Inter-Agency Leadership

[Rob Thornton]

One thing I was struck by during the testimony was the breadth of Ambassador Crocker's testimony. Based on the depth of his answers in terms of articulating the complex situation in Iraq, domestic, regional and inter-national factors and short & long term consequences - my understanding of roles and responsibilities was altered.

My previous understanding was that most country diplomatic missions have a kind of bi-lateral focus, although regional desks and the COCOM's political officer would seem to need a broader scope. With the testimony, I saw a very complimentary partnership between the military and diplomatic corps. While both men were able to articulate each other's position to a great degree, the manner in which they presented the argument provided additional context - it was a kind of soldier/statesman - statesman/soldier blend. The relationship they described with regard to day to day operations & leadership - may be one of the most mature I've ever seen, read about or heard of. Putting these two men together was only pat of the solution - the individual commitment required to rise above organizational culture and solve the problem had to come from within.

I'm not writing this to play cheer leader for anybody. I am using this as a vehicle to explore the question of Inter-Agency leadership and the role it will play in this increasingly complex environment where because of the inter-relationship between reaction & consequences (often on a regional and global scale) there are no easy answers.

Is this a model for leadership we should consider for future command structures where the other elements of national power - MIDLIFE or DIME-FIL may require balance or proportionality? I think our previous models have been correct for the questions of conflict termination, but what about prevention and resolution? What are the consequences of change (good or bad)?

I'd also consider:

What are the tools of diplomacy & what are their limitations or benefits? Are the tools adequate to the environment we face? The question of a new G/N act is fair game I guess, although their are serious impediments to getting there - but what about how a co-operative CMD structure like we see demonstrated might bridge the gap?

Best Regards, Rob

[Ironhorse]

Jeez, Rob. Nice articulate observation / question.

I have been quoted as saying that the relationship between the reserve Commanding Officer and his active Inspector-Instructor (USMC) has got to be the weirdest structural set up in all of the military.

I might still get away with that through a Clintonesque technicality of what "in" means, but I honestly now have to defer to the CG, MNF-I / U.S. Ambasssador structural arrangment for its max potential weirdness. Kudos to them for working it out like champions.

[John T. Fishel]

that these two distinguished leaders have developed the kind of rapport that is required for effective unity of effort. But, how much is due to the fact that their personalities mesh and how much is due to hard work to make the relationship effective? Clearly, unity of command requires work to be effective but it is easier since one knows who is responsible and who works for whom. Where nobody is placed in charge then the mechanisms to achieve unity of effort will always be ad hoc and personality dependent with a high probability that organizational imperatives will cause difficulties at best and block the attainment of unity of effort at worst.

Best

JohnT

[Stan]

Hey Rob !
A great post, but nothing less than I expected from a person of your caliber

This would indeed be a good point for Tom to jump in, but I just so happen to have an opinion on Statesman/Soldier relationships. So, here's an NCO's view from the bottom of the pile

Given the fact that both of these men have has some time together in rather inhospitable situations, and were put together for good reasons (I hope), it's then no surprise they have worked out differences and concluded (based on their respective abilities) same. I would also submit, they've had some time to practice (speeches, et al), or both would not only be out of jobs, but look real dumb doing so.

The desks or COCOMS do in fact drive the train, but once far from the flag pole, State and DOD get to hash out differences on site. It really no longer matters who's (legally) in charge, and Tom will again tell you, it's leadership.

As the Ambassador, time to let some things go and permit your professional soldiers to do their job. Conversely, the Soldier must understand his/her limitations, financially as well as physically. Some things are better handled via diplomatic channels, some not.

We bridge the gap with understanding and trust. Tom and I never got to bridge the gap in Zaire, and our reporting fell on deaf ears. The mission suffered and the end state was never achieved. Decades later, Subject As Above. Only later would Tom receive a leader from State, not afraid of letting his troops perform.

Regards, Stan

One thing I was struck by during the testimony was the breadth of Ambassador Crocker's testimony. Based on the depth of his answers in terms of articulating the complex situation in Iraq, domestic, regional and inter-national factors and short & long term consequences - my understanding of roles and responsibilities was altered.

My previous understanding was that most country diplomatic missions have a kind of bi-lateral focus, although regional desks and the COCOM's political officer would seem to need a broader scope. With the testimony, I saw a very complimentary partnership between the military and diplomatic corps. While both men were able to articulate each other's position to a great degree, the manner in which they presented the argument provided additional context - it was a kind of soldier/statesman - statesman/soldier blend. The relationship they described with regard to day to day operations & leadership - may be one of the most mature I've ever seen, read about or heard of. Putting these two men together was only pat of the solution - the individual commitment required to rise above organizational culture and solve the problem had to come from within.

I'm not writing this to play cheer leader for anybody. I am using this as a vehicle to explore the question of Inter-Agency leadership and the role it will play in this increasingly complex environment where because of the inter-relationship between reaction & consequences (often on a regional and global scale) there are no easy answers.

Is this a model for leadership we should consider for future command structures where the other elements of national power - MIDLIFE or DIME-FIL may require balance or proportionality? I think our previous models have been correct for the questions of conflict termination, but what about prevention and resolution? What are the consequences of change (good or bad)?

I'd also consider:

What are the tools of diplomacy & what are their limitations or benefits? Are the tools adequate to the environment we face? The question of a new G/N act is fair game I guess, although their are serious impediments to getting there - but what about how a co-operative CMD structure like we see demonstrated might bridge the gap?

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

nation need to accept that I cannot play Basketball as well as Michael Jordan and conversely, he probably can't shoot a pistol as well as I can. We all have equal rights before the law but we are not all equal. We make many mistakes in policy and in practice due to the assumption that X can do a particular job because he was this or has that experience.

T'ain't so. Crocker and Petraeus appear to be the right persons for the job right now. I would argue that at least one of their predecessors in those same jobs should never have had them.

Rob's great post and Stan's comment point to a very complex problem for which there is no simple solution and there are many facets of that problem that need to be addressed but when all is said and done, the best system in the world will founder with the wrong person in charge. It is possible to design systems that are so redundant and fail safe that the ability of the boss to severely impact the processes adversely is reduced but that possibility cannot be eliminated.

Such tightly designed and controlled systems -- for which we seem to constantly opt -- may eliminate some failures; but like the ARTEP (Hark, drums...) they will also cut off the peaks. That is not good...

This is, of course, a plea for all shakers and movers to rigorously reject over control and select people for jobs based on their ability and not because it's "their turn." It is also a warning that ignoring both those dictums too frequently lead to failure.

[Tom Odom]

Hey Rob !
A great post, but nothing less than I expected from a person of your caliber

This would indeed be a good point for Tom to jump in, but I just so happen to have an opinion on Statesman/Soldier relationships. So, here's an NCO's view from the bottom of the pile

Given the fact that both of these men have has some time together in rather inhospitable situations, and were put together for good reasons (I hope), it's then no surprise they have worked out differences and concluded (based on their respective abilities) same. I would also submit, they've had some time to practice (speaches, et al), or both would not only be out of jobs, but look real dumb doing so.

The desks or COCOMS do in fact drive the train, but once far from the flag pole, State and DOD get to hash out differences on site. It really no longer matters who's (legally) in charge, and Tom will again tell you, it's leadership.

As the Ambassador, time to let some things go and permit your professional soldiers to do their job. Conversely, the Soldier must understand his/her limitations, financially as well as physically. Some things are better handled via diplomatic channels, some not.

We bridge the gap with understanding and trust. Tom and I never got to bridge the gap in Zaire, and our reporting fell on deaf ears. The mission suffered and the end state was never achieved. Decades later, Subject As Above. Only later would Tom receive a leader from State, not afraid of letting his troops perform.

Regards, Stan

Rob,

I would echo what Stan said and add a few points:

A. It is absolutley critical to recognize that GEN Petraeus has gone well beyond most GOs in understanding the interagency and the foreign policy realms. Countless flag officers have testified on the Hill; not many have embraced the idea that you can be a warrior-scholar-statesman and that as a GO you should be.

B. I would also emphasize that Crocker is equally the "real deal". He has served in the hot spots (and that includes DC). he has done what many at his level do not do--he has been out on the ground repeatedly and when it mattered, he voiced his oppostion to a proposed course of action, that being the decision to invade Iraq in the first place.

c. I would say the tag team seen on TV yesterday could not have happened with a Bremer and a Sanchez; the two were the yin to the collective Petraeus-Crocker Yang.

d. Finallly I will again say what Stan said I would say; this is all about leadership in pursuit of a goal. Stan is right; we had to actively fight our leaders in Zaire because they focused on their own narrow agenda versus the mission at hand.

Best

Tom

[Jimbo]

As impressive as the current Iraq head-shed is, they are the exception and not the rule (regrettably). Systemically, there are some issues in how the DoS views regions. The militayr has a pretty good construct as to what the GCC does and his sphere of engagement. State does not tend to look at problems regionally, at least not intentionally. The State regional bureaus all have desks that deal with specific country issues, but these desks do not tend to work on a "regional plan". In layman's terms the State Department tends to be very stove-piped, and they do not always look at the region as a whole. The State Department tends to view each country and its issues as stand alone problems. The interesting aspect is Crocker as COM Iraq talked the regional issues fairly well (his track-record would indicate he would be able to), and Satterfield as the special coordinator for Iraq hasn't really done so as much. I guess the best way to sume it up is that the State department has a "JCS" type organization with a ton of sub-unified commands (Country-Teams), but the really don't have any level comparable to the GCC level. Sorry to ramble.