ROKMAN - very good questions to ask, but I don't think you're as out of your league as you seem to think. General William E. DePuy, who gave the US Army much of its present tactical doctrine, obeserved that there was quite a striking correlation between infantry and armour small-unit tactics; the principles of movement, suppression, assault, and security were the same.Originally Posted by ROKMAN
The RM Commando 21 organization is remininiscent of that of the Bundesheer's Mountain and Parachute Battalions (at least until recent years - they've reorganized, I'm not clear on their present composition): Two Rifle Companies and two Anti-Tank Companies, plus HQ and other CS and CSS elements. I'm not completely sold on it, but it offers intriguing possibilities.
The 8-man Rifle Section is a personal peeve of mine. That's what I had to use in the RCR (most Commonwealth Armies use an 8- or 9-man Rifle Section, the difference between 8 or 9 being dependent upon funds for troops slots, and when the 9th man is authorized, he's stuck carrying a Carl Gustav. The 8-man Rifle Section is easy to control, and responsive, but vulnerable. Having 8 men gives you almost no capacity to sustain battle losses, and as I was told in the RCR, such a Section would lose 60% of its strength in the first 24 hours of offensive operations (while attacking a dug-in Soviet Motorized Rifle unit, I presumed - and after attacking such a position on ex, I can see why). Clearly, there's a problem there.
The other problem with the 8-man Section is that the Section Commander and the Section 2i/c are not free to move about as necessary within the Section. The 8-man Section is divided into two 4-man Fire Teams (Australian, British, and New Zealand Armies) or Assault Groups (Canadian Army). The Section Commander personally leads one fire team/assault group, and the Section 2i/c the other. While discipline is certainly tight and control good (and the NCOs are practically indistinguishable from the other soldiers of the section - a good thing), the NCOs are necessarily divided in their attentions by fighting the section as a whole, fighting their own fire teams/assault groups, staying alive themselves, and handling commiunications and sitreps, etc., with platoon, company, etc. That's a lot of burden and a lot of potential distraction.
The final problem with the 8-man Section is its tactical use in offensive operations. It does not typically use the US technique of sending a fire team forward a safe distance with the other (or in USMC others) following, thus potentially avoiding the total destruction of a squad in the first bursts of enemy machine gun/mortar fire. The entire section, both fire teams/assault groups advance like an over-sized US fire team, while the rest of the platoon supports; the advantage of this is that, coming under fire, the entire section instantly responds, bringing its entire firepower to bear on the source of enemy fire; the disadvantage of this is as I described immediately above - the section might not survive the initial enemy fire to respond in kind.
Yeah, ROKMAN, I agree that the Marines' DO Squad is hardly ideal for non-COIN ops. This is a reconaissance/forward observer/raid element, not really a line squad.
I like Tom's ideas for a squad (except for the breech specialization by just one element). As for whether it and higher units are too large and too demanding upon manpower, I'll put it this way: using the present US Army organization and tactical concepts, you'll suffer up to twice the losses while having only 2/3rds of the manpower to begin with, compared to Tom's organization and the tactical concepts it uses. When the shooting starts in a high-intensity war, no one is going to like the fact that the infantry battalions are running out of rifleman at least a few times faster than the Army can train replacements for them - that's a real manpower problem. Tom's way goes a long way to avoiding that.
The German panzergrenadier sqaud was similar to British Commonwealth section with the following differences:
1. Used GPMGs/MMGs instead of LMGs - YEAH!
2. The Squad Leader had control over the Squads' machine guns, while ASL led assault; in Commonwealth Section, the Section commander "leads" the assault, while the Section 2i/c "controls" the cover fire
.
3. The Germans did not use Battle Drill or Fire Teams; once the fire fight was won, the machine gun teams simply stayed with the SL, and the riflemen went with the ASL into the assault. But as the Squad reduced in size from an authorized 12 men and finally down to 8-9 men, it lost its offensive power. In the defence, the machine gun teams nominally remained under the control of the SL; in practice, the machine gun teams were the defensive line, as there were so few riflemen left by late in the war - so an NCO per machine gun team was not exactly unheard of.
The Germans, like the Commonwealth, held that the squad was not independent, but just a part of the platoon. But like the Commonwealth, the Germans found that independent squad/section operations were necessary.
As to your last question ROKMAN, the answer requires some explanation. The USMC Rifle Squad is best (but not quite ideal) in and of itself, provided that it has machine guns, rather than automatic rifles. But the RM Commando 21 organization follows the German Mountain/Parachute Battalion organization, which provides for the best minor-unit level suppression. In WWII, German infantry battalions either had a full machine-gun company, or each rifle company had a full machine-gun platoon (depending on circumstances), plus either a separate Heavy Company (mortar, pioneer, AT, AA platoons, etc) or elements of those attached from Regimental companies. With 4-6 MGs per platoon, and 2-3 platoons per machine gun company (plus mortar fire), German rifle companies were often able to more or less walk to their objectives (yes, I said walk, not pepper-pot/bound) with such fire support coordinated at either company- or even battalion-level.
The more recent German organizations are developments of this, and with the Royal Marines also adopting this organization, having 8-man Rifle Sections is only a problem when:
1. Either the terrain or cover masks the Fire Support Companies' fires.
2. Coordination with the Fire Support Companies breaks down or said companies come under serious attack.
3. When 8-man Rifle Sections are detached on independent missions by as a result of tactical circumstances.
In these circumstances, the 13-man USMC Rifle Squad is much better suited. It can provide its own heavy suppressive fires using two of its three fire teams while the other assaults; it can take heavy losses and still remain effective; the squad as a whole does not have to reorganize to accomodate unfamiliar and newly attached strangers who themselves are unfamiliar with this particular squad; and you don't have to take fire support (platoon weapons sqaud or heavy weapons attached from company) away from the parent platoon or company which is already having to deal with the loss of an entire squad while still facing the potential for contact with the enemy.
Finally, with the Squad Leader free to fight the squad and not have to fight a fire team as well, the USMC Rifle Squad's only major problem is that it does not have a dedicated ASL likewise free from fighting his own fire team in order to handle communications/sitreps/adminstration/logistics and the like in order to free the SL from having to deal with platoon/company when ever they get on the horn; and the ASL can deal with platoon/company over all the beans n' bullets matters while the SL deals with the enemy. I think Tom had that idea.
Sorry for the long response ROKMAN.
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