Rifle squad composition

[Ken White]

In a COIN fight, I suspect that every swingin' Richard out there ought to be thinking about the C in METT-TC a whole lot and their squad leaders,PSGs, and 1SGs better be making sure they do. The NCO chain is about making sure troops do the right things and not get put in jail for letting their "testosterone" do the thinking for them.

I agree that practical application of the principles vary with the size of the organization and the size of the fight, but you can't train folks without some basic set of principles to apply situationally. "Alfa Fire Team lays down a base of fire while Bravo maneuvers right to take the high ground" is just as much an application of mass, maneuver, and economy of force as is "1 ID makes the main effort on the left with 3ACR screening to the right. 2ID and 1AD follow and support to exploit the penetration by 1 ID. 210 FA BDE is DS to 1ID, o/o DS to 1AD."

Huh? Not just restricted to COIN, watching out for civilians applies to all levels of war, I'd think.

They do. Think about civilians, that is. But at Squad level, it's an individual thing -- I mean the civilians in view on one hand and the individual actions of Joe on the other hand. If Joe and his boss are well trained, it will all go well. It's an action thing, not a planning parameter. Wheras at higher echelons it's a group and planning thing, a thinking thing...

If the kids are trained well, they'll do well. If they are not -- or if someone blows it and flips out (and anyone can flip out given the wrong triggers at the right time) then all the harrumphing about the chain of command -- officer and NCO -- "not doing their job" is immaterial and is nothing but, in all too many cases, after the fact CYA.

If they're trained well, they're less likely to err and they'll also spot and the chain will remove the likely weak links. Sadly my son tried to do that to two kids who worked for him in Afghanistan last year, his CO agreed -- Bn overruled and the kids stayed until one got hurt and got some others hurt by failing to react in time while the other wigged out.

That strikes me as a case where the NCOs were doing their job and so were the Company Grades but they ran into a Field Grade let down...

I've seen that too many places and too times over too many years. It is simply not smart.

Moving right along,

Unfortunately, what you find out at Squad level is that those doctrinal principles sound fine and work well on paper -- or even in a MILES engagement. OTOH, when there are a lot of real caps popping, that goes by the wayside. Really. It becomes a rock to rock or tree to tree or room to room effort in disjointed gaggles and Team members get mixed up, the SAW gunner gets hit, Murphy is everywhere. Just isn't as neat and pretty as it is in the book.

Yet, the Company can still say, honestly, that "First Platoon executed fire and maneuver and cleared the objective at 1545Z."

Consider also that if you are a Division OpO, Drowning Creek at Camp McKall you will not even notice in your planning; at Bde level you may or may not notice it, probably not but you almost certainly will not think of it as an obstacle. Nor, likely, will the Bn S3.

As a Company Commander, you'll note that it IS an obstacle and as a Platoon Leader, you will flat know it's an obstacle -- and a significant one.

Echelons matter. Significantly. Your stated tenet is one of the major flaws in our doctrine today; all people of the same rank and specialty are interchangeable (they aren't) and all doctrine is echelon immaterial -- it flat is not.

Ron has asked several times about factors at the Operational level. We don't do it well because we try to stretch tactical doctrine upward and strategic thought (we have no strategic doctrine) down.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, size matters...