Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
From "Preparing Field Grade Leaders for Today and Tomorrow" by BG Volney J. Warner and LTC (Ret) James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., Military Review, January-February 2006:
Since the 1890s (as indicated by Dr. Gabel's article), CGSC changed its focus from "what to think to how to think." It doesn't hurt to remind CGSC of the focus, but the concept is certainly not new to CGSC...A New Philosophy
To deal with the complexities and challenges of post-Cold War full-spectrum operations, CGSC has changed its educational philosophy. The institution has adjusted its approach from training students what to think to focus more on teaching students how to think. This approach emphasizes critical reasoning; creative thinking; complex problem solving; service and joint, interagency, and multinational competence; transformation; cultural awareness; and regional expertise.
The article posted sounds very much like Maj Don Vandergriff's book,
Raising the Bar. It is well worth taking a look at.
Last edited by SWJED; 09-23-2007 at 09:55 PM. Reason: Edited Amazon Link for SWJ / SWC credit if purchased
Mark
Discuss at: The Irregulars Visit at: UW Review
"The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton
A thought: when General Caldwell mentions giving serving officers experience working on Capitol Hill, isn't there a real danger of them learning Washington's lessons too well? By which I mean the budget game, the way in which the different services get their share of the pie, most often through big-ticket procurements that can farm out pork to Congressional Districts. I would think that getting officers more involved on the Hill may give them valuable experience "outside the box," but at the risk of dragging them further into the corrupt game that sees us spending hundreds of billions on weapons that won't help us in the wars we're fighting now, and most likely won't help us much down the road either.
Hey GS,
I got to meet a couple of officers working the Hill recently (we were doing an Inter-Agency Staff ride as part of the BSAP (FA 59) curricula) . While one of them did spend some of his time discussing Army budget with Hill staffers and members, they seemed to spend the bulk of their time working to get Congressional answers on the war from the Army staff, or about soldiers from their districts/states. I'd also mention that during and between, they spent time educating both Congress and staffers on the Army - its culture, history, etc.
Overall, I think the amount of officers that cold actually work on the Hill at any given time is probably pretty small, but the opportunity to bring knowledge in and also take knowledge of Congress out is healthy - it helps leaders understand civil military relations and to be able to articulate that back into the mainstream Army is probably worth the investment. However, you bring up a very valid concern, these days to get the most out of our people we should ask why we want to do something - and what are the good and bad consequences of doing so.
Best Regards, Rob
The Air Force had a program (I don't know if it still exists) where they picked really elite captains, assigned them to Washington for two years, but moved them to a different job somewhere in the NCR every few months. When they later came back as colonels, they kind of knew how the place worked.
I've heard lots of Army generals brag that they never served in the Pentagon until they were a flag. The Air Force would never do that. That is one of the reasons that, for decades, the Air Force has whupped the Army in political/budget battles.
I'm afraid that I have become completely cynical when it comes to this axiom of "How to think, not what to think."
I've heard since I was a cadet in the early 90's, and still rarely encounter officers of a higher rank who actually allow this to occur.
The OER is a sliver of the problem, the bigger problem is the Army culture. Until the culture is fixed so trust becomes a two way street between commander and subordinate, I fear the phrase of "How to think, not what to think" is just empty speech.
Is the entire MDMP process telling us how to think, or what to think? I'd be interested in hearing some responses on this.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
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