Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Rob Thornton]

One of the questions that Ambassador Crocker mentioned in his opening statement during his testimony to the Senate was the declared intention of Iran to fill any vacuum provided by the U.S. - but how much of a vacuum could they actually fill?

We cannot claim to control every square inch of Iraq, Afghanistan, the HOA, the Philippines, Columbia or any place we are currently operating in where we consider instability a threat. The local and national governments of these places cannot claim to either - but they are trying to work (with us) towards the level of control required to do prevent these spaces from growing and impacting other regions of their states, and eventually shrinking these spaces - or as a larger goal - shrinking what Thomas Barnett has described as "The Gap".

AMB Crocker's comments and today's press conference by the International Institute of Strategic Studies are framing an important question that extends beyond Iraq & Afghanistan. There are plenty of ungoverned spaces within geographically defined state borders all over the world. There are also states and non-state actors willing to exploit these areas, foment instability, and use them as staging areas, sanctuaries, and training grounds from which to pursue broader goals.

This is certainly should not be viewed as a "US only problem". However, because we have wide ranging interests of which some are vital and some are peripheral but linked to vital interest; because the U.S.is targeted based on our pursuit and defense of those interests; because we often stand as an impediment to the pursuit of national, regional or international objectives of non-state and states which have their own set of fear, honor and interests (as Thucydides described the reasons for which war is waged); and because the U.S. has the means to act; we are perceived as the counter to this problem.

What then should our policy goals be?

What are the means by which we should pursue those goals? How should / or should we adapt/transform our elements of National Power to meet these requirements? Does the military need to change - how much? Do we need an increase in our Diplomatic, Informational, Economic capabilities - how much?

What are the ways by which we should pursue these policies and employ our means to best effect? If a state cannot or will not act to prevent those states, non-state actors, state sponsored actors with goals that jeopardize our interests (and those of our allies) from operating in these ungoverned spaces - should we violate their sovereign borders in order to attack, defeat and destroy those organizations? This is certainly the subject of debate by 2008 Presidential Candidates - and I believe it is a very real decision that a President will have to make given the trans-national nature of groups to plan, recruit and train in one geographic location, but execute varying scales of terrorist attacks as part of their own agenda, or the agenda of their sponsor in areas across the globe.

What I have not heard a great deal of discussion about from Presidential candidates is a counter balancing plan that is able to build state capacity on the scale required to reduce the chances of having to make that decision. I do think the COCOMs are doing this, and I think DOS is working hard to do this as well, but are we doing this by adapting the means available to accomplish this? Do we have the right means required to meet the scope of the task?

Do we need to re-evaluate our policy and strategy to ensure we have a match that more gully meets the challenges as we are beginning to understand them? While I think we can make the case that we are evolving based on what works on the ground and by implementing the innovative and sometimes imaginative that occur at the tactical level, could we do better by adjusting our strategic framework so that we are better arranged to take advantage of those ideas, and also place the correct means where they are needed?

The last week has really raised good & needed questions that extend beyond Iraq, even though the question of our commitment there was the catalyst. Tonight the President will also discuss Iraq, Iran, Al Queda in Iraq - and possibly Hezbollah, Hamas, the region at large and our vital national interests - and many of these same issues will surface in the following days as the rationale for remaining committed is debated, and the question of what it all means get sorted out. We are starting to develop a national consciousness in regard to the threats of the 21st Century.

Thoughts?

Best Regards, Rob

[Jedburgh]

....AMB Crocker's comments and today's press conference by the International Institute of Strategic Studies are framing an important question that extends beyond Iraq & Afghanistan. There are plenty of ungoverned spaces within geographically defined state borders all over the world. There are also states and non-state actors willing to exploit these areas, foment instability, and use them as staging areas, sanctuaries, and training grounds from which to pursue broader goals....

Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

I originally posted this in the Adversary/Threat sub-forum when it was first published, but I've cut it out and put here because I feel you've put a better start on the topic of discussion:

RAND, 23 Aug 07: Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks

Since the end of the Cold War, failed or failing states and ungoverned territories within otherwise viable states have become a more common international phenomenon. Many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces were produced by the collapse or absence of state authority. These ungoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy, and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on U.S. military resources. The problem of dealing with ungoverned areas has taken on increased urgency since 9/11, which demonstrated how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies.

The objective of this RAND Corporation study is to understand the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and their effects on U.S. security interests and to develop strategies to improve the U.S. ability to mitigate these effects—in particular, to reduce the threat posed by terrorists operating within or from these territories. The study is based on an analysis of eight case studies.

Our research approach is as follows: We first identify and analyze the attributes of ungoverned territories, which we refer to as “ungovernability,” on the basis of four variables. Second, since not all ungoverned territories are equally hospitable to terrorist and insurgent groups, we identify and analyze what we call “conduciveness to terrorist presence” on the basis of four other variables. Using this two-part framework, we next conduct a comparative analysis of the eight case studies. Finally, we derive the implications of our analysis for the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Air Force.

To answer the question, the case studies in the book cover the following areas:

The Pakistani-Afghan Border Region

The Arabian Peninsula

The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc

The East Africa Corridor

West Africa

The North Caucasus

The Colombia-Venezuela Border

The Guatemala-Chiapas Border

[Rex Brynen]

Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

To add another case study to the link Ted posted--not from the perspective of the counter-insurgent, however, but rather focusing on what strategies insurgent groups may adopt to obtain and maintain sanctuary in third countries:

Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The book is out of print now, and the link is to a web version of the text.

[LawVol]

What are the ways by which we should pursue these policies and employ our means to best effect? If a state cannot or will not act to prevent those states, non-state actors, state sponsored actors with goals that jeopardize our interests (and those of our allies) from operating in these ungoverned spaces - should we violate their sovereign borders in order to attack, defeat and destroy those organizations?

I recall reading somewhere about how the rise of these combative non-state entities (e.g. terror organizations like Al Qaeda) are challenging the states' monopoly on war and thereby challenging the state as an entity itself. If the goal of these fundamentalist terror organizations is to establish a Caliphate wherein Islam rather than some notion of the nation-state rules, don't we need to tailor our response to account for this?

You raise an interesting point regarding sovereignty and the pursuit of our enemies. Many ungoverned spaces are located within bonafide nation-states. The fact that a portion of their land is ungoverned does not change the fact that it still belongs to them and they have certain rights to that area under international law. If we were to ignore this and invade, no matter how noble the cause, do we not assist in the break down of the nation-state at least on some small level?

The Darfur situation comes to mind. It is striking to me that some of those that oppose action in Iraq argue for action in Darfur. I'm not saying we should or should not go into Darfur, but we must remember that Darfur falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Sudan. While jumping in there may be a good idea, where do you draw the line at violating state sovereignty? Another issue that comes to mind is the hunt for UBL. Say we find him in Pakistan or any other country. Do we go get him even if the host nation says no? Maybe so, but that action has consequences and possibly breaks down the notion of the state. That being said, I do know that Israel did this in the Eichmann case, but I'm not familiar with the fallout, if any.

Thoughts?

[slapout9]

I read the study that Jed posted on another thread and the case studies are interesting but the framework they use to identify and judge failing states is just as important. It is one of the most common sense methodologies I have seen. The report is worth the read.




LawVol You bring up a good legal point and I have a legal question for you. Is There in legal basis to apply the principle of when to use force that can override jurisdictional boundaries. I was thinking ability,opportunity, and jeopardy are the guidelines for use of force in many states both for LE and civilians??

[LawVol]

There's an old adage that says if you ask two lawyers a question, you'll get three answers. What this means is that much of the law has gray areas that are open to argument. For example, the Bush adminstration argued that preemptive action in Iraq was legal because Iraq posed an imminent threat. Obviously, many have disagreed with this conclusion and continue to argue the illegality of the war. Those that adhere to that line of thinking would likely answer you question by saying that only an attack from a beligerent country would authorize a violation of that country's sovereignty (the theory being that they waived that sovereignty in the context of conflict by attacking another country).

I know of no legal basis for unilaterally entering a country in a military capacity to do things like administer humanitarian aid or to capture a terror suspect. I would think that even the Bush doctrine of preemptive action wouldn't cover this since the country itself would pose the threat. In other words, it is the terrorist that poses the threat not the country in which he is located. The humanitrian issue does not met this either unless someone can advance an argument that the humanitarian crisis poses a threat to a particular nation's sovereignty (i.e. its the equivalent of an attack).

With the terrorist example, I revert back to my comment I've shared before about treating the war on terror as a criminal rather than military fight. I think it would be easier to come to terms with various nations to allow an international unit (or international sponsored unit) to effectuate an arrest. However, I see many difficulties even with this.

Whatever the solution, I think we need to place it within a legal framework so that we do not weaken state sovereignty.

[Rex Brynen]

he Darfur situation comes to mind. It is striking to me that some of those that oppose action in Iraq argue for action in Darfur. I'm not saying we should or should not go into Darfur, but we must remember that Darfur falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Sudan. While jumping in there may be a good idea, where do you draw the line at violating state sovereignty?

Those supporting intervention in Darfur generally do on R2P (responsibility to protect) grounds. The emergence and evolution of R2P since Rwanda and Kosovo is an interesting case of change in international norms, even if the concept is still vague and elastic enough (and constrained enough by national interests) to be a poor predictor of actual international behaviour.

The classic statement of this, of course, is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (December 2001) on Responsibility to Protect.

R2P, however, is all about protecting third-country populations from massive human rights abuse, on the grounds that state sovereignty is contingent on states providing a certain degree of protection to their own citizens. If they are unable or unwilling to perform that fundamental obligation of statehood, sovereignty fades as a consideration.

This is a rather different thing from intervention in failed or failing states for counterinsurgent or counter-terrorism reasons. Of course, responding to attacks emanating in third country sanctuaries is hardly anything new, and one can easily root it in centuries of international law and practice of jus ad bellum. No one in the international system, for example, had particular problems with intervention in Afghanistan against AQ and their Taliban allies after 9/11.

The larger complication lies, I think, when such actions:

1) Are preemptive, or

2) Are perceived as unnecessarily unilateral (for example, striking at UBL in Pakistan rather than asking the Pakistanis to do so).

3) Risk establishing precedents that others use or misuse ("well, if the Americans can do it, why not us?")

Finally, at the level of practice rather than doctrine, there is the fundamental "big picture" question of whether such actions cause more problems than they resolve, complicated by the law of unintended consequences. Israeli intervention in Lebanon against the PLO in 1982 resulted in the subsequent emergence of Hizbullah; an American strike against UBL could well destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistani government; and so forth.

[Jedburgh]

14 Feb 08 testimony by Angel Rabasa, one of the authors of the Rand pub linked above, before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:

Ungoverned Territories

....Building government capacity and expanding the central government’s writ into ungoverned territories is the work of generations. Many of these policies are difficult to implement. Nevertheless, if the United States works with its partners to implement them, then—despite individual failings and inefficiencies—the overall results would help to make ungoverned areas less hospitable to terrorists and much less conducive to their activities. Taken in tandem with policies to reduce the number and size of ungoverned territories, the results could mean enhanced constraints on terrorism, international organized crime, and other plagues that traditionally have been spawned and nurtured in ungoverned territories.

[Ski]

I gave a brief two summers ago to some interested military personnel (I have to be vague here) about this situation.

The brief was built around Foreign Affairs "Failed State Index" - available here: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/c...?story_id=3865

I simply said - look at the nations on the list and then tell me how many countries the US has been involved in over the last decade, and how many are we in today. That trend is not going to disappear anytime soon. They understood where I was coming from.

[Mike Innes]

To add another case study to the link Ted posted--not from the perspective of the counter-insurgent, however, but rather focusing on what strategies insurgent groups may adopt to obtain and maintain sanctuary in third countries:

Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The book is out of print now, and the link is to a web version of the text.

I'd second that - Rex's book is the only one that I'm aware of that intelligently applies guerrilla warfare theories on sanctuary as an interface between state and non-state actors.

Take a look also at this Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report on Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe, 1993-2000. It takes the theoretical framework from Sanctuary and Survival and applies it to good use elsewhere.

I'd also suggest a look at my own edited book on the subject, out as of last summer, entitled Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). It doesn't offer an overarching analytical framework in the way that Sanctuary and Survival does, and that wasn't its intent. The idea, instead, was to poke holes and raise questions with regard to the political orthodoxies of the last seven years on the subject of "ungoverned territories".

Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

I originally posted this in the Adversary/Threat sub-forum when it was first published, but I've cut it out and put here because I feel you've put a better start on the topic of discussion:

RAND, 23 Aug 07: Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks

One thing I can appreciate about the RAND report is that it limits itself to ungoverned "territories", rather than using ungoverned "space", the more usual political handle which actually revolves around a much broader category of issues analogous to the complex physical, human, and information terrain of the Australian Army's Future Land Operational Concept: Complex Warfighting.

Where I think things get a bit more complicated, and bear a whole a lot more study, is with the problem of scale. It's good to be thinking in terms of sanctuary as a macro-level security issue and challenge of political legitimacy, development and governance. But there are more immediate and local dimensions of sanctuary, just as there are non-physical aspects to the issue. The best work I've seen on this so far is by Ron Hassner, a political scientist at Berkeley, who's been writing about insurgent uses of sacred sites, as well as comparative just war theory approaches to sanctuary. Citations as follows:

Hassner Ron E. "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.” Security Studies 12:4 (Summer 2003): 1-33.

_____________. “Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground.” Washington Quarterly 2:29 (Spring 2006): 149-166.

_____________. "Islamic Just War Theory and the Challenge of Sacred Space in Iraq." Journal of International Affairs 61:1 (Fall/Winter 2007): 131-152.

Problems of surrogacy and state sponsorship are certainly vexing. In international law, a "harboring thesis" places the burden of responsibility on states to ensure that their territories aren't made available to int'l/transn'tl criminal and terrorist organizations. Both Tal Becker and Dan Byman cover this pretty well in their respective books on states and state sponsorship. Where I think the logic fails is while it rightly emphasizes preventing state provision of sanctuary, it also neglects non-state actor acquisition and exploitation of sanctuary, absent state-level intent to support. Both Byman and Becker do this by looking to passive forms of support as a lowest common denominator, which to my mind stretches the credulity of the argument.

This ties back to another SWC thread on Hizbullah tactical effectiveness; basically, non-state actors evolve, demonstrate agency, etc., and this needs to be given at least as much consideration as the capabilities of states and their responsibilities under int'l law - especially since the logic of state failure/collapse, taken to its extreme, means that some states will be (and have proven to be) incapable of either actively providing sanctuary or preventing terrorist exploitation of their resources. At that point, non-state actor acquisition and development of sanctuary has to be the focus.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States

The difficulties experienced during U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the increasing recognition of the threat posed by ungoverned spaces have once again placed fragile states at the forefront of the U.S. national security agenda. Yet, the United States remains ill-equipped to meet the challenges of stabilization and reconstruction. There is a lack of coordination and strategic engagement within the U.S. government and no clear legislative authority for an overall strategic plan.

This study—the first to examine the role of Congress in strengthening fragile states before, during, and after interventions—identifies key legislative and executive branch obstacles to effective stabilization and reconstruction operations and explores opportunities for a new grand bargain that embodies goals both branches support.....

Complete 93 page paper at the link.

[Mike Innes]

CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States

Complete 93 page paper at the link.

Thanks for posting, I look forward to reading the full report.

There was an interesting report in the Int' Herald Tribune a few days ago that touched on this. I wrote it up in the Complex Terrain Lab blog HERE.

[Mike Innes]

Dear SWC Members - I'd like to draw your attention to a new post at the Complex Terrain Lab on state failure, by Stephen D.K. Ellis, the author of The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (NYU Press, 1999; Hurst & Co Publishers, 2006). It's his first post to CTLab.

Stephen's CTLab bio is here

The post on state failure is here

Best

Mike