I think you really need concrete rationale for visible, large scale organizational change. As it considered how to use the increase, it probably scrutinizing what the nation is asking it to do, and has assigned it to do, and made some hard choices about organizations and force structures.
Maintaining an OPTEMPO of sustaining sufficient BCTs in OIF and OEF while allowing flexibility for other contingencies and resting and refitting those BCTs out of the rotation is a tall order. Add in attempting to keep the Reserve Component BCTs free to perform their Civil Support roles in their home states is also very challenging
There are no easy choices. I believe Army leadership strongly considered (and is still considering) all the options in meeting the needs of its commitments.
What can drive the major changes in the Armed Forces:
What are our foreign policy goals - and how do we provide means and describe the ways in which we will best achieve them?
The congressional involvement in the various HASC, SASC, Foreign/International Affairs committees that consider the roles/missions, authorities, etc.
The service involvment and obligation to provide our best military advice to civilians in helping make the above decisions - this last one is a bit subjective, because we may be culturally predisposed within our comfort zone - so while it takes the civilian side to provide the binding action - the uniformed side is expected to articulate why and to live with the consequences.
This is not to say that the civilian side does not have alternatives. If they feel that they are not getting the best advice, they can call pretty much anybody they want to testify. This also is not without consequence.
I think at this time the creation of a permanent advisory corps is part of a much larger question that involves all the instruments of national power - the Inter-Agency question and the threats/challenges of the post 9/11 world. Remember the sense of urgency where Congress asked GEN P/AMB C about the linkage between AQ and Iraq - they were not just sharpshooting the Executive - they were examining the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. Since their constituents are more concerned with domestic policies they must always consider that as the primary and the influence of foreign policy as the secondary - all politics are first local. However, 9/11 was a watershed event - it was a very terrible but visible event that stated that foreign policy "matters" (as in its damned important to domestic politics), national security matters, and that in this increasingly globalized world, the ties between domestic and foreign policy get stronger everyday. Congress must play an important role in the "debate" that shapes the policies/ends, has the legal responsibility for allocations/means & must remain informed and understand the implications of the strategies/ways - IMHO, to ignore it would be great domestic political risk.
My sense is we are just starting to sort things out. Leaders (inside and outside the military) are starting to ask the right, hard questions. I apologize for making the detour, but this is not just a simple Army decision, and we have to understand that. There are "Must Dos", "Have/Need to Dos", and there are "Would like to Dos". Its nice when they all three (or even two of them) coincide, but its not usually the case when you are talking about doing something as big as meeting the NSS. If the civilian side really wants something done, they make it a "Must Do" - but unless they provide the additional means to make it happen, they risk compromising a "Have/Need to Do".
So we'll see what happens.
Best regards, Rob
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