Leslie Wilkins, tried to quantify that social contagion of the symbolic type only moves the mean of deviance one standard deviation away instead of two as a realistic portrayal might do. Applying this to leadership, I would imagine that bad leaders manipulate the symbolism in sinister ways, and good leaders are more capable of realistic risk portrayal as in the way risk communication is supposed to be done in homeland security. In sum, contagion is an energy source for the causes of action. It can be managed, sure, but I think it has to be treated as a structural phenomenon if we are ever to understand its true nature. Thanks for letting me share.

[marct]

Hi Tom,

The social constructivist paradigm is weak because it fails to give any obdurate (how I've longed to use that word in some forum) status to norms and roles. And forgive me if I'm stomping all over someone's favorite paradigm here, but people like Joel Best see norms as always emerging and roles as constantly entered and exited. They see society as always in flux, a fiction if you will, that only exists in peoples' minds. Hence, contagion for them is only useful as a concept which explains consequences of action, not as a concept which helps understand the causes of action.

I think you are misreading social constructionist theory here, mainly by conflating it with symbolic interactionism and social constructivism (BTW, its not my favourite paradigm at all, I just find it a simple and useful tool ). A couple of points that are worth bringing out here.

Norms: The first point I'd like to make about norms is that they are a statistical construct based on a frequency distribution of a given norm amongst a population (the Parsonian version of the older concept of "mores and folkways". They are not a thing in itself but, rather, a frequency characteristic of a population. Since their originating source is individual members of the population, the frequency distribution of any given norm will fluctuate as members of that population change their perceptions and ways of doing things. Giving an obdurate status (love that word too ) to a norm is the analogic equivalent of measuring solar radiation at one point in time and saying that it is the constant.

Roles: Social roles are similar to social norms in that they are also population level frequency distributions that are subject to change based upon changes in the social structure, organizational structures and/or environmental variables.

Obdurate status of rules and norms: certain types of roles and norms are more persistent than others, and some could be classified as obdurate. In particular, these would be the norms and role expectations (not the roles themselves) that have direct ties to the biological reality of humanity. The examination of this type of roles and norms is what led E.O. Wilson to start thinking about, and formulating, sociobiology in the earl 1970's. For a much better, and more modern and enlightened view, take a look at Jerome H. Barkow, 2001 Universalien und Evolutionäre Psychologie. In Universalien und Konstruktivismus, pp. 126-138. Peter M . Hejl, Hg. Universalien und Konstruktivismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag (English language version here).

On the question of causation, I really think you are wrong. The concept of contagion is used extensively by some of the constructionists as a way to understand social action. Take a look at The Satanism Scare (Best, Richardson and Bromley, 1991: Google books Amazon) for an example of this, especially the chapters in part 3.

It seems what the whole rhetoric of fear crowd is missing is what attribution psychologists call "veridicality" or what Walter Stephan (2000). "Intergroup relations" pp. 333-336 in A. Kazdin (ed.) Encyclopedia of psychology. Washington DC: APA calls "realism" as in realistic threat assessment. This constitutes the role of leaders to realistically characterize the threat and not cater to symbolic overtones. Interactionists firmly believe symbolic communication is more powerful than realistic communication, and that is both their virtue and vice.

Tom, I think you are totally misreading the assumption about symbolic communications: constructionists assume that all communications are "symbolic". If by "realistic" you mean an objectively valid, 1:1 mapping of language and reality, then they would reject this as totally naive and unsupported in philosophy, biology or linguistics, and I would agree with that position. If by "realistic" you mean using words and producing analyses in what Kuhn termed a "normal science" manner, they would certainly agree that it exists, but they would note that it is a limited "map" of "objective reality" - it's why the constructionists spend so much time analyzing the operational definitions in social rhetoric.

In sum, contagion is an energy source for the causes of action. It can be managed, sure, but I think it has to be treated as a structural phenomenon if we are ever to understand its true nature. Thanks for letting me share.

Now who's reifying ! I certainly agree that you can't really understand contagion without analyzing the social and communicative structures. I will point out that there are methodological problems in doing so; specifically if you treat contagion as an "energy source", how do you measure it? Most of the major attempts I'm aware of go back in one way or another to Korzybski's General Semantics and, specifically, his concept of semantic indexicality. But this puts you firmly back into an examination of the bio-physiological roots of thought which, if we want to update the scientific basis of Korzybski, means that we end up examining cognitive schemes.

Now, personally, I'm fine with that - I've been doing it for quite a while now.

You know Tom, I suspect that this entire conversation would do better over beers .

Marc

[Tom OC]

I may have been a little harsh on symbolic interactionism and social constructionism. I have to admit I'm unfamiliar with this latest trend in many fields called constructivism. Indeed, I have probably conflated them. I'm sympathetic to the argument that the more obdurate social phenomena (norms, roles, rites and rituals) are closely tied, symbolically, to the biological realm, but I would argue, as Durkheim did, that certain sociological phenomena can be causes too. Call it "collective conscience" or what-have-you, but as Skorupski (1976) explains in Symbol and Theory, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, the real referent of ritual beliefs is the social order and so-called psychological processes like egotism and altruism are really social contagion processes essential and functional for that social order. Society develops in reaction to these processes when even more obdurate values and morals develop, and these things tend to persist long after the social circles which comprised them no longer exist. Hence, I have to defend my saying that social contagion is a cause, and a very deep, root cause at that. It has nothing to do with semantics, interpretation, or deconstruction. I appreciate that some social constructionists try to analyze statuses and especially master statuses that come around during satanist scares and the like, but it's always impressed me as pretty shallow research designed for the sake of showing the consequences of something like usually the powerful exerting their influence or demonstrating some better sociological imagination or creating typologies like the famous "villains, heroes, and fools" typology of radical criminology (e.g., Quinney). Sociobiology is much more promising. At least there is a brain to conjecture about there. I sometimes wonder if all these safeguards we put in place to avoid reductionism as well as reification are really worthwhile. When I see a central concept like social contagion, I'm reminded of all the missed opportunities for grand theory. Hope I didn't come off as intolerant of all the side roads I know we must take. And yes, I think these kinds of conversations go better with beer, or good scotch.

[marct]

Hi Tom,

And yes, I think these kinds of conversations go better with beer, or good scotch.

Ah, a man after my own heart .

I'm sympathetic to the argument that the more obdurate social phenomena (norms, roles, rites and rituals) are closely tied, symbolically, to the biological realm, but I would argue, as Durkheim did, that certain sociological phenomena can be causes too. Call it "collective conscience" or what-have-you, but as Skorupski (1976) explains in Symbol and Theory, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, the real referent of ritual beliefs is the social order and so-called psychological processes like egotism and altruism are really social contagion processes essential and functional for that social order.

Oh, I wouldn't disagree with you that social phenomena can act in a causal manner - It's one of the reasons I used to teach my Intro to Anthropology students Durkheim's Rules of the Sociological Method. Still and all, I find Durkheim's and Skorpuski's views of religion and ritual to be somewhat less than complete; more of a Newtonian special case than a proper unifying theory. Then again, I've spent a long time studying ritual and symbolism in the Victor Turner line of thought, along with the experimental lines of thought that come out of Charlie Laughlin's work. In pact, my Ph.D. dissertation was a reworking of Victor Turners Rites of Passage model updated in a broadly Malinowskian functionalist model, but going from brain neurology to macrosocial levels (I threaten my sudents every now and again with making them read the theory section )

Society develops in reaction to these processes when even more obdurate values and morals develop, and these things tend to persist long after the social circles which comprised them no longer exist. Hence, I have to defend my saying that social contagion is a cause, and a very deep, root cause at that. It has nothing to do with semantics, interpretation, or deconstruction.

We may be using different models of causality here. I would argue that social contagion is a process, rather than content - a feedback loop that can act as if it is a cause. As a process, I would agree that here is nothing "semantic" about it. However, I would also argue that, also as a property of it being a process, it is divorced from its content which is primarily about semantics. It doesn't matter if we call that content "idions", "memes" or "norms", they are all about how people should perceive and comprehend those perceptions.

Sociobiology is much more promising. At least there is a brain to conjecture about there. I sometimes wonder if all these safeguards we put in place to avoid reductionism as well as reification are really worthwhile. When I see a central concept like social contagion, I'm reminded of all the missed opportunities for grand theory. Hope I didn't come off as intolerant of all the side roads I know we must take.

I think that sociobiology has pretty much been subsumed into evolutionary psychology and cognitive evolutionary cognitive neuropsychology - a move I fully endorse . For me, the truly nice thing about this move is that we actually no longer have to engage in conjecture about brain operations - we can see and map a fair number of them; at least as long as we can get our subjects to hold still in an MRI machine .

Just to give you an example of where I think this can lead, for the past 4 years I have been researching the interlinking of music, teaching and organizational culture in a choir I sing with. While I still can't get MRIs on the singers, I have been watching comprehensions shift within the group and new attitudes/perceptions being formed. It's quite the phenomenon, and I will probably start publishing about it after this year (there are some crucial changes going on). What is most apparent is how these new perceptions are being linked into both skills and phenomenal experiences, and how that is being constructed into a (far from complete) whole.

Marc