Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)

[Rex Brynen]

An interesting perspective of Ahmadinejad's appearances in NY (including Columbia) in Slate:

I've had the opportunity to attend events with President Ahmadinejad on his three trips to the U.S. (including serving as the interpreter for his U.N. speeches for the last two), and have spent time with his aides and Iranian diplomats during the New York visits. This visit felt perhaps the most politically charged yet, and was certainly the most controversial, even for the Iranians. But amid all the theatrics, Ahmadinejad's political savvy and strategic intentions in New York should not be underestimated.

[Jedburgh]

RAND reprint from the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Spring 07:

American and Iranian Public Opinion: The Quest for Common Grounds

The emergent and ever-deepening conflict between Iran and the United States is often framed in the rhetoric of “clash of civilizations.” Iran’s religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, alleges, “The bitter and venomous taste of Western liberal democracy, which the United States has hypocritically tried to portray through its propaganda as a healing remedy, has hurt the body and soul of the Islamic Ummah and burned the hearts of Muslims". The U.S. President, George W. Bush, for his part contends “the greatest obstacle to th[e] future [of] Iran that [its] rulers have chosen to deny [the people of Iran] liberty and to use [their] nation’s resources to fund terrorism, and fuel extremism, and pursue nuclear weapons". While sharp differences persist at the level of U.S. and Iranian official rhetoric about the value of democracy and the nature of the influence exerted by both states, diminished personal contacts between Iranian and American peoples frustrate efforts to discern whether such sharp differences in values and worldviews exist among Iranian and American polities.

Conveniently, data exist that allow analysts to explore both the shared and differing values of the Iranian and American peoples, namely the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a multi-country social survey designed to assess values and attitudes across nations and among peoples of varying economic, educational, and cultural backgrounds. The survey includes questions on personal values of respondents as well as their opinions on broad issues of politics, work, family life, and religion. The surveys use a stratified, multistage random sample of persons at least 18 years of age.

We analyze data from Wave 3 of the survey, which is the only available wave of data for both Iran and the United States. In the United States, Wave 3 was conducted in 2000 and includes data for 1,200 respondents. In Iran, this wave was fielded in 2003 and contains data for 2,532 respondents. Though now somewhat dated, Wave 3 of the World Values Survey, particularly for the questions of more enduring values that we examine, still offers numerous policy-relevant insights. Indeed, Wave 3 datasets comprise the only source for such insights for recent years on the values of the peoples of both nations. A fourth wave is currently being fielded in Iran but the data have not been publicly released and the fourth wave of data collection has not yet begun in the United States. Significantly, despite the fact that tensions between Iran and the United States have continued to intensify in recent years, such analysis has not been executed.....

[Van]

Interesting footnote to this thread that highlights the differences in values, beliefs, culture etc.

It is worthy of note that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad refered to the movie "300" again in his speech to the media during his NYC visit (My Dinner with Ahmadinejad Wednesday, Sep. 26, 2007 By RICHARD STENGEL ). Again.

The whole idea of an independent media is so alien to him that he obviously thinks a movie based on a comicbook was made as an extension of U.S. policy. Given the media's open attacks on the President, I'm sure it's driving him nuts as he tries to figure out what they're really up to.

On the other hand, we can't wrap ourselves around the idea that he believes he can get away with managing the media in the days of internet. E.G. The conflicting translations and transcripts of his speeches in the english and persian sections of the Iranian websites ASSOCIATED PRESS. I like to think that no U.S. leader is so naive as to think that this would pass unnoticed.

The underlying point is that the U.S. needs to spend some more time getting inside Iranian heads if we are to overcome the threat they pose.

[Rex Brynen]

It is worthy of note that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad refered to the movie "300" again in his speech to the media during his NYC visit

Its not just Ahmadinejad: I must have had 4-5 people a day mention it to me when I was in Tehran. Moreover, some of those who mentioned it had spent years in the West, and (unlike Ahmadinejad) fully understood how Hollywood operated.

The movie touched a raw nerve of immense Iranian pride about their history (even their pre-Islamic history). It also was seen as reflecting (unfairly, I think) a general American stereotyping of everything Iranian (or Persian) as an evil threat.

Had the movie given the opposite portrayal--Persians as heroic, Greeks as sinister--I suspect you would have had a similar reaction by Greeks. (Insert reference here to Greek sensitivities over the name "Macedonia")

You're just lucky we're all too busy eating doughnuts with terrorists to have gone to war with you over the South Park movie. Blame Canada indeed!

[tolsen]

I was having lunch the other day with an Iranian (where I work that is pretty much a given), and he said something that was interesting. When I asked how he would describe his nationalism he said "Persian". Talk about a different take on the entire cultural war. Whereas I had though of Iran being a cohesive nation state of Islamic fundamentalism here was somebody basically shattering that misconception. He put it into perspective of the religious fundamentalists in the United States taking over the government by force and forcing their agenda.

This is also true of two people I know. They refuse to call themselves 'Iranian' - its always 'Persian'. Of course, both of them are children of those who fled the Mullahs. Im not sure how it is in Iran proper.

[Ken White]

Cyrus are alive and well.

You'll also find that calling them 'Arab' is a grave insult. That favor is returned. All why I pay little attention to "Iran is the big winner in this" rhetoric. Everyone from Juan Cole upward saying that is ignoring 5,000 years of history. The folks who live there will cooperate when it suits but they aren't climbing in bed together...

[Rank amateur]

All why I pay little attention to "Iran is the big winner in this" rhetoric. Everyone from Juan Cole upward saying that is ignoring 5,000 years of history. The folks who live there will cooperate when it suits but they aren't climbing in bed together...

Well, if the Iraqis cooperate more with Iran now than they did before, then Iran is the short term winner. If you think very long term, wars don't matter. (How would the world be any different if Brutus had defeated Anthony?)

[Ken White]

10 characters...

[Rex Brynen]

This is also true of two people I know. They refuse to call themselves 'Iranian' - its always 'Persian'. Of course, both of them are children of those who fled the Mullahs. Im not sure how it is in Iran proper.

It is worth remembering that ethnic Persians form only a bare majority of Iranians. According to the CIA World Factbook, the numbers break down as:

Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%

There have been periodic signs and episodes of ethnopolitical dissatisfaction among the Azeri, Arab, and Kurdish minorities in particular, although personally I think they are very, very from being regime-threatening.

[Van]

Rank Amateur

If you think very long term, wars don't matter.

Perhaps you wish to reconsider this opinion? Especially in this thread?

Consider the long term consequences had the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks not held at the Hot Gates as long as they did, or had they failed a year later at Platea. What we think of as Greek Democracy would never have happened, the Rennaissance would have been very different, etc. Military conflict buys time for diplomatic solutions, but in history we have a number of examples of leaders who see military force as their primary instrument of national power (Hitler, Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, for example). Wars matter, but require context to make sense.

[UrsaMaior]

According to a hungarian Iran expert the division lines are not between different ethnic groups only (although it is interresting to note, that more azeris live in Iran than they do in the independent Azerbaijan), but also between nomads and peasants as well. BUT because of the relative well being (in material sense and human right wise -although the latter has declined under Ahmedinejad-) basically no significant minority is playing on ganing independence. According to the same person when asked they first say they are iraniians, second their religion and their ethnic belonging is only in the last place.

If there will be any regime change it will be most likely caused by the economic instability (high unemployment especially among the youth who were born after 1979 -it is not to be neglected since they represent 50% of the countries population-). Problem from a western point of view is that even the most radical iranian reformers (living in the country) think in a theocracy. That means they will cling to their nuclear programme, unless they are given security guarantees by the US directly. While I understand the outrage of some on their position (ie dictating conditions), either talks based on the above or a war with unforeseenable consequences.

[tequila]

Rank Amateur


Perhaps you wish to reconsider this opinion? Especially in this thread?

Consider the long term consequences had the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks not held at the Hot Gates as long as they did, or had they failed a year later at Platea. What we think of as Greek Democracy would never have happened, the Rennaissance would have been very different, etc. Military conflict buys time for diplomatic solutions, but in history we have a number of examples of leaders who see military force as their primary instrument of national power (Hitler, Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, for example). Wars matter, but require context to make sense.

Greek democracy, such as it was, would not have died under Persian rule. During the Ionian revolt, the Greek tyrannies in Ionia which revolted against Persia were put down and democracies implanted instead. Ionia (Greek Asia Minor) is the progenitor of Greek philosophy, a title it held under both Lydian and Persian hegemony.

The critical battle of that campaign was Salamis, anyway. Thermopylae was like the Alamo or the Lusitania in that it provided a useful myth and rallying cry, but it was strategically insignificant. Plataea was the mopping up of a denuded army already in strategic retreat.

At any rate Greek democracy quite thoroughly crushed by the Macedonians and then the Romans. The principles of democracy, hardly exclusively Greek, were already reasonably widespread through the Mediterranean, including places as farflung as North Africa and Italy.

I do agree that wars matter, even if most often they are simply violent reveals of an already-existing state of affairs. The sheer violence of these "reveals" often leads to unexpected changes that would never have occurred if they had come about through more peaceful means. The bankruptcy of European colonialism in Asia, for instance, was brutally exposed by Japan in WWII, and this resulted in a far more rapid and more violent removal of European dominance than would have happened otherwise.

[ali_ababa]

While these pictures are impressive one must remember that The United States has much more advanced weapons.

I use to be told from my dad's military career how Iraq fielded a very impressive force and then it was gone in 1991. Times change very quickly.

[JeffC]

CNN reports:

"China Petroleum and Chemical Corp., or Sinopec, and Iran have signed a long awaited agreement for development of the Yadavaran oilfield, the official Xinhua News Agency and Iranian reports said Monday."

"The initial estimation of the project's cost is about $2 billion," Xinhua quoted Iranian Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari as telling reporters at the signing ceremony in Tehran.

"Zhou Baixiu, head of Sinopec's International Exploration and Production Unit, and Hossein Noqreka-Shirazi, head of international affairs for the Iranian Petroleum Ministry, signed the agreement, which completes a memorandum of understanding signed in 2004, the Iranian Republic News Agency reported."

"Beijing has balked at new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, arguing for diplomatic solutions to the standoff. A new U.S. intelligence report that Iran stopped atomic weapons development in 2003, contrary to U.S. suspicions, may have cleared the way for Sinopec to move ahead on Yadavaran, although Washington is still arguing in favor of sanctions."

[Jedburgh]

Two articles from the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, 13 Dec 07:

Iran’s Nuclear Act and U.S.-China Relations: The View from Beijing

Four Divergences

The first issue concerns the gap in U.S. and Chinese “threat” perceptions. The Chinese and Americans have widely differing perceptions about the threat or “potential threat” posed by Iran, including possible Iranian nuclear weapons. To Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike—Iran and its nuclear weapons pose a very serious threat to peace and stability in the Middle East, because of its threat to Israel and for American comprehensive interests: oil, security, strategic, political in the region, and to the American homeland. To Chinese government and military leaders, and to the public, Iran—even a nuclear Iran—does not pose any direct or real existential threat to China.....

....The second issue concerns the U.S. “intelligence” fumbles. Largely as the result of the U.S. mishandling of the Iraq war, the Chinese government has serious reservations about American statements and intelligence about Iran—and the new NIE report reinforces such perceptions that U.S. intelligence is not reliable. The Chinese believe that there are differences between IAEA investigations, assessments and conclusions, and American suspicion about the Iranian nuclear program, as there were differences between the United Nations’ inspection team about its investigation about Iraq’s nuclear weapons’ program and U.S. claims before the Iraq War.....

....The third issue concerns historical relations—or a lack thereof between the United States and Iran. The Chinese see that the United States has not had positive relations with Iran for many decades, so whatever the United States or the international community do to Iran will not come at the expense of the United States. In other words, the United States does not need to be too cautious in dealing with Iran—including its nuclear program. On the other hand, China has had a good and mutually beneficial relationship with Iran for decades. To the Chinese understanding and worldview, Iran is an important nation in the Middle East, a great civilization, rich history and influence in the contemporary world. Iran is a positive country to many Chinese, all in addition to the fact that Iran has been a major source of Chinese foreign oil supply.....

....Lastly concerns China’s identity issue. The Chinese leaders and people still seriously believe that China is a developing country—albeit the biggest and fastest growing one in the developing world. Therefore, the Chinese consider it a moral problem for China when it comes to how it should position itself on international issues. In the Chinese worldview, almost all the conflicting issues today are issues between the two worlds: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar and others. So it is difficult for the Chinese leaders to explain to their people why whenever there is a conflicting issue between developed countries led by the United States—and a developing country, China sides with the developed world and “bully” the smaller and poorer country......

The Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations

....The Iranian nuclear question in U.S.-China relations will make its presence felt in East Asia. The potential rise of a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to detract from the U.S.’s military footprint and security commitments in East Asia, to include its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well as its efforts to court Vietnam through closer military ties. This environment will surely encourage the Chinese to take a more assertive line when it comes to the question of Taiwan and other contentious issues, especially regional territorial and maritime disputes, as well as economic and trade disagreements. The U.S. may attempt to compensate by encouraging its regional partners such as Japan to take on more proactive roles on regional security issues. Nevertheless, these developments are a recipe for heightened U.S.-China tensions, especially as Beijing seeks to exploit what it may perceive as the steady unraveling of the U.S.-led cold war security alliance architecture aimed at containing China in East Asia.....

[Rex Brynen]

Iran Cited In Iraq's Decline in Violence
Order From Tehran Reined In Militias, U.S. Official Says
Washington Post
Sunday, December 23, 2007; Page A01

The Iranian government has decided "at the most senior levels" to rein in the violent Shiite militias it supports in Iraq, a move reflected in a sharp decrease in sophisticated roadside bomb attacks over the past several months, according to the State Department's top official on Iraq.

Tehran's decision does not necessarily mean the flow of those weapons from Iran has stopped, but the decline in their use and in overall attacks "has to be attributed to an Iranian policy decision," David M. Satterfield, Iraq coordinator and senior adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said in an interview.

[JJackson]

Is this not due to Sadr's 6 month operational freeze or is the US position now that this is thanks to Tehran?

[Rex Brynen]

I suspect that it is due to a variety of factors--Sadr's operational freeze/reorganization, the surge, waiting out the surge, slightly modified Iranian policy, Iraqi pressure on Tehran, and a few others beside.

[Ron Humphrey]

I suspect that it is due to a variety of factors--Sadr's operational freeze/reorganization, the surge, waiting out the surge, slightly modified Iranian policy, Iraqi pressure on Tehran, and a few others beside.

If one were to use the analogy of children playing on a playground, this kind of makes sense.

If one of the kids is acting up and not playing nice you correct them, tell them what's expected of them and then you have to give them a chance to show that they are following that advice.

The key will be what you do if you find that they are still doing the same things just working hard at hiding it from you. How you react then will determine the long term conditions on the playground.

I realize some may not like analogies such as this, but for me it has always followed with the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) principle. Thereby allowing for debate with more clarity in points of contention.

[JeffC]

If one were to use the analogy of children playing on a playground, this kind of makes sense.

While your example does offer one way to look at this, the obvious problem is that the role of the U.S. isn't one of playground monitor. That would be closer to the role of the U.N. (which doesn't do it very well). Take a look at this post on Myerson's Game Theory paper which discusses the required balance of Force and Restraint in order to obtain a desired outcome between nations.

A U.S. official says Iran has reined in the Shi'ite militias it supports in Iraq, contributing to a sharp drop in sophisticated roadside bomb attacks.

In an interview with the Washington Post published Sunday, the State Department's top official on Iraq, David Satterfield, says Iran has decided "at the most senior levels" to restrain Shi'ite militants.

Satterfield says the flow of roadside bombs from Iran may not have stopped, but he says the drop in their use and a decline in overall attacks must be attributed to an Iranian policy decision.

The full article can be read at GlobalStrategy.org.

This is further evidence that Iran is a rational actor, and that a negotiation strategy should continue to be pursued.