And we do just that here at the JRTC and what is in this article has been part of the process. The point being that Private Snuffy and John Squad Leader are the key elements in the cross-cultural aspects of both OIF and OEF.Originally Posted by Stan
Hey WM !
With all due respect, you're addressing an individual that knows first hand what a soldier goes through, each and every day of the year.
Now that I've removed my boot from my mouth, I agree with you
Private snuffy should not immediately be assigned to any mission before being properly trained and prepared for instances of cultural diversity, when said could negatively impact the success of the mission.
When I say making Snuffy Lawrence of Arabia is unrealistic, I am talking about Snuffy and the small unit leaders around him. I have in the past 6 years listened to any number of briefings, lectures, or discussions that center on the need to train "cultural understanding" like it is simply something to add to a lesson plan. You cannot train situational understanding; you can train how to develop situational awareness. Sustained SA leads to SU. The same thing applies to cultural understanding and cultural awareness; the first is the desired end state and it requires sustained investment in the latter. Where this goes astray is when a brief or a report says "more cultural understanding" and heads nod north and south, murmurs of "quite right" echo, and someone starts talking phraselators or similar crap. Again I have heard this before and it briefs well but falls on its face when attempted.
All of that said, we have to do something because the individual soldier is critical in this effort and it is not something that can be left to the staff. Staffs do not patrol; Soldiers and small units patrol. We have to give them a framework for understanding that goes beyond "don't use your left hand". At the sametime, we are loading ever greater mission sets on the individual soldiers and the small units. Training for those increased mission sets eats up time and priorities imevitably come into play.
Nonetheless we continue to work the issue; we have to because it is critical. I will say this one more time for emphasis; there is no comparison between 2 US units--say Marine and Army--working together and a US unit working intimately with an Iraqi or an Afghan unit. If you have not tried it, your inexperience limits your understanding of just how difficult it can be. Even FAOs get it wrong--Stan and I had one get it seriously wrong with the French in Goma in 1994.
Tom
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