Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Mechanized units can (and do) play a valuable role as reaction forces, but one of the major lessons not learned from Vietnam was that most of them needed more dismounted elements. The units in-country learned this, but the lesson faded quickly after the war was over. The paper does make passing reference to the 3rd ACR, but not in the depth the subject may have required.