Page 5 of 21 FirstFirst ... 3456715 ... LastLast
Results 81 to 100 of 403

Thread: Who are the great generals?

  1. #81
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    WM,

    You changed the reference to Market Garden in your second post to large operations with your disclaimer about airborne operations and AIRBORNE operations. Like others here I saw the reference to Market Garden as a type of operation to mean vertical envelopment .

    If you are only talking about an airborne operation involving the lift of three divisions and a brigade in daylight, then there is no comparison because Market Garden is the only one.

    The reference to if the Germans won the war takes your what if the Normandy invasion failed to its logical extension. The invasion did not fail and the airborne operations were part of the reasons it succeeded. That the paras had air support was part of the plan.

    As for Bastogne, again if you want to get into what if the Germans had operated differently, then things might have gone differently for the 101st. That is more supposition like postulating about a German victory at Normandy.

    Dave Glantz wrote an excellent study on the Sovier Airborne Experience you might find enlightening.



    Best

    Tom
    Tom,
    The lower case/upper case distinction (airborne vs AIRBORNE) was meant to point out a difference in scope and size. As I noted, in agreement with Mark, small scale, limited objective vertical envelopments (whether using parachutes (airborne), helicopters (airmobile), or fixed wing assets(air landing) as the deliver mechanism, have a place in our bag of tricks. I submit that operations like Market Garden and Crete do not.

    Back to Bastogne, you seemed to miss my main point--it was not simply a light infantry versus tanks battle. The 4th AD relief column that Patton pushed north engaged in such a infantry Vs, Tanks battle with the German 5 Parachute Div. It sliced through the Germans like a hot knife through butter.

    Thanks for the reference to the Soviet Airborne Experience title.

    Thanks also for the healthy debate.

  2. #82
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Tom,...

    Back to Bastogne, you seemed to miss my main point--it was not simply a light infantry versus tanks battle. The 4th AD relief column that Patton pushed north engaged in such a infantry Vs, Tanks battle with the German 5 Parachute Div. It sliced through the Germans like a hot knife through butter.
    . . .
    Just as a matter of record, the German 3d through the 7th FJD were Parachute in name only for prestige purposes; the troops were not parachutists, training was abbreviated and the divisions were not light infantry, they were effectively normal or heavy infantry divisions with a different TOE from the true FJD -- including more artillery, heavy weapons and vehicles -- and they were poorly trained Divisions at that.

    The more experienced US 82d and 101st held their own against the dispersed attacks including Armor , the 5th FJD could not against a precisely focussed attack.

  3. #83
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Just as a matter of record, the German 3d through the 7th FJD were Parachute in name only for prestige purposes; the troops were not parachutists, training was abbreviated and the divisions were not light infantry, they were effectively normal or heavy infantry divisions with a different TOE from the true FJD -- including more artillery, heavy weapons and vehicles -- and they were poorly trained Divisions at that.

    The more experienced US 82d and 101st held their own against the dispersed attacks including Armor , the 5th FJD could not against a precisely focussed attack.
    Given the casualties and reorganization of the Wehrmacht, I doubt that I would call any late 1944 regular German division (I am not including Waffen SS in this discussion, but I would include the Luftwaffe's gound forces--Fallschirmjaeger, and Luft Divisions), other than some few of the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, a match for any American division in troop strength or equipment. Volks Grenadier divisions ostensibly had greater armor defeating capabilities in terms of their weapons mix, but the troops manning them tended not to be quite up to the task of using them effectively.
    In late 1944, many US divisions had trained and operated together for almost 3 years before being commited in France. German forces on the other hand had devolved into rag tag bands thrown together with only a few months collective training. And, as in later WWI, the Germans had lost almost all of their veteran, effective small unit leadership.

  4. #84
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2006
    Location
    Fort Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    1,510

    Default Technology on St Crispin's Day

    Its an interesting point about technology, but all formations to a varying degree employ the technology they have available based on the conditions at hand. The available means and how the general employed them to a tactical, operational or strategic advantage might be a better indication of his quality, vs turning it into a handicap.

    Henry at Agincourt is a good example of dueling technologies (the Long Bow & French Armor) that were employed to good or bad effect given the conditions.

    Even Orde Wingate & the Chindits made use of technology where practicable given METT-TC


    I like Mark's ref. to Normandy and the Airborne Operations required to facilitate the landing by isolating German forces on the Normandy beachheads. I think it reinforces many of the things I admire about Eisenhower - He knew the risks, weighed them and committed. As was pointed out there is a great deal of chance in such a risk - weather, time to build combat power, etc - but they made it work. How many military operations can we point to of that scope, and difficulty where multiple forms of maneuver were coordinated and executed by Joint and Allied forces?

    I think there are certainly some that come close - The invasions of Italy and Southern France certainly have their place; but I'd argue they were not the LOO we committed to in our advance to Germany.

    Ref. Airborne operations overall - I hope we retain the ability to seize airheads (could be Air Assualt or retired MG Grange's Air/Mech) in conjunction with follow on forces - we have the ability to attain surprise on an operational level, and with the increasing lethality in small packages, improved C4ISR to maintain comms, provide, near precision-all weather-long range fires, project sustainment with near pinpoint accuracy, the ability to have good map data combined with BFT/FBCB2, better mobility and the host of other things good technology have made possible - we have at least a little less to chance then Eisenhower did. However, without good leadership that sees the problem as it is vs. what they would like it to be, its all for naught (good people/leadership first - enabled by tech).

    Best regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 08-30-2007 at 07:14 PM.

  5. #85
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default True.

    10 characters...

  6. #86
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Ref. Airborne Operations: As for US Airborne operations they are better understood in the framework of Cavalry Operations, which is exactly how General Gavin meant them to be used. Since he wrote the book on them(He wrote the 1st Airborne FM and how they should be used) they have a different perspective than Vertical Envelopment but some strong similarities.

    The Normandy Invasion was a giant "Cavalry Screen" as were many Airborne ops and they were meant to and planned to link up with the heavier main force effort right from the start. It is when they were used for something else that they got into trouble, such as Market Garden. I don't remember Gavin's exact quote but it something like"Somebody just dreamed up a real nightmare"

    Because of the Cavalry Mobility advantage Gavin thought they would be idea in the traditional role of the screen,the guard or pursuit roles. It is when they are used for something different that they can get into trouble.

    The concept of the Air-Mech Division is nothing but the Cavalry concept of the "Flying Column" mad concrete. Gavin believed that these "Flying Columns" could play a critical role in what he referred to as "Brush Fire Wars" or as the Marines say Small Wars (the concept of flying columns is in the USMC Small Wars manual) his concept was different from standpoint that he meant a small light armored vehicle force that would have Strategic mobility to anywhere in the world but also maintain tactical mobility and survivability. Again similar to some of the advanced V-22 USMC concepts of Operational Maneuver.

  7. #87
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Posts
    15

    Default

    Well, this is a Small Wars site, so here goes:
    -Nathaniel Greene
    -Simon Bolivar
    -Spartacus
    -William Wallace & Robert the Bruce
    -Jose Francisco de San Martin
    -Duke of Wellington (in Iberian Peninsula)
    -Bohdan Chmielnicki (revolted and created separate Cossack state)
    -Huang Chao (rose up & established Qi Dynasty)
    -Zhu Yuanzang (revolted against Mongols and established Ming Dynasty)
    -Mao Tse Tung
    -Vo Nguyen Giap
    -US Grant and WT Sherman
    -Harold Briggs & Gerald Templer
    -Chesty Puller
    -Anthony Zinni
    -John Pershing
    -William Joseph Donovan (Wild Bill Donovan)
    -Many, many others...

  8. #88
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2006
    Location
    Fort Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    1,510

    Default Had to post this from a realted thread

    TT made a great connection on this thread and I wanted to link the two and share his observation because of its bearing on this thread:

    Rob,

    What was most annoying about my keyboard is that it did not share

    (I have been trying to get the 'blue quote' thing to work but I give up)


    from a question Rob asked TT and Marc - 'The last event, if dramatic enough, seems to shape the rest of an individual experience and becomes sort of Rosetta Stone or lens through which all lesser experiences are viewed until some other experience of equal weight is encountered. Its a natural bias which must be guarded against in order to look forward (at future problems) with objectivity.
    I think your observation is spot on. To take this point onwards....

    A very solid argument can be made, I think, that WWII, the ‘Good War’, provides the foundation for how the modern US military (well, not so much the USAF, ‘cause it did not exist during that conflict) sees itself and what it does. To grossly oversimplify, as each US service sees itself in a different way, WWII is in essence the last war that the ‘generals’ want to fight better (as opposed to the last battle). This form of warfare, state vs state, division vs division, has been, and to a degree remains today, the focus of the US military in spite of the many small wars it has engaged in since 1945, with the US military steadily refining and becoming ever more proficient in the form of warfare they fought in WWII.

    This emphasis is partly reinforced and indeed propagated by the icons of each service. In the ‘Who are the Great Generals’ thread, I was struck by the fact that most – but certainly not all -- of the Generals named were those who commanded ‘conventional’ style wars (from Alexander to the present). I understand that the intent – particularly by the members of the SWB – is to identify Generals who exemplify the many leadership skills and attributes that are required of a good officer whatever the form of warfare. These men – and the few women mentioned – certainly do serve as role models. As such, however, the connection between their iconic status and the form of warfare on which their status is based carries a strong connotation or meaning about what is 'proper war', about what is the form of warfare that should be aspired to. Or to put it another way, such role models, consciously or unconsciously, reinforce ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’, and the 'what we do' in many of the examples put forward is ‘conventional warfare’.

    wm in his post on the ‘Generals’ thread titled ‘The "Greats" & America's Infatuation with Technology’, made what I think is a very astute observation. His observation was, ‘Maybe if we chose a different set of icons for our WWII heroes, we might find a better set of solutions for the current morass in which we find ourselves enmired.’ This is, wm, excellent advice.

    Certainly the great Generals should be iconic symbols, but it seems to me that there is real need develop a new set of ‘iconic’ leaders, to elevate the many US military personnel from through out US history who demonstrated the same leadership skills and attributes as the ‘great generals’ but in small wars. A hard reality is that such potential ‘iconic’ officers would not make a Great Generals list, for many if not most of the officers you would be looking for would not have been Generals at the time and many, if not most, very likely never made it up the ladder to ‘General’ (or Admiral). So one way to try to forestall the ‘stagnation you raise, the US military should (to contribute to changing the ‘narrative’) is pillage through its history (and as small wars are largely on land, this means mostly the history of Army and Marine Corps) to find and rehabilitate those officers, whatever their rank, who engaged in small wars to provide modern day role models of leaderships to sit alongside .

    Just as a brief example Chesty Puller was mentioned several times as a great general Even in the Marine Corps (where Puller is as Jon Hoffman has said, ‘is the mythological hero of the Marine Corps – the very icon of the entire establishment’) he is most well known for his actions and exploits in the Pacific Campaign and Korea – conventional wars. Yet Puller cut his teeth as a junior officer in the small wars of the USMC in the 1920s and 1930s, and from what I have read, he was very effective in these small wars (and yes, most Marines do know this, more or less, but the emphasis is on WWII and Korea).

    Finding other officers such as Puller who were very good or excellent in small wars, who, while not great ‘generals’, were as more junior officers still great leaders in and practitioners of small wars. These men (and women) can serve as role models to exemplify what is required of the officers of today and tomorrow, while that same time indicating that small wars/COIN/irregular warfare is an important part of what the US military does, rather than being, as they sometimes appear to be, terms that are best not used in polite company.

    TT

  9. #89
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Actually I think you have to include the Air Force (in its Army Air Force/Corps versions) in that statement, since so much of their mythology and corporate identity came from the strategic bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific. SAC was the creation in many ways of Curtis LeMay, who made his bones in WW 2. Many of the changes that have since come to the AF were in reaction to LeMay's organizational template, but they still draw much of their inspiration and identity from the AAC/AAF days. Most lineage for the major commands goes back to WW 2. It's as much a part of them as other services...perhaps more so because they trace their birth straight back to the changes that took place immediately after the war.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  10. #90
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Canada
    Posts
    128

    Default Mea Culpa

    Steve,

    Actually I think you have to include the Air Force (in its Army Air Force/Corps versions) in that statement,
    You are absolutely correct, of course. What was I thinking....oh, I apparently wasn't .

    TT

  11. #91
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by TT View Post
    Steve,



    You are absolutely correct, of course. What was I thinking....oh, I apparently wasn't .

    TT
    No worries....

    Actually, I think this bedrock link to WW 2 really hurts the AF when it comes to any sort of irregular war situation. So much of their being is tied up in total war and the like that any change to a limited situation is very wrenching for them...perhaps more so than any other service. If you look at the published reaction to wars like Korea and Vietnam, you see a service that tends to reject the results because they weren't allowed to do what they wished without restriction. Also, both conflicts tended to produce few 'inside' heroes or role models aside from individual pilots within the system. In Vietnam, Chappie and Olds are remembered for their kills, not their planning. In fact, the commander who pushed for revisions in the Linebacker II strike planning after the first few days has been more or less removed from most internal historical discussions of that campaign.

    I like some of your observations on the adaptability thread, TT. Carlson and Edson certainly deserve to be mentioned as great commanders, and Edson certainly for what he did after the war. Within the US Army (and going back to one of my main periods of study), I really wish commanders like Mackenzie got more attention than folks like Custer or Crook. Thomas Devin is another commander who deserves more notice than he's gotten for his actions after the Civil War. Both Mackenzie and Devin were among the few officers who successfully made the transition from the big unit Civil War to the Indian Wars. In fact, a fair amount of Crook's later success could be traced to the aftermath of Devin's campaigning around Prescott. But I digress.....
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  12. #92
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2006
    Location
    Fort Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    1,510

    Default

    Steve,
    You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.

    Best Regards, Rob

  13. #93
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Steve,
    You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.

    Best Regards, Rob
    Yeah...I've been kicking around an idea like that for some time now. Best get started...though I still owe Marc a bit of stuff on AF history....

    I've always considered most examinations of Indian Wars Army leadership to be too focused on the CCM effect (Custer-Crook-Miles), with little attention paid to many other fine officers who managed to transition between two very different types of warfare. Personally, I don't think either Crook or Custer did a very good job (Crook had served on the Frontier before the war, so he just continued what he'd been doing before) of making that transition. Mackenzie and Miles had no pre-war Frontier experience, and they proved to be two of the best. Devin also did a fine job, along with Carr and Hatch. Interesting bunch, to be sure.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  14. #94
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Canada
    Posts
    128

    Default

    Steve,

    I really wish commanders like Mackenzie got more attention than folks like Custer or Crook. Thomas Devin is another commander who deserves more notice than he's gotten for his actions after the Civil War. Both Mackenzie and Devin were among the few officers who successfully made the transition from the big unit Civil War to the Indian Wars. In fact, a fair amount of Crook's later success could be traced to the aftermath of Devin's campaigning around Prescott. But I digress....
    Actually, you are not digressing. My knowledge of Army history is worse than woeful, but it is probably officers such a Mackenzie and Devin who are the type of officers who need to resurrected.

    You know - I'll bet that could be a book (along the one done on the inter-war years between WWI & WWII) that focused on adaptive leadership between the Civil War and the Indian War - at the very least it'd make a hell of a fine article.

    Yeah...I've been kicking around an idea like that for some time now.
    Writing such articles is definitely part of the process, for it exposes officers to predecessors of whom they likely know little. I would look forward to reading such an article! But really to accomplish the sort of shift we have been discussing will require, to my mind, a more wide ranging effort -- such as having the Army historians start producing 'critical' studies of past small wars Army officers.

    The 'critical' approach is crucial. Far too often such histories tend to be very descriptive and/or hagiographical in bent (and I am thinking mostly of Marine Corps history, as I have read much Army history). The hagiographical bent is part of creating and reinforcing 'self identity' (plus is good PR to the general public and Congress), yet it is this narrative that needs to altered -- perhaps 'added to' is the better way to phrase this.

    TT

  15. #95
    Council Member Armchairguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    Sugar Land, Texas
    Posts
    42

    Default More great generals

    I saw most of the generals I'd pick in one list or another.

    Don't know if I saw the following though.

    Alfred von Schlieffen for his great invasion plan and it's modified version used successfully the very next war on the western front.

    Haile Selassie troops armed with spears, arrows, and some antiquated guns against the Italians in WWII did a pretty good job considering the Italians had Tanks, Airplanes, Poison gas and machine guns. Haile wasn't a general but he told his commander how to fight the Italians. They lost, but even losing generals can be great.

    Leonidas was another non-general loser who did pretty well.

    I won't even try to talk about vertical envelopment

  16. #96
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2007
    Posts
    89

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post

    Rare is the flag who can employ air, land and sea-power in a complimentary and synchronous manner to achieve an end.
    I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

    When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.

    However, many (perhaps rightly) will not be able to see past MacArthur's extreme egotism. He was, according to one biographer, a "thundering paradox" of a man. He often refered to the Air Force and Navy under his command as "his Air Force, and his Navy" all the while skillfully employing each. The one real blight on his military career was his despondance at the inital Japanese invasion of the Phillipines, once he got engaged, we was able to skillfully maneuver his army intact to Bataan, but his delay to order this withdrawl ensured that not enough supplies would be transported as well, therefore dooming his command.

  17. #97
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by stanleywinthrop View Post
    I'm going to go out on a limb here--when I read this sentence one name came to mind-Douglas MacArthur.

    When you look at his breadth of his Pacific Campaign, I see a general who fills the above description to a T. After the slugfest at Buna, MacArthur embarked on a campaign that minimized direct engagements all the way up the New Guinea coast and on to the Phillipines, when taken in the whole his entire 3 year campaign had fewer casualties than the Battle of the Buldge.

    True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

    I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

    Tom

  18. #98
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Don't forget, either, that one of MacArthur's tactics was to declare regions "secure" and haul out US troops, replacing them with Australian and New Zealand forces. Of course in most Pacific campaigns there were many pockets of resistance that remained after an island was "secure," so losses continued even though press coverage and command attention slipped away. It also held down the number of casualties reported during the initial operation...keeping his totals low.

    MacArthur could also have the success he did thanks to the parallel campaign in the Central Pacific conducted by Nimitz and the massive US submarine campaign that practically destroyed the Japanese ability to move troops and supplies. Nimitz' moves kept the Japanese high command constantly guessing as to where a blow might fall, and the submarine campaign crippled their ability to respond to any shift on the part of the allies.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  19. #99
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Thumbs up Concur!

    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    True but when you look at his actions in the PI after Pearl Harbor, the contrast is stunning. The same yin and yang applies to Korea. He ignored any signs the war would start because he said it would not. He exhibited genius in the Inchon operation. And then he again returned to the pre-war mold and ignored the Chinese threat.

    I will take a middle of the road, plodder anyday over a guy like Macarthur.

    Tom
    ..........
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  20. #100
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2007
    Location
    West Point New York
    Posts
    267

    Default

    Levels of war (if there are such things) matter and affect choices for top generals but here is a stab:

    Grant
    Ike
    G Washington
    Frederick the Great
    Napoleon
    Patton
    LeMay
    Davout (was "DaMan at Austerlitz)
    Nathaniel Greene

    And yes LeMay, at the operational level during World War II he was one of the best.

    Why don't we have these sorts now? Please dont attack me for saying this but we dont have big battles to fight anymore or major coalition warfare that allows generals to succeed brilliantly or fail.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •