Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.
Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.