The headline should be re-titled “senate recognises what already happened”Originally Posted by Fabius Maximus
Yes, it is no longer an insurgency.
No, it is still an insurgency.
Jp 1-02
I too dislike many of the JP 1-02 definitions. But I use them, as I think it's important that we play with a common set of definitions -- otherwise it's Tower of Babel, revisited. These discussions are complex enough, rife with misunderstandings, without adding a new layer of confusion.
That's not to say debates on definitions are not important; just that unless stated otherwise I advocate sticking with the "book" meanings.
The headline should be re-titled “senate recognises what already happened”
Sorry to interject
Third, I've always found the assertion that insurgents often or normally win to be patently wrong because there are hundreds, probably thousands of insurgencies that were defeated at an early stage which simply aren't well known because they were defeated.
I tend to agree with this. Many proto-insurgencies get nipped in the bud before they can blossom. Because of this they tend to get mentioned in the histories only in passing.
Malaya,Palestine,Northern Ireland,Kenya,Oman,Iraq,Afghanistan,El Salvador
Additional Trivia: I might also add the Soviet agricultural collectivization campaign in the late 20's - early 30's. The soviets tried very hard to hide the level of violent resistance from the outside world (and soviet urban citizens) so many people don't know how extensive it was and its hard to get exact figures on the real death counts but it now appears to have met more violent resistance than was previously imagined. IIRC, I remember reading that the <i>internal</i> Soviet count of their own dead - NOT peasants, but just the soldiers, state security, and police killed by peasants - exceeded 10,000 during the course of the flare up ... and the Soviets almost always under-counted even in their own documents.
Last edited by tolsen; 09-27-2007 at 08:12 PM. Reason: readability
Bud nipping is the way to go. I believe that anytime the U.S. becomes involved in counterinsurgency, our policymakers have failed to do what they should have done.
Yeah, like educating the general public what COIN is.
I think the Iraq situation is a classic example of this enduring conundrum with counterinsurgency: for a government (or ruling authority) to admit that it faces a serious insurgency, it has to admit that it made major policy errors. The natural tendency is to postpone such an admission as long as possible. But this gives the insurgents time to coalesce. I believe the situation in Iraq had reached a psychological "set" by late 2003 or early 2004. If we had admitted our errors and undertake the "surge" in the late summer of 2003, it might have made a difference.
I don't know,Steve. As one who is on the "front lines" of hearing civilian dissent everyday, that happened when people like Joe Wilson and Cindy Sheehan came into the picture. The nail in the coffin was Cheney saying "the insurgency is in their last throes" That was the beginning of the end of any chance this administration had for garnering major public support. Very sad.
Last edited by skiguy; 09-27-2007 at 11:05 PM.
Or if someone had asked, "Why are we bringing freedom to people who hate our freedom?"
I agree and it fills me with a mix of sadness and anger. How many people could still be alive if things had been done differently?
*Disclaimer: please tell me if I get to 'political' with this*
I'm not sure, however, that you can pin it all on the Administrations desire to avoid admitting mistakes. I understand the Administrations actions - CYA behavior is found in every organization. I still don't understand the comparable actions by the grassroots. Frankly, it looked to me like a lot of regular Americans didn't want to hear anything negative either. I was a war-supporter and participated in some blogs/forums/etc. inhabited primarily by other supporters and I can swear that even the grassroots reaction to anyone suggesting that we weren't "winning" was .... unpleasant. Almost no one wanted to hear it.
Sorry if this is too political - I'm new and I don't want to start an argument over spilled milk. However, I am interested in understanding it.
Why did people with nothing to lose personally react with such hostility, for so long, to allegations that we faced problems, even when those allegations were made in the name of fixing the problems and not just running away?
Which could be another way of saying that insurgents can only be defeated if they don't enjoy wide spread public support. Which means that the concept of stopping an insurgency to create "breathing space" for a reasonable political solution is putting the cart before the horse.
Switching topics, one of the cool things about this forum for me is that many of the things I've been thinking about are already being discussed. To me, there isn't an antigovernment insurgency in Iraq. There are many different groups divided by religion, class, politics, tribal ties etc. Almost all have some representation in the government and they almost all have militias.
Our objective is to get them to settle their differences politically instead of militarily, which I think is highly unlikely - no matter which tactics are used - because I've witnessed how difficult it is to stop politicians who believe they have the ability to "shock and awe" their opponents. Arming the heck out of the weak side might work, but MAD only seems to work with nuclear weapons, is contrary to do what I learned about the pre WW1 arms race in grade 11 history and if we really believed in MAD we wouldn't have a problem with Iran getting nuclear weapons.
Human nature and group dynamics. Things that happen in any board room - look at how the music industry responded to MP3 - multiplied by 10 because the issue became political.
I was guilty of that myself. I wish I could answer why. I know one thing, I'm still participating on the same boards, but I'm losing friends. There isn't much they can say when you mention over 4 million people are now refugees. You can't block your ears to that and pretend it's not happening.
There's also a lot of hatred towards Arabs out there,and it's mostly from the Right. When I call them on it, I'm accused of being a terrorist sympathizer or falling for terrorist propaganda. If I'm feeling "uncivil" I just retaliate by calling them a racist.
Since I've been here and had my mind pried open, I'm noticing it a lot more and I'm also noticing how many just don't get it, including war supporters. They get excited when they hear about bombings and dead taliban, and don't take me wrong, a dead terrorist is a good terrorist, but too bad they didn't get as excited hearing about the meetings between Sunni and Shia tribal leaders.
tolsen, only speaking for myself, but you weren't too political. You're realistic.
If we could steer this back into the realm of your original comment about COIN manuals and losers for a moment, your statement about the past is still WRONG.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Really?...And so you can say authoritatively that the book they wrote was wrong?
No, you are making a prediction about the future. I said that the institution which produced it had not won a counter-insurgency (within the parameters I gave). That's a statement about the past.
You blew in here again and made a sensational statement, then returned to wordsmithing, so please humor me for a moment as I do not know what you are trying to say.
Are you negating the socio-economic, internal political, and information operations (at a national policy level) effects that factor heavily into lost COIN efforts? That seems to be the thrust of what you are saying when you literally discount COIN manuals as somehow unecessary because the "institutions that wrote them" did not win.
Just what institutions are you talking about?
Why the need to make a sensational statement if all you really meant to say that Iraq is getting worse, or that we need to take actions which represent a drastic departure from the current course?
There seems to be a fixation with the tools used to prosecute COIN and say they are useless, yet you are not recognizing the vast number of other influencing factors that impact on this complex environment. National public will comes to mind above all else, so what does the manual have to do with this?
You also never countered Steve's post regarding your errors in post #169. Kudos that his post #171 fits your views, but do you have any comment on #169? Inquiring minds want to know, and I couldn't stop myself from asking.
I'd like to answer, but ...
...I cannot relate your reply to what I said.
I'll take a shot at this anyway. I am not negating anything, just making a statement of historical fact (not gospel, history being a slippery thing). Whatever the social-political-info factors, the folks who write these manuals write from an institutional background of losing at 4GW. Nor did I say that COIN manuals are unnecessary. I have written dozens of articles saying just the opposite. But we do need a realistic perspective in order to see our peril. Harsh truths of 4GW.Are you negating the socio-economic, internal political, and information operations (at a national policy level) effects that factor heavily into lost COIN efforts? That seems to be the thrust of what you are saying when you literally discount COIN manuals as somehow unecessary because the "institutions that wrote them" did not win.
As for the discussion of winners at the game of foreign occupiers vs. local insurgents, I was summarizing two articles I wrote about this, based on several chapters in van Creveld’s book. Things get dropped in this process of abstraction. Here’s a summary of an upcoming article of mine. I apologize for the length.
Consider only wars since WWII. Many things changed at that time, including Mao’s development of 4GW into a mature form.
For analytical purposes, we can say that since WWII 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside states (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW’s).
1. Violence between a government and insurgents (both sides can comprise any number of factions; there can be more than 2 sides). Governments often beat insurgents, even insurgents with foreign assistance (although this improves their odds). The local government leads in such areas as making political reforms, setting tactics – and casualties, although it may have important or even decisive foreign aid.
2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners. We’ll call these wars of national liberation, locals vs. foreign occupiers (however well-intended, if foreigners lead they’re likely seen as occupiers by the insurgents). Insurgents almost always win these, with three special cases which should not obscure this key point.
First, many 4GW’s are still in progress, such as in Israel (Jewish immigrants taking and holding land, with quasi-cooperation of the colonial ruler) and Palestine (Israel still holds a few pieces). Iraq and Afghanistan.
Second, as always there are borderline cases. Like Northern Ireland -- how foreign are the English? Third, what is the minimum threshold? At what point does it become an insurgency? Do you consider as insurgents the violent leftist groups in Europe and America that operated 1970-2000?
The question frequently occurs of who is the “winner”: the locals or the western power giving assistance (e.g., the Malaysian Emergency). As an example, to help us to see both sides of the question, consider the American Revolution. Lincoln did not say “Four score and seven years ago France brought forth on this…” We could not have done it without France’s aid, but it was our victory.
FM, believe it or not I posted an article from (Military Review) sometime ago written in the 60's written by a German Professor who said almost the same thing. He said there are 3 types of insurgencies of which 2 out of the 3 will be won by the insurgency only a type 1 could be won by a major power. What was really unusual was the guy died just before the article was published so he could never go into detail on his theory.
Right...It becomes so clear now.
There is no such thing as an original idea!
slapout9, do you have a name, title, or other reference? I would like to see (and cite) this.
One of my early descriptions of this is in a January 2007 article.
Part four of a series about the US expedition to the Middle East
FM, here is the thread with alink to the article and the discussion that followed. The thread title is everybody wrong?
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=wrong
The link is not working,but it is the October 1969 issue of Military Review. Title is "When Counter insurgents Cannot Win" by Otto Heilbrunn
Last edited by slapout9; 09-28-2007 at 02:45 AM. Reason: fix stuff
if that's too complex, here's the short version...
Things changed in mid-20th century. Since then..
a. If there is a "real" government, insurgents probably lose -- unless they have significant help from outside, and esp if they have nearby sanctuaries.
b. If there is not a "real" government -- per the usual pol sci list of attributes of gov't to measure legitimacy -- and foreigners lead the war, then the insurgents will probably win (if they can work up to a reasonable size).
Foreigners never lead the war when there is a "real" government. Sometimes insurgencies take generations to resolve.
A few questions, FM. I'm trying to understand your above statement. Stay with me on this...
How you've defined "government" above: I'm assuming you're talking about National government. Do your two contingencies above relate to the local or provincial level as well? Would you consider the alliance of sheikhs in Al Anbar a "real" government or outside support and sanctuary?
Outside Support: How do you factor in the Iranian Qods force influence in the above two scenarios. I'd imagine they'd be part of outside support. What other groups would you include in the "outside support" label? Tribes, ethnic sects, the UN, OPEC, etc...?
Example is better than precept.
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