What are the US Strategic Goals in Iraq?

[Rex Brynen]

One of the questions that Ambassador Crocker mentioned in his opening statement during his testimony to the Senate was the declared intention of Iran to fill any vacuum provided by the U.S. - but how much of a vacuum could they actually fill?

I don't want to overstate this, but in some ways I don't think the danger is of Iran extending influence in areas where the Iraqi central government has no writ--it is (in part) the opposite: Iranian influence is becoming strongest in those areas supposedly most under the control of the central government (or, more accurately, its primary Shi'ite parties). The south is a case in point. This is very different from the danger of Sunni jihadists (whether AQI or others) flourishing in the "wild west" (at least, prior to the "Anbar Awakening") of a weak Iraq, or the general problem of insurgent sanctuaries in failed states.

As a side note (arising from Rob's original posting on ungoverned spaces, in another thread) I sometimes think we draw a slightly erroneous lesson from Afghanistan: AQ flourished there not during the period of most intense state failure (the civil war), but rather when the Taliban had reasserted control over most of central and southern Afghanistan, really did have governmental power in these areas--and as a matter of deliberate policy provided shelter for its AQ allies.

All of which--coupled with President Bush's speech tonight--raises a question that I've been grappling with these last few days: What are US strategic priorities in Iraq? How might they be ranked-ordered, particularly if only some can be achieved? To some extent, much of the recent discission of COGs and other COIN issues on SWJ is entirely contingent on this question.

I'll throw a few of the obvious ones out:

1. Preventing Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for AQI or other Sunni jihadist groups that would threaten the US or its allies.
   
2. Preventing Iran from extending its political influence in Iraq.
   
3. Creating a "free" Iraq. This figured much in the President's speech, and its easy in 2007 (when the "Forward Strategy of Freedom" seems largely defunct) to dismiss it as rhetoric. However, I don't think it is in the President's mind, and I do think there is a degree of normative obligation.
   
4. Creating a stable Iraq. Not necessarily the same as #3, of course.
   
5. Maintaining a long-term US military presence for power-project or other similar broader strategic reasons.
   
6. Not being seen to lose, so as not to erode US deterrent capabilities and political credibility, and so as not to encourage current or future challengers.

Some of these go together. Others don't: the current tactical alliances with Sunni tribes and others, for example, could potentially push Iraqi Shi'ite leaders closer to Iran. A "free" Iraq might be less stable than an authoritarian one, and might be less able to prevent the emergence of jihadist groups. Attaining #5 might appear to help #2, but also guarantees the Iranians redouble their efforts to offset the US position. #6 is probably quite important, but may be hard to design a COIN strategy around.

To return to your original point, how would the US choose between the prospects of a failed Iraq state, or a "less failed" Iraq under greater Iranian influence?

I would be interested in how others perceive "what the war is for..."