I was speaking to the change in society, not to the effectiveness of the policies. The number of valor awards from the 442nd pretty much puts any debate on that issue to bed.Originally Posted by tequila
I was speaking to the change in society, not to the effectiveness of the policies. The number of valor awards from the 442nd pretty much puts any debate on that issue to bed.
If you're talking about social cohesion, that tends to vary throughout history, generally based on economic conditions. I'd argue that the Civil War era which you cited before was a time of extremely low social cohesion, so much so that the Union itself split apart and significant portions of the population in both North & South were actively disloyal or aggressively nonparticipatory in the war itself. The WWII era had a much higher degree of social cohesion, but that was also a function of the industrial economy and its subsidiary, national conscription.I was speaking to the change in society, not to the effectiveness of the policies. The number of valor awards from the 442nd pretty much puts any debate on that issue to bed.
The WWII era was not more virtuous than today. It was vastly less egalitarian and unequal politically, saw violent and aggressive disenfranchisement of large segments of the American population, and from a purely military standpoint oversaw enormous incompetence and disasters which were either covered up or disregarded in the name of national morale (Market Garden, Pearl Harbor, the fall of the Philippines, Hurtgen Forest, the failure of Army commanders at Omaha to take advice from Pacific theater veterans, much of the Italian campaign, etc. etc.) IMO we need to stop looking at the past in sepia tone and understand it for what it really was - that's the only way to gain both understanding and lessons for the future.
Not more virtuous, but not less...
I agree with everything quoted above, though I suspect that if we both begin from this starting point, we will arrive at different conclusions. In the WWII era, many Americans did not see themselves as part of civil society. They wanted to be included and in this quest they endured injustices that few of us would tolerate today, being shunned due to their ethnicity or other unjust reasons. Today, an equal or larger proportion of America is unconcerned with membership, with some actively rejecting civil society.
If one does not care one way or the other about inclusion in civil society, then it is difficult for that person to place much importance on the outcome of battles that the society enters into (in other words, “militant Islamists hate America, not me”). He is susceptible to being persuaded to support or not support the battle for reasons that are disconnected from the benefits of success or the costs of failure (In other words, this argument can sound logical: “lots of teens with no other economic opportunities in life than to join the Army are dying in Iraq, therefore we should end this war”).
If one actively rejects and opposes the society around him, then that person is likely to seek to rally opposition to the battle. His most logical audience, aside from peers, is those who have the least interest in the benefits of winning, such as the personality above.
The (thankfully) modal American personality sees himself as a member of civil society, sees that he has a shared stake in the outcome of a battle, and is susceptible to persuasive arguments connected to the benefits of success or costs of failure or inaction. And there are still those among us today who are not members of civil society (residents, aspiring immigrants, etc) but who seek inclusion into society and hold the sense of a shared stake in the outcome of our battles.
Among those who see themselves as members of civil society or aspire to be part of it, I think that you will be hard-pressed to find many who oppose continuing our efforts in Iraq unless they think that failure is inevitable or that there is almost no benefit to succeeding. Contrast this with the rhetoric of the most vocal among those who reject or abstain from our civil society: Bush lied, Cheney is an evil oil baron, 4,000 dead, thousands of Iraqis are being raped and slaughtered by a handful of troops, we’re to blame for al-Qaeda’s actions, et cetera. There is not much evidence that they are concerned with the outcome and its implications for our nation. They are simply offended by the use of force in our national interest and horrified at human suffering, oblivious to the context in which it occurs.
And, just to clarify ahead of time, I do not expect everyone to agree with me, nor would I seek to persuade them by calling them names. I’m pondering the situation, not recommending a course of action. The former must precede the latter. Most of my peers prefer to discuss football and their upcoming PCS, so this forum is a more logical place to have my views challenged so that I can refine or reject them. Hopefully that doesn’t sound like I’m trying to be cute or coy – I do recognize that nutjobs pop up in open forums and purposely “disrupt”, “flame”, or spout extreme views that they have no intention of changing, regardless of the evidence against them. I present my views so that others may pick them apart or validate them.
Schmedlap can put me in the validation box.
While I might quibble around the edges a tiny bit and would add that most Americans are considerably more concerned with US success than they are about the factors cited by those opposed to this war (many to any war...), I think he has it mostly correct.
Errors are made in all wars, tequila cites a few from World War II. There were many more, some more egregious and / or damaging than those named -- Palau comes to mind -- but anything involving humans is highly subject to error and often for very base reasons. That is not going to change. Far more regrettably, a tendency to fail to learn from past mistakes also seems to be a human foible...
I would add that with respect to current operations, there have been errors aplenty -- strategic, operational and tactical -- in high places and one of the most important is the abject failure of this administration to outline its case for Iraq. This is the worst Admin for getting its message out in my memory.
I believe that the errors made in WW II and those made today do not negate the necessity of participation in either war.
You argue there is a disconnect between parts of our nation and civil society. However, we currently have an all-volunteer, professional military, which is in stark contrast to the traditional American way of war. Historically we rapidly stand up forces in times of need through conscription, and just as rapidly stand them down when the crisis ends. Standing armies in the United States have been historically small and insignificant, for our Founding Fathers warned us of the danger they bring. This is how we do it. This is our system.
I think you make some very good points, but is it right to be critical of portions of our nation when we have deviated so far from our historical norm?
Actually for most of our history, we've had an
all volunteer professional military; conscription was used briefly only in the Civil War and World War I.
It was reimposed for World War II; intended to be for the war period only. The world was irrevocably changed by WW II and we had become a global power so, for the very first time, the draft was reinstituted in peacetime (1948) after the war and that effectively gave us a quite large standing Army from 1950 until 1973, running about .004 of the population for most of that period with spikes for Korea and Viet Nam (only about seven out of 24) .
From 1973 until 1991, that figure was about .003 -- with no draft.
Compare that to 1930. A 165K Army (including the Army Air Corps) equated to about .0014 of the population. Today with vastly more responsibility it's only about .0017 (with about as many aircraft as has the Air force). That is not a significantly greater number and it doesn't approach the 1950-1991 figure.
I suggest that the deviation in strength and processes is not great and that the real and very significant deviation is the transformation from an inward looking growing nation to a major power with global responsibilities. Given that major change in focus and responsibility -- wanted or not, we have it -- the actual change is miniscule and unavoidable.
The internal US societal changes are, I believe, a different issue that have little bearing on the size and structure of the Army.
Hi Ken,
I'm not sure that I would agree with you on this. I have a suspicion that the social changes and, more importantly, the disjuncture between stated political ideologies and the "lived experience" of many Americans, is having a major effect on the size and structure of the Army. As a case in point, the issue of junior officer retention and the use of cash bonuses seems to point to a significant problem.
A few of my more radical, left wing friends and colleagues have made an interesting argument that is, IMHO, somewhat germane to this issue: they argue that, for the past 70+ years, the Management Society has been, basically, attempting to "domesticate" the average American. While I think they are definitely over the top in their rhetoric and their more than somewhat paranoid conspiracy theories, they does raise some interesting observations.
First, North American culture has been shifted significantly from a somewhat balanced point of individual freedoms and responsibilities to one where individual "rights" dominate. Second, and again obver the same period (roughly 1910 to the present if we go back to the Taylorite model), we have seen an increasing acquiescence to the power of "experts" to define how things should be run. Third, we have seen a systematic stripping away of many of the "traditional" systems of meaning (often religious, but also nationalistic) and their replacement with commercialized versions (i.e. and individual gets meaning not from acting within a transcendent system but from buying things and "constructing" their "own" identities).
I think that this trend has had an effect on the Army and, probably more on the USMC, since they still operate with an "older" form of "meaning" and identity construction. As a result, I think that you see the military attracting people who have a more "conservative" (please not the small "c") attitude towards rights and responsibilities, and this is where I see the disjuncture between the military and the rest of civil society showing up.
I'm tossing this out really as a discussion point rather than something I could prove.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Marc,
I suspect you may be right about the shift in the systems that provide "meaning" to individuals' lives. But, I think it is more of a pendulum swing than a move to a new system.
If you remember your Locke, you jnow that he identified our fundamental rights as life, liberty, and property. We seem to have gone back to the Lockean notion of property as a defining characteristic of our place in the world. This is far from a new thing. What is somewhat new is what now counts as property. Where once it was what one actually produced with the sweat of one's brow (the original definition of property from Locke), it is now the number and type of possessions that our buying power allows us to acquire--necessities versus luxuries if you will. Those who are more concerned with the necessities are those who fit into what you described as "small c" conservatives, IMO.
To put this a little more poetically, Rousseau noted "Man is born free yet is everywhere in chains." Today, more of us than ever before are "chained" by our "need" to acquire the latest and greatest consumer goods instead of the basic essentials of life (like food and shelter). As a result, we have less time/desire to be "chained" by such things as national service, unless they can satisify our consumerism needs.
Those who are chained to the more fundamental needs are more likely to be attracted to the radical appeal. They see it as a means to break free from those chains so they can be shackled to the "higher pleasure."
Hi Marc.
Note I said little bearing. We can differ on the amount I suppose...
I suggest the bonuses are indeed a response to societal changes -- the metrosexualization slash liberalization and the increasing emphasis individualism for just two impactors -- but those are responses to address the societal impacts, not drivers of the size and structure.
I'd also suggest that junior officer retention invariably decreases with a volunteer force in any wartime scenario; the wives don't like it and the more sensitive of said J.O find out that war is brutal and not just an academic exercise, they are turned off at the waste and trauma (as is most everyone; some just tolerate it better than others).
I broadly agree with the rest of your comment, however, this:while true has -- thus far -- had little bearing on size and structure but great impact on the disjunctive factor.."As a result, I think that you see the military attracting people who have a more conservative" (please not the small "c") attitude towards rights and responsibilities, and this is where I see the disjuncture between the military and the rest of civil society showing up."
The reverse of that attitude, the progressive view in general, has had a more significant impact on size and structure in the downsizing, imposition of various social engineering programs and funding cuts prior to 2001.
There has been a societal effect, no question but I contend it has been minimal to this point. That said, I'll acknowledge the future doesn't portend well...
I'll take the bait.I have a suspicion that the social changes and, more importantly, the disjuncture between stated political ideologies and the "lived experience" of many Americans, is having a major effect on the size and structure of the Army. As a case in point, the issue of junior officer retention and the use of cash bonuses seems to point to a significant problem.
A few of my more radical, left wing friends and colleagues have made an interesting argument that is, IMHO, somewhat germane to this issue: they argue that, for the past 70+ years, the Management Society has been, basically, attempting to "domesticate" the average American. While I think they are definitely over the top in their rhetoric and their more than somewhat paranoid conspiracy theories, they does raise some interesting observations.
First, North American culture has been shifted significantly from a somewhat balanced point of individual freedoms and responsibilities to one where individual "rights" dominate. Second, and again obver the same period (roughly 1910 to the present if we go back to the Taylorite model), we have seen an increasing acquiescence to the power of "experts" to define how things should be run. Third, we have seen a systematic stripping away of many of the "traditional" systems of meaning (often religious, but also nationalistic) and their replacement with commercialized versions (i.e. and individual gets meaning not from acting within a transcendent system but from buying things and "constructing" their "own" identities).
I think that this trend has had an effect on the Army and, probably more on the USMC, since they still operate with an "older" form of "meaning" and identity construction. As a result, I think that you see the military attracting people who have a more "conservative" (please not the small "c") attitude towards rights and responsibilities, and this is where I see the disjuncture between the military and the rest of civil society showing up.
I'm tossing this out really as a discussion point rather than something I could prove
Marc
First off. If you walked into the lines of any Combat Arms unit in the English-speaking world, and asked for a show of hands of who was right-wing, most of the hands would go up; when you asked who was left wing, maybe a few defiant, or embarrassed individuals might raise their hands, to the (at best) the jeering of all the rest or (just as likely) the general annoyance of said. In general, I doubt that you would be able to find very many individuals, especially inside the Combat Arms, who would admit to be "left-wing". Even outside the Combat Arms, the troops tend to be right-wing in their views.
The Officer Corps, even though they are perhaps more likely (I suspect) to have individuals of leftist persuasion in their midst, not only tend to be rightist in their persuasions, but over the last generation or so a discernible "hardening" into right-wing tendencies has visibly occurred.
Second, and developing the first point, not only has there been much comment in recent years over the "politicization" of the Officer Corps (and in at least three of said English-speaking countries) - and to the right - but being in the Military in recent decades involves a political indentity as well, that is more or less part-and-parcel of being "Military". Political Parties are observed to be either Anti-Military - and invariably "Left-Wing" - or Pro-Military - and invariably "Right-Wing". Given the veiled (and sometimes open)hostility of Left-Wing politicians and parties to the Military in general, and the rather more "benign" (often it isn't), even solicitous attitudes of Right-Wing politicans and parties to the Military, the officers and men find themselves repelled by the former and inclined to the latter.
Third, and back to the "identity" matter. In the absence of strong traditional identities normally organic to society that suppressed or denigrated in our current "individualistic" society, people are encouraged to "construct" their own identity. First off, people are not just individuals; it is neither natural nor normal for humans to be simply individuals. Humans are naturally and normally organic members of human society (and I'm not going for the pathetic "communitarianism" rubbish of a decade or so ago - good riddance to that). They are not by nature simple individuals; political "philosophical" (I would say ideological instead) rhetoric directed to such ends is self-serving rubbish (literally) for selfish conceptions of human life and the ideologies that are constructed to see such conceptions brought into reality - like now. When such nihilistic (and to those who instead prefer the term "existentialist", well this is what existentialism really is with the thin layer of varnish stripped-off - existentialists are nihilists in denial) conceptions of human life are imposed upon human society, then individuals stripped of traditional sources of identity much more easily adopt whatever political persuasions are common to their place of work.
Fourth. The place of work has become so vital to personal identity for so many people in the absence of other sources of identity that the prevailing "culture" (in the modern anthropologically-defined sense) either socializes its member so those views, or is likewise attractive to individuals who see their own views more of less reflected in those places of work, and thus are drawn to those workplaces. For men, certainly, work has always been a key source of identity and purpose; said matter is greatly aggravated when there is little or no vital or at least important social attachments outside of work, or work and immediate family. The Military for one, is often seen by many men of "Right-Wing" persuasions to be attractive, even conducive to their own views. Once in the Military, they often find their Right-Wing views not only confirmed or developed further, but hardened as well. Conversely, those who are of "Left-Wing" persuasions strongly tend to view the Military with suspicion or even contempt, and avoid joining. Thus, the Military attracts, and is seen to be attractive to, those of the Right, and repellant to, those of the Left.
Fifth. In an individualistic society that deliberately leaves its members to construct (or rather, seem to construct) their own identities and purposes in life, such nihilism, given the breakdown of organic and traditional social attachments and identities - and above all meaning - creates two things. The first is a self-fulfilling prophecy - Leftists don't like the Military, and don't join; Rightists like the military, and are inclined to join - and the Military becomes inclined to the Right, whilst the Left are inclined to other professions, such as Academia, the Media, certain professions, and the like. This creates a not only a visible tension, but a potential source of serious conflict in the event of Left-Wing Governments and Right-Wing Militaries (in addition to the tensions that exist when both are of the Right). Thus, wars like Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq lead to much bitterness back home, and a "war" of sorts is waged between the Left and the Right. The Military, not without good reason, strongly tends to perceive the attentions and intentions of the Left as being inherently subversive to its operations, and even to the Military as an Institution itself. Conflicts betwen the Military and the Right are usually (not always) unencumbered by such mutual suspicion and animosity. The Left, for its part, tends to see the Military as a tool of the Right (at best) or a key "plotter" so to speak in whatever vast Right-Wing conspiracy its political ilk are up to (at worst). Needless to say, the situatation is often poisonous. And it is the Left that tends to want to cut the Military, and deeply, whereas the Right tends to be more reluctant in this area.
marc is correct about his suspicions with regard to existing social conditions and individual identity. But given the fact that social scientists aren't exactly beating down the Military's doors to get in and do serious, open-minded research and study on the matter, there's not a lot of serious, objective, documented proof on this. Just the testimony of those who are or have been in, the Military.
I think that the Composition, much more so than the Size and Structure, of the military is most affected by this; but is has a lesser, though real impact on the latter matters.
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-24-2007 at 03:50 PM.
I'm not sure why the point about historical norms is significant to what I addressed.
My opinion is that many Americans have rejected our civil society, but have exploited the benefits of that society to exert disproportionate influence over debates concerning our national interests. I think that I am right to view this situation as a bad thing, regardless of the historical norms in question. Public debate should not be dominated by citizens who reject the civil society whose interests are at stake.
Just for clarification: this is not to assert that those who oppose our efforts in Iraq are, by definition, anti- or un-American. It is simply my observation that the people who are the most vocal, active, and energetic opponents of the war, who are driving the information campaign to prematurely end operations in Iraq, are doing so because they actively reject our society and they are offended by the application of our national power.
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