COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Rob Thornton]

Steve - I think its going to be a very good article, and I really look forward to it - considering the bearing of leadership on organizational adaptation is I believe the most influential factor - plenty of armies have had a technological advantage and went into a fight thinking they would not fail, only to have suffered catastrophic defeats at the hands of Armies better led.

Where successful, those armies (the ones better supplied and more technologically advanced) have overtime adapted their tactics, operational thinking and strategy to meet the needs of the COE - but it was the emergent of dynamic leadership which supplied the rationale for change. That leadership seems to come most often from the conditions which required the change.

Its going to be a very timely and relevant article - but no pressure

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Here is a link to an article published June 1973 Military Review on a Theory of Strategy. This was before the Ends,Ways and Means definition appeared.

Not only that but it is by a Navy guy

From the paper.
Strategy is defined as the comprehensive direction of power to establish control over areas and situations to achieve objectives. Strategy is essentially concerned with control for a given effect. The essences of Strategy is control.
The Strategic concept is simply a verbal statement resulting from the analysis of:
1-what to control?
2-the nature of the control.
3-the degree of control necessary.
4-when control is to be initiated.
5-the duration of control and the general method or scheme to be used.
Without clearly and precisely analyzing these elements,it is impossible to establish any rational kind of control which could reasonably succeed in bringing about the desired effects.

http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/e...CUR_DOCUMENT=1

[Alex Alderson]

Forgive me asking what may be an obvious question, but aren't our definitions of COIN a touch dated? If identifying the nature of the problem is a fundamental (paraphrasing K v C) is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy? Presumably if insurgency is a strategy (see Steve's Learning from Iraq and Rethinking Insurgency), then to counter it requires a strategy? Lots of definitions tell us where the military might start but not how a political solution to a political problem might finish. The answer might be obvious but not from doctrine or most of the mainstream works.

[Rob Thornton]

Alex,
Check out the slides presented by DR. Dave Kilcullen on the SWJ Blog. They'll provide you some food for thought - they are a good stand alone set - as much as slides can be.

This is a very broad brush to discuss your question-

With regards to insurgency as a strategy - really defining the best ways with regard to available means toward defined ends. Defining the use of Insurgency as a strategy is to describe a way of overcoming limited means (relatively speaking) towards the end of establishing some other form of government, ruling body, or possibly even toward the absence of one in which to achieve broader ends for a group or other state.

In DR. Kilcullen's piece he plays on Counter-Insurgency and puts forward Counter War - the question that builds your COIN strategy is how do you counter the conditions which encourage war and violence as an alternative form of political redress? This is where the various elements of national power figure into the strategy as required ways and means to achieve that end.

In a very simplistic sense (until you try doing it in an environment full of they type of fog, friction and chance that allowed an insurgency to take hold), a strategy of counter-insurgency is one in which diplomatic, economic, informational and military means of power are employed in ways that counter the conditions which led to and perpetuate the insurgency.

Within the more general COIN strategy there is a great deal of latitude for how to employ those elements of power, and toward their individual limitations. Just because you know you must conduct a COIN campaign doesn't mean you'll get it right - much of what occurs is going to be shaped by subjective nature of the insurgency and the environment which gave birth to it. The priority given to objectives and weight given to logical lines of operation across the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Intelligence) must be defined with regard to the insurgency. In Iraq it may vary some by region.

There are no cookie cutter solutions with regard to insurgencies - just as there are no cookie cutter societies or problems that occur in those societies. I hope I've not mis-characterized Steve's work - he's done some good thinking and its helped me consider the problems of Insurgency and its opposite number.

Best Regards, Rob

[skiguy]

I found this explanation good too.
Understanding Current Operations in Iraq By Dave Kilcullen

[max161]

Forgive me asking what may be an obvious question, but aren't our definitions of COIN a touch dated? If identifying the nature of the problem is a fundamental (paraphrasing K v C) is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy? Presumably if insurgency is a strategy (see Steve's Learning from Iraq and Rethinking Insurgency), then to counter it requires a strategy? Lots of definitions tell us where the military might start but not how a political solution to a political problem might finish. The answer might be obvious but not from doctrine or most of the mainstream works.

Forgive the drive by: One thing that I think we need to consider is that (in my very humble opinion) the US cannot "win" a COIN fight unless the the insurgency is directly threatening the overthrow of the US. The US cannot "win" in the Afghanistan, Iraq, (or in the Philippines where I am just departing from). Only the Afghans can win in Afghanistan, only the Iraqis can win in Iraq, and only the Filipinos can win in the Philippines. I think that we are trying so hard to "win" and win hearts and minds for the US that we undercut the necessary legitimacy of the indigenous government and security forces. We cannot win these fights ourselves, we can only help the indigenous governments and security forces to win. As we consider COIN strategies I think we need to think about who is really capable of winning.

Now to answer your question here are some excerpts from various definitions of insurgency. These are dated (from a paper I wrote in 1995 and Larry Cable has been discredited academicly but he still provides some useful concepts so these are pre-1995 definitions from Joint pubs and FMs).

1. Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Definition)

a. It is an armed expression of internal and organic (regardless of external support) political disaffiliation. May be offensive (revolutionary war) or defensive (separatist or autonomous movements). (Dr. Larry Cable)

b. A protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy (FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations)

c. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources (FM 31-20)

(1) Revolutionary insurgencies seek to overthrow existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

(2) Other insurgencies seek to:

• Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
• Establish autonomous national territory within the borders of a state
• Cause a withdrawal of an occupying power
• Extract political concessions that are unobtainable through less violent means

5. Some additional notes on insurgency for consideration.

a. Consider that there are generally four “elements” that may be involved in the insurgency:

(1) The insurgent

(2) The population

(3) The counter-insurgent (the existing government or occupying power)

(4) The peace enforcer or peace keeper (external nation or forces)

b. Key to understanding insurgency is that it is a political problem first and foremost which has implications for the military. However, an insurgency will ultimately be successful if the underlying political and socio-economic causes are not addressed,

c. The insurgent, the counter-insurgent, and the peace keeper/enforcer have only two fundamental tools to work with to accomplish their goals:

(1) The enhancement of popular perceptions of legitimacy.

(2) The credible capability to coerce

d. Success or failure is determined by each sides understanding, application, and the mixture of these tools (which is determined by the political leadership NOT the military leadership)

e. Remember that no armed political disturbances begin without significant lead times.

f. When is the US military committed to counter-insurgency? Usually during the guerilla warfare or, at worst, the war of movement phase. Guess what? The war is already lost especially if a thorough Phase I has been conducted. It is generally too late for the established government to initiate the political reforms necessary to defeat the insurgency. Therefore, the US military ends up conducting a military operation to counter a political problem which just adds strength to the perceived legitimacy of the insurgency. The signs of a latent insurgency are too often overlooked and unrecognized.

g. Some fundamental considerations needed for the mindset of dealing with insurgencies.

(1) Encourage improvisation by subordinates (can lead to valuable tactics and techniques; i.e., SF CIDG program in Vietnam or the USMC Combined or Civic Action Platoons (CAP in Vietnam).

(2) Orient on the “human terrain”. Think in terms of cultural historical, and psychological terms.

(3) The killing (military operation) is clearly subordinate to the psychological and political.

(4) Replace “shoot, move, and communicate: with “presence patience and persistence.” Someday, if you are successful, the mission will disappear, like a river flowing into a swamp. (Dr. Larry Cable)

You may consider these dated but I think they are still useful in understanding the types and nature of insurgencies.

V/R

Dave

[Rank amateur]

The one issue I've never seen addressed - though I'm sure someone here has addressed it some where - is defining the circumstances under which COIN can be successful and under which it can't.

[max161]

The one issue I've never seen addressed - though I'm sure someone here has addressed it some where - is defining the circumstances under which COIN can be successful and under which it can't.

An excellent new book analyzing insurgency and COIN is Jeffrey Record's Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. I strongly reocmmend it.

[SteveMetz]

An excellent new book analyzing insurgency and COIN is Jeffrey Record's Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. I strongly reocmmend it.

The problem is that it deals almost exclusively with an outside power undertaking insurgency in a strange culture. My own belief is that the current administration , for some reason, forgot that's a very bad idea. Future administrations are likely to remember.

Incidentally I came across an interesting New York Times op ed from December 2001 while doing research for my book. The title is "Iraq Shouldn't Be the Next Stop in the War on Terror." Coming as the campaign in Afghanistan was nearing a conclusion, it was intended as a warning for those who wanted to set their sights on Iraq, arguing that there are other targets much more important to destroying transnational terrorism.

The author's name was L. Paul Bremer.

[SteveMetz]

Forgive the drive by: One thing that I think we need to consider is that (in my very humble opinion) the US cannot "win" a COIN fight unless the the insurgency is directly threatening the overthrow of the US. The US cannot "win" in the Afghanistan, Iraq, (or in the Philippines where I am just departing from). Only the Afghans can win in Afghanistan, only the Iraqis can win in Iraq, and only the Filipinos can win in the Philippines. I think that we are trying so hard to "win" and win hearts and minds for the US that we undercut the necessary legitimacy of the indigenous government and security forces. We cannot win these fights ourselves, we can only help the indigenous governments and security forces to win. As we consider COIN strategies I think we need to think about who is really capable of winning.

Now to answer your question here are some excerpts from various definitions of insurgency. These are dated (from a paper I wrote in 1995 and Larry Cable has been discredited academicly but he still provides some useful concepts so these are pre-1995 definitions from Joint pubs and FMs).

1. Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Definition)

a. It is an armed expression of internal and organic (regardless of external support) political disaffiliation. May be offensive (revolutionary war) or defensive (separatist or autonomous movements). (Dr. Larry Cable)

b. A protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy (FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations)

c. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources (FM 31-20)

(1) Revolutionary insurgencies seek to overthrow existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

(2) Other insurgencies seek to:

• Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
• Establish autonomous national territory within the borders of a state
• Cause a withdrawal of an occupying power
• Extract political concessions that are unobtainable through less violent means

5. Some additional notes on insurgency for consideration.

a. Consider that there are generally four “elements” that may be involved in the insurgency:

(1) The insurgent

(2) The population

(3) The counter-insurgent (the existing government or occupying power)

(4) The peace enforcer or peace keeper (external nation or forces)

b. Key to understanding insurgency is that it is a political problem first and foremost which has implications for the military. However, an insurgency will ultimately be successful if the underlying political and socio-economic causes are not addressed,

c. The insurgent, the counter-insurgent, and the peace keeper/enforcer have only two fundamental tools to work with to accomplish their goals:

(1) The enhancement of popular perceptions of legitimacy.

(2) The credible capability to coerce

d. Success or failure is determined by each sides understanding, application, and the mixture of these tools (which is determined by the political leadership NOT the military leadership)

e. Remember that no armed political disturbances begin without significant lead times.

f. When is the US military committed to counter-insurgency? Usually during the guerilla warfare or, at worst, the war of movement phase. Guess what? The war is already lost especially if a thorough Phase I has been conducted. It is generally too late for the established government to initiate the political reforms necessary to defeat the insurgency. Therefore, the US military ends up conducting a military operation to counter a political problem which just adds strength to the perceived legitimacy of the insurgency. The signs of a latent insurgency are too often overlooked and unrecognized.

g. Some fundamental considerations needed for the mindset of dealing with insurgencies.

(1) Encourage improvisation by subordinates (can lead to valuable tactics and techniques; i.e., SF CIDG program in Vietnam or the USMC Combined or Civic Action Platoons (CAP in Vietnam).

(2) Orient on the “human terrain”. Think in terms of cultural historical, and psychological terms.

(3) The killing (military operation) is clearly subordinate to the psychological and political.

(4) Replace “shoot, move, and communicate: with “presence patience and persistence.” Someday, if you are successful, the mission will disappear, like a river flowing into a swamp. (Dr. Larry Cable)

You may consider these dated but I think they are still useful in understanding the types and nature of insurgencies.

V/R

Dave

As I've mentioned before, I think that Joint definition is badly, badly flawed and I'm hoping it gets changed.

[SteveMetz]

is there any particular reason why only Steve Metz has tied insurgency to being a strategy?

He did lots of drugs when he was young.

[Steve Blair]

Perhaps it's because in its classic sense an insurgency IS a strategy. It is a campaign (or series of campaigns...or linked operations) aimed at accomplishing a specific goal or goals and has both a military and political component. What causes confusion, IMO, is that the term "insurgency" is used to cover a variety of situations and individuals...many of whom do not properly belong within that term's framework.

[Rank amateur]

Future administrations are likely to remember.

I wish I shared your optimistic view of human nature. (Maybe I didn't do enough drugs when I was younger.)

[SteveMetz]

I wish I shared your optimistic view of human nature. (Maybe I didn't do enough drugs when I was younger.)

Well, we did remember Vietnam for 30 years. I really think it was a complex combination of conditions that got us where we are in Iraq, and that they're unlikely to be replicated:

1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection
2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq
3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months
4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological
5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"
6) we had drawn inappropriate military lessons from the past decade (speed and precision=victory)

To tell you the truth, I'll go to my grave kicking myself in the keester over this. In 2003, a number of my colleagues and I were convinced this was going to be a disaster but, for reasons I won't go into, we were prevented from published frank, critical assessments. I know it wouldn't have mattered, but I feel I was an intellectual coward.

In case anyone is intersted, I've attached the draft chapter of my book that I finished last week. It's not really counterinsurgency, but the roots of the Bush strategy. The next chapter will be on the decision to intervene in Iraq and the conventional campaign; the one after that the counterinsurgency.

[Tom Odom]

To tell you the truth, I'll go to my grave kicking myself in the keester over this. In 2003, a number of my colleagues and I were convinced this was going to be a disaster but, for reasons I won't go into, we were prevented from published frank, critical assessments. I know it wouldn't have mattered, but I feel I was an intellectual coward.

Steve,

Even raising it took a certain amount of guts; I echoed your concerns and indeed they echoed concerns heeded in 1991. You do what you can, when you can.

And even when you are in position of responsible authority, your warnings even if 100% accurate will not necessarily have any effect, much less the effects you seek. Rwanda in 1995-1996 taught me that.

When a senior official can go before Congress and declare that there are no ethnic divisions in Iraq like the Balkans and that such a war will pay for itself, then that official and the adminstration he represented, and the Congress that accepted that testimony without serious challenge are the ones who need their keesters kicked.

Best

Tom

[jcustis]

1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection
2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq
3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months
4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological
5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"
6) we had drawn inappropriate military lessons from the past decade (speed and precision=victory)

An excellent and appropriate analysis Steve.

[SteveMetz]

An excellent and appropriate analysis Steve.

Thanks. Give me four years to mull something over and occasionally I'll get it right (marriage excepted)

[tequila]

Some quibbles:

1) the insurgents looked/sounded enough like al Qaeda that we were able to make a mental connection

I think the issue here was more that we did not know enough about the insurgency to tell who they were. I remember the old saw back in 2004-2005 was not AQ, but rather that they were all dead-ender Ba'athists, and they would dry up and blow away once Uday/Qusay died and Saddam was caught.

2) the international community (may a pox be on their house) decided that it was more important to punish us for our hubris than to stabilize Iraq

Not sure exactly what the international community was supposed to do about the insurgency, or that the Administration would have welcomed any assistance forthcoming. Control was the most important thing to this Admin. The treatment of de Mello before the UN bombing showed just how seriously the CPA and Bremer took the UN - that is, not at all.

3) the insurgency emerged just before a presidential election, which caused the administration to deny it during the crucial few months

After the election, our strategy did not appreciably change or improve.

4) Rumsfeld had made civil military relations pathological

They weren't this way already? And did Rumsfeld really add to the poisonous disconnect between Bremer and Sanchez?

5) our most recent involvement in counterinsurgency--El Salvador--was a "win"

Really, is the ES experience valid or applicable at all? Did Big Army draw anything from here, or was this "win" seen as something interior to the SF community?

[SteveMetz]

Some quibbles:



I think the issue here was more that we did not know enough about the insurgency to tell who they were. I remember the old saw back in 2004-2005 was not AQ, but rather that they were all dead-ender Ba'athists, and they would dry up and blow away once Uday/Qusay died and Saddam was caught.



Not sure exactly what the international community was supposed to do about the insurgency, or that the Administration would have welcomed any assistance forthcoming. Control was the most important thing to this Admin. The treatment of de Mello before the UN bombing showed just how seriously the CPA and Bremer took the UN - that is, not at all.



After the election, our strategy did not appreciably change or improve.

They weren't this way already? And did Rumsfeld really add to the poisonous disconnect between Bremer and Sanchez?



Really, is the ES experience valid or applicable at all? Did Big Army draw anything from here, or was this "win" seen as something interior to the SF community?

I don't know how to make text boxes within a quote, so:

1. I meant if not for the smells-like-AQ dimension of the conflict, we could have disengaged or downgraded our involvement long ago. We've gotten where we are because the administration has to seem "tough on terrorists."

2. There's lots that could have been done:

--Turkey could have played initially, allowing a more rapid stabilization of the Sunni Triangle by the 4th
--Europe, India, etc could have seen peacekeeping troops when there still was peace to be kept
--The Gulf States could have provided reconstruction assistance
--The whole world, but especially the EU, could have helped with strategic communications

3. By the time of the election, we were committed to massive involvement. I'm suggesting that if not for the election, it would have been easier to have begun disengagement earlier. Or, conversely, to have sustained U.S. political control until the Iraqis were truly able to manage it. I believe we had two viable options: throw the keys to Chalabi in the summer of 2003 and beat feet; or run the place for a decade. By splitting the difference, we got the worst of both.

4. I wasn't clear. By civil military relations, I meant Rumsfeld's relationship with senior military, not the Bremer Sanchez thing. If the COCOM commander and all of the JCS had said, "Yea, Shinseki is probably right," things might have been different. I think some day H.R. McMaster Jr will write Dereliction of Duty II

5. I was suggesting that El Salvador allowed policymakers to draw the conclusion that we could successfully undertake counterinsurgency. No one stood up and screamed "that's an inapplicable lesson." One of the great ironies in that in 2004, a lot of people in DoD were looking at Algeria for lessons about how to conduct a counterinsurgency in an Arab country. No one was asking, "And how did that turn out for them?" Basically we figured that with the development of AirLand battle, we could derive operational lessons from the Germans without replicating their strategic blunders, so we could do the same with the French and counterinsurgency. This is kind of like a college coach cribbing a Charlie Weis game plan.

[Tom Odom]

One of the great ironies in that in 2004, a lot of people in DoD were looking at Algeria for lessons about how to conduct a counterinsurgency in an Arab country. No one was asking, "And how did that turn out for them?"

I remember that well. Rumsfeld held a limited showing of the film in the Pentagon and as I recall invited the press to sit in, which struck me as really bizarre given the FLN wins.

I put out two history lessons on the Alerian War, one of which highlighted the paradox of Trinquier's methods succeeding tactically and failing strategically, which the film The Battle of Algiers offered as its central message.

Tom