Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers. A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.
Cavguy,

Maybe because it's easier to read riding around versus humping a ruck

Seriously though, I think this is a great example of where the mechanization variable doesn't serve as a solid proxy for doctrinal approach/mindset. While having big toys, the goal on average for the cav is not to use them if possible, which is certainly a different mindset than an armored division designed and trained to take it to the enemy directly.

However, I'd suggest that this might not be the full story. Of the five names I recognize from your list, I see two masters degrees and two PhDs, all of them in the social sciences/humanities realm. The exception is COL McFarland, who did RIP/TOA directly from 3 ACR and thus, transitioned with a unit already successfully performing COIN. I'm not trying to detract from their successes, but I think you can attribute some of it to the learning curve that has occured across the Army as we've adapted to the war we need to fight. I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.

Shek