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Thread: Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers

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  1. #1
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    At the risk of raising blood pressures and getting myself banned, I have to say that the Economist has done an excellent job and the derogatory comments about the article and the British demonstrate exactly why we are in the trouble we are in in Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan.

    To put it another way, some of you just don't get it, and you don't know that you don't get it - which is why you don't like the Economists take on things.

    Lets start with some neurolinguistics again "Framing" - if you frame Iraq as a "war" and then tag it as something that is either a "win" or a "lose" you are setting yourself up for disappointment, because these concepts don't compute in an insurgency.

    Take Malaya for example, the British didn't call it a "war" it was officially described as "The Malayan Emergency", the campaign in Northern Ireland against the IRA hasn't been called a "war" either.. The "enemy" (for want of a better word) weren't regarded as "soldiers" fighting a "War" they were regarded as criminals performing criminal acts and if caught they were dealt with by the civil justice system.

    Names DO matter because with each name there comes a whole host of connotations; War - enemy - defeat - victory - soldier - winning - losing - battle.

    The end state we eventually reach in Iraq is not going to be defined as a "win" or a "loss", that much is obvious already. Instead we will ultimately settle for some sort of political compromise that will have good parts and perhaps bad parts from our point of view. The Economist implicitly understands this.

    What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.

    The simplest example I can give of this asymmetry is from my own past: I was once given that most delightful role you can have in a war game - playing the enemy, in this case the VC. We had a ball, and every night we went to sleep with the alarm clock set for 0200 or thereabouts when we would get up and carefully creep towards a perimeter, throw a few grenade simulators and make some noise, then we'de go back to bed in the knowledge that the poor guys in the base were going to be stood to for the rest of the evening. - Thats asymmetry - liittle effort by us - big effort by you.

    Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One. A journalist asked him about precautions being taken against the possibility of Iraqi minefields and how many mines there might be?

    Schwartzkopf simply replied "Son, all it takes is one mine." Same again - little effort by minelayer - big effort by us.

    There is a video on You Tube of a radar controlled Gatling gun destroying incoming mortar bombs at Balad. Great demonstration of technology and a great video, but I couldn't help from thinking about how much it was costing in ammo to destroy each of these old $5.00 81 (or 82)mm mortar rounds. Same thing - little effort by insurgents - big effort by us. Thats asymmetry

    I also fail to understand the comment that:

    The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.
    No significance? How many billions have been spent on hardening vehicles? How many billions are spent on road blocks, checkpoints and god knows what other security measures to deal with these threats in Iraq??? Not significant???? Of course they are significant because they have constrained the way we must operate every day, all day!

    "Winning" in counterinsurgency, as it was taught to me, involves getting people, including the insurgents, into a state where they think that its going to be better for them in future to either stop fighting or stop supporting those doing the fighting, and as we have sadly seen "Shock and Awe" just doesn't cut it as a motivator. The Economist seems to understand this.

    Sorry for the rambling post, it saddens me deeply that some people just don't get this.

  2. #2
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by walrus View Post
    ...
    To put it another way, some of you just don't get it, and you don't know that you don't get it - which is why you don't like the Economists take on things.
    Most of us here have been saying the same thing the Economist said for some time. I went on a rant longer than yours just about the stupidity of the words 'victory,' 'war' and 'win.'

    I suggest there's a difference in deciding something is superficial as opposed to not "liking the Economists take on things" in the sense that anyone disagreed with it.

    The end state we eventually reach in Iraq is not going to be defined as a "win" or a "loss", that much is obvious already. Instead we will ultimately settle for some sort of political compromise that will have good parts and perhaps bad parts from our point of view. The Economist implicitly understands this.
    Neither you or the Economist have a patent on understanding that problem. Again, a numberl of us have made that point

    What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.
    Or that point. The recurring thread not only on this board but from most of the folks in the US DoD for some time is that we can screw it up, only the Iraqis and the Afghans can fix it. I guess you missed all that as well...

    I'll also note that most of us are more than aware of the screwups, plural and by many actors, that got us to this point and have had no problems stating that.

    The simplest example I can give of this asymmetry is from my own past: I was once given that most delightful role you can have in a war game - playing the enemy, in this case the VC. We had a ball, and every night we went to sleep with the alarm clock set for 0200 or thereabouts when we would get up and carefully creep towards a perimeter, throw a few grenade simulators and make some noise, then we'de go back to bed in the knowledge that the poor guys in the base were going to be stood to for the rest of the evening. - Thats asymmetry - liittle effort by us - big effort by you.
    That is a simple example. Having spent a couple of years in Viet Namese rice paddies against the real thing, they were a little more painstaking than you were -- they would almost never attack a fixed position without at least two painstaking reconnaissance peeks. They also had RPGs and AKs -- didn't do the suicide bit though, just got a lot of their own folks killed by getting caught before they got to the wire.

    Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One....
    We can differ on that...

    There is a video on You Tube of a radar controlled Gatling gun destroying incoming mortar bombs at Balad. Great demonstration of technology and a great video, but I couldn't help from thinking about how much it was costing in ammo to destroy each of these old $5.00 81 (or 82)mm mortar rounds. Same thing - little effort by insurgents - big effort by us. Thats asymmetry
    Yes it is. It's also not smart on a couple of other levels but we have a bad habit of relying on technology rather than training and trying to insure troop comfort to almost the same extent we go to in protecting troop safety. Penalty of living in a democracy with a dim, panicky legislative body and collectively more money than good sense. *

    I also fail to understand the comment that:
    ""The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.""

    No significance? How many billions have been spent on hardening vehicles? How many billions are spent on road blocks, checkpoints and god knows what other security measures to deal with these threats in Iraq??? Not significant???? Of course they are significant because they have constrained the way we must operate every day, all day!
    The items have no significance -- the people using those things are quite significant. They are doing the things you state, so I guess you and the Economist missed that one. It's not the hardware, it's people and their mind and dedication...

    Oh -- and those vehicles? Comment * above applies.

    "Winning" in counterinsurgency, as it was taught to me, involves getting people, including the insurgents, into a state where they think that its going to be better for them in future to either stop fighting or stop supporting those doing the fighting, and as we have sadly seen "Shock and Awe" just doesn't cut it as a motivator. The Economist seems to understand this.

    Sorry for the rambling post, it saddens me deeply that some people just don't get this.
    I think most everyone here gets that and has for some time. One could even say that's why this board exists (note the Title and headers). The Economist is apparently not a reader or contributor, others who stop by only sporadically may also miss some commentary. Nothing wrong with that. Except perhaps those real VC with their painstaking recon before attacking might have been able to show one something about taking the effort to know what one is attacking instead of assuming things...
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-29-2007 at 12:44 AM. Reason: Typos

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    I am going to have too agree with Ken almost 100% here.

    We are more dissapointed in the Economist, which has for many years a periodical of fine caliber, that unfortunately has been deteriorating. Our (I believe I am not talking for just myself. Correct me if I'm wrong. ) objection to the article is that it is a summary of issues which have been, and are being debated and discussed which is myopic and selective in its view of this situation and it historical parallels.

    What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.
    I think anyone who has been following this site is aware of that.

    Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One....
    Perhaps the greates persona ( the past 30 years), but don THE GREATEST personality or general. Desert Storm was impressive, but far from perfect. He put far too much confidence in technology and air power finding targets (specifically SCUDS) on the ground. Whether or not he was misguided in his confidence is an issue for debate. His record on this and other issues precludes him from holding the title of "the greatest commander America has produced since WWII." I do greatley admire the man, but that goes too far. I would however give him and award for, "gallantry in the face of Press." He certainly new how to deal with them.

    For everything else I want to say, see Ken.

    Adam
    Last edited by Steve Blair; 10-29-2007 at 04:07 PM. Reason: fixed quotes

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    MO says when confroting religious autocrats at the regional and national level whose ideology is grounded in Quranic Socialism, there is going to have to be a bit more destroying than building. The new ideology and tactics may be producing more temporary accomodation on the part of indigenous peoples/host forces that fundamental change. Rigid paternalism, rigid monothesim and rigid tribalism have been around alot longer than than empowerment, cultural sensitivity and warm hugs. If you ain't marrying their women and praying some to their God, you ain't going to leave much of a footprint behind when you go home.

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Gotta agree with Ken - lots of agreeing to disagree with the piece (which is little more IMO than a rehashing of the obvious with a lot of hot air tossed in for good measure) and some other comments (Schwartzkoph's 'greatness' comes to mind immediately, but there are others as well).
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    What's obvious to you, isn't obvious to everyone. I thought it was a decent summary of key concepts written in a way that amateurs could understand.

    As point of reference, I'm sure most Iraqis would laugh their ass off at our Iraqi culture discussion because they are full of gross simplification and the obvious. It doesn't mean that they're not helpful to someone.

    Also, I need to disagree with Ken's earlier point. The fact that 150,000 - give or take - US soldiers are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan by people with PRGs and AKs greatly increases the likelihood of Iran getting the bomb and that obviously has major strategic geopolitical implications.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 10-29-2007 at 05:23 PM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    . . .

    Also, I need to disagree with Ken's earlier point. The fact that 150,000 - give or take - US soldiers are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan by people with PRGs and AKs greatly increases the likelihood of Iran getting the bomb and that obviously has major strategic geopolitical implications.
    You do note that you and I say it's the people -- which was my point -- and not the tools? We can agree on that much.

    I disagree that US Soldiers being occupied (as opposed to "tied down") in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to greatly increase the likelihood of Iraq getting "the bomb." If it has any effect at all, it is more likely to deter them. Give it some thought.

    Nor, for that matter, do I think that even if Iran had a nuclear capability that the strategic implications would be major -- acknowledging that you and I would probably differ on what constitutes 'major.'

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