Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
As far as your comment of not wanting to have the army repeat “its past mistakes from Vietnam” I couldn’t agree with you more which is why I have been thinking and writing about this topic. But brace yourself here: it is not me who is repeating these past mistakes but you. The mistakes from Vietnam as you imply were that the American Army became so consumed with conventional warfighting that they ditched and refused to consider problems of unorthodox war. Well, inversely, as I see it that is what we are doing now with Coin and to our detriment. I know this idea does not go over well with many because so called Coin experts and practitioners after being pushed to the sidelines during the Cold War now are enjoying their place in the sun and anything that challenges and questions their dominance is attacked.

Onward social science warriors….
I still fail to see where you can find a precedent for COIN replacing the sort of warfare that the Army has always preferred to prepare for. Training was reoriented during Vietnam, as was a certain level of doctrine (the level depended on the branch in question), but all that was quickly phased out as soon as the conflict ended. If memory serves the real peak for such training came in 1968-69, and most lessons had faded by 1975 or so. I have seen little to convince me that the same thing will not happen again. After all, we were "surprised" by Somalis using RPGs against helicopters...

If the political objectives of the United States call for the Army to be involved in COIN frequently (which is very possible given the number of failed states and the looming creation of AFRICOM), then at least some percentage of war preparation should be directed to that end...and not just a token 10% or so. That's just responsible planning.