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Thread: Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Ungoverned spaces & State, Non-State, State Sponsored opportunities vs. our Interests

    One of the questions that Ambassador Crocker mentioned in his opening statement during his testimony to the Senate was the declared intention of Iran to fill any vacuum provided by the U.S. - but how much of a vacuum could they actually fill?

    We cannot claim to control every square inch of Iraq, Afghanistan, the HOA, the Philippines, Columbia or any place we are currently operating in where we consider instability a threat. The local and national governments of these places cannot claim to either - but they are trying to work (with us) towards the level of control required to do prevent these spaces from growing and impacting other regions of their states, and eventually shrinking these spaces - or as a larger goal - shrinking what Thomas Barnett has described as "The Gap".

    AMB Crocker's comments and today's press conference by the International Institute of Strategic Studies are framing an important question that extends beyond Iraq & Afghanistan. There are plenty of ungoverned spaces within geographically defined state borders all over the world. There are also states and non-state actors willing to exploit these areas, foment instability, and use them as staging areas, sanctuaries, and training grounds from which to pursue broader goals.

    This is certainly should not be viewed as a "US only problem". However, because we have wide ranging interests of which some are vital and some are peripheral but linked to vital interest; because the U.S.is targeted based on our pursuit and defense of those interests; because we often stand as an impediment to the pursuit of national, regional or international objectives of non-state and states which have their own set of fear, honor and interests (as Thucydides described the reasons for which war is waged); and because the U.S. has the means to act; we are perceived as the counter to this problem.

    What then should our policy goals be?

    What are the means by which we should pursue those goals? How should / or should we adapt/transform our elements of National Power to meet these requirements? Does the military need to change - how much? Do we need an increase in our Diplomatic, Informational, Economic capabilities - how much?

    What are the ways by which we should pursue these policies and employ our means to best effect? If a state cannot or will not act to prevent those states, non-state actors, state sponsored actors with goals that jeopardize our interests (and those of our allies) from operating in these ungoverned spaces - should we violate their sovereign borders in order to attack, defeat and destroy those organizations? This is certainly the subject of debate by 2008 Presidential Candidates - and I believe it is a very real decision that a President will have to make given the trans-national nature of groups to plan, recruit and train in one geographic location, but execute varying scales of terrorist attacks as part of their own agenda, or the agenda of their sponsor in areas across the globe.

    What I have not heard a great deal of discussion about from Presidential candidates is a counter balancing plan that is able to build state capacity on the scale required to reduce the chances of having to make that decision. I do think the COCOMs are doing this, and I think DOS is working hard to do this as well, but are we doing this by adapting the means available to accomplish this? Do we have the right means required to meet the scope of the task?

    Do we need to re-evaluate our policy and strategy to ensure we have a match that more gully meets the challenges as we are beginning to understand them? While I think we can make the case that we are evolving based on what works on the ground and by implementing the innovative and sometimes imaginative that occur at the tactical level, could we do better by adjusting our strategic framework so that we are better arranged to take advantage of those ideas, and also place the correct means where they are needed?

    The last week has really raised good & needed questions that extend beyond Iraq, even though the question of our commitment there was the catalyst. Tonight the President will also discuss Iraq, Iran, Al Queda in Iraq - and possibly Hezbollah, Hamas, the region at large and our vital national interests - and many of these same issues will surface in the following days as the rationale for remaining committed is debated, and the question of what it all means get sorted out. We are starting to develop a national consciousness in regard to the threats of the 21st Century.

    Thoughts?

    Best Regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 09-13-2007 at 07:25 PM.

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