Quote Originally Posted by Merv Benson
I think it will have an effect. Whether 80,000 is enough may be a question, but I don't think Saddam needed more than that to keep control. His methods were, however, much more brutal and terrifying.
Saddam had a much stronger security forces-to-population ratio, which consisted of concentric rings of watchers watching watchers. Each ring consisted of a blend of military, "law" enforcement and intelligence elements. Not to mention the ranks of informants, which, although they may not have reached East German levels, was still a formidable operation. I had the very interesting opportunity to view Saddam's Baghdad up close when I worked with UNSCOM in the mid-'90s. Think of Moscow under Stalin.

Having so many individuals with a depth of experiencing in running HUMINT and technical collection ops against their own people in their own country certainly provided the Sunni Arab insurgents with a certain advantage from the get-go. The Kurds, having essentially fought a vicious CI battle with the Mukhabarat since gaining autonomy during Provide Comfort, have developed a significant degree of expertise within their AO at foiling their ops. The Shi'a, having been constantly under the thumb of Saddam until OIF, never developed an equivalent CI capability. The new Iraqi regime still faces a significant challenge in developing an integrated CI capability that can meet the insurgent threat, but is still suitable for an emerging democracy. In fighting off the threat, we don't want to end up recreating the building blocks of dictatorship.