Ken

That’s exactly what I’m talking about. With a more modular MOS immaterial force structure comes better mission flexibility and the ability to task organize based on the mission or the over quoted and seldom used “Troop to Task” concept.

This smaller MOS immaterial structure also builds leaders as NCOs will lead their cells at a far more junior rank then when they traditionally become the Detachment team sergeant. With the high OPTEMPO and commitment to CENTCOM can we not better divide and conquer on the force commitment to FID missions in other theaters world wide? I’ve been on many JCET with one or two guys on the platform and the rest of the team either prepping the material for the next day or sitting in the back of the class.

At the more advisory type LCE roles (re JSOTF-P) are 12 advisors needed at the Battalion level? Can a four man element form the advisory LCE while the remainder of the ODA breaks down into a intell/targeting cell and maybe another out doing village assessments? Or can we cover down on 3 Battalions with a four man cell at each, thus spreading our unit coverage and not committing more forces?

Here’s some of the Pros and Cons I’ve come up with, of course as I mentioned this is BEFORE I discovered this site and thread so this weekend I’m going to print off the entire thread and comb over it with a fine tooth comb.

Pros
• Flexible
• Modular
• MOS immaterial-troops to task
• Fits most current TTPs (CQB stack, 4 man recce team, 4 man Mobility, etc)
• Allows for force multiplication (re more missions): 12 divided by 3 equals three times the amount of useable “teams” for many missions.
• Reinforces the “thru-by-with” mentality: Hard to take a target down with four guys, becomes doable with 12 or even more 15 or 20, the larger we make ODAs the more we promote unilateral mission mindset.
• Develops tactical leaders at the lower levels
• Smaller profile/footprint element
• MOS immaterial- Promotes Generalization of Operators: DA centric operations have forced SF to become more and more specialized (shooters/assaulters) and less and less generalized.
• Smaller units (not always four I know) have some historical precedence in SOF units: ie recce teams, OSS jedbugs, etc

Cons
• Smaller package=weaker force pro posture: Will higher fear deploying 4 operators without the safety in number (albeit only 12 normally)
• MOS immaterial force structure downplays MOS technical expertise
• Breaks from SF centric historical ODA/split team concept
• Less control of smaller teams: Will higher allow 4 man teams led by a senior NCO deploy on missions with no officer?

Feedback is appreciated. And all good ideas/quotes will be credited in the article. Paul Howe (Leadership and Training for the Fight) sent me some great ideas about this stuff I’ll pull out of my notes and post later this weekend.

Thanks again for the feedback and great stuff.

VR

Duke