Abolish the Air Force

[selil]

They have the Saturn V at Kennedy... I was recently there and they have the whole enchilada suspended from the ceiling. Monster does not describe it well enough. I've got a picture of the wife and kids standing underneath it...

[Adam L]

Missiles are great in their place (and we should have and use more of them), but for close air support there is nothing like a human pilot on the scene.

Missiles can have long lead times beween when the decision to fire is made and when the warhead hits the target (or misses completely). Aircraft may have longer lead times to get on scene, but when they do they can react quickly. That means an aircraft has a better shot at a moving or fleeting target than a missile.

An aircraft can make a quick return pass if the weapon misses or malfunctions.

An aircraft can stay on station for a long time - sometimes hours.

Finally, there's nothing like fighters overhead to keep away the enemy's aircraft. That's an advantage that makes the rest of the USAF's money and issues sorta worthwhile.

Yes, an aircraft is much better than a missile in many (most) situations, but the AF beyond any other service is developing aircraft that are obscenely expensive, fragile and costly in money, time and labor to maintain. G-d forbid one of our new f22's gets hit, the composite wing skin is almost impossible to repair. Once you get even a scratch (that penetrates one layer) in most of these new composites it will eventually expand (there goes stealth and the stability of an already unstable aircraft.)

The AF wants to control all fixed wing research including UAV's. If they want to appear as though they are in any way with what’s going on they have to develop a CAS aircraft that meats the following requirements:

1. Alluminium/titanium superstructure
2. The composite skin and aerodynamic surfaces must be able to be removed and replaced quickly (like an F1 car, sort of.)
3. Light weight (hence 1 & 2) with a long loiter time and high payload capacity.
4. Must be highly maneuverable at low altitudes with the capability to maneuver like a dive-bomber.
5. Must be able to take off from improvised runways and have a small wheel base (sort of like the OV10.)
6. Must be a stable airframe flown without computer assist.
[There should be research (or subsidizing of current private sector research) into diesel engines for rotary airplanes. This will greatly increase range as well as economy]
5. Must be CHEAP.

Basically, a more economical a10 combined with and updated OV10.

If they can develop and fund a program like this I think they might demonstrate their importance in COIN operations. Right now instead of just admitting that their primary job is not COIN they are trying to justify using an angle grinder to trim toe nails. LOL!

Adam

[Adam L]

They have the Saturn V at Kennedy... I was recently there and they have the whole enchilada suspended from the ceiling. Monster does not describe it well enough. I've got a picture of the wife and kids standing underneath it...

It is absolutely staggering to stand next to a machine of such immense proportions. Not to mention that the entire thing had less computer power than my calculator.

Adam

[Adam L]

Slapout:
A B-2 is just an airplane that can go a long way, carry a lot and penetrate air defenses. An imaginative person can do a lot with a weapon like that.

Yes, a creative person can do a lot and overcome enemy air defenses, but the damn things can't get wet. They are spending a fortune upgrading the computers in these planes, but they can't find a way to get rid of this "little" problem.

Adam

[carl]

Slapout:

I am not so sure the Saturn 5 was either simple or inexpensive. There were a lot of parts to that thing, like thousands and thousands. Plus it was liquid fueled so it took days and days to assemble, transport and fuel. I don't remember but there may have been restrictions on how long you could leave it sitting there fueled and ready to go. And there was a huge infrastructure needed to support it. Liquid fueled rockets make a cumbersome weapon.

Anyway we could go back and forth about relative expense for a long time and not resolve it. I for sure don't know enough to do so.

True our enemies are developing missiles; but the reason those missiles vex us is because they may be used for throwing nukes. For throwing nukes, nothing beats a missile. I don't think we would very worried about North Korean or Iranian missiles if they were only going to deliver h.e. warheads.

The US has a rather different purpose in mind, and airplanes can often fulfill that purpose better that missiles.

As far as arty vs. CAS, people like Cavguy have the experience that makes their opinions really count; but as a civilian who only knows what he's read, CAS has some real value to it.

[carl]

but the damn things can't get wet.

What do you mean by this? They can't fly in rain? I am not trying to be a smart-aleck, I just never heard of this problem.

[Adam L]

Slapout:

I am not so sure the Saturn 5 was either simple or inexpensive. There were a lot of parts to that thing, like thousands and thousands. Plus it was liquid fueled so it took days and days to assemble, transport and fuel. I don't remember but there may have been restrictions on how long you could leave it sitting there fueled and ready to go. And there was a huge infrastructure needed to support it. Liquid fueled rockets make a cumbersome weapon.

Anyway we could go back and forth about relative expense for a long time and not resolve it. I for sure don't know enough to do so.

1. Saturn V development was inexpensive in comparison to other programs due to its simplicity in design.
2. Its parts due to thier large size were actually easier to work with. Where it got nuts is with the wiring and sensors.
3. Fueling was not only time consuming and expensive, it was very dangerous.
4. Liquid fueled rockets must be monitored constanlty when fueled. It is unfeasable and dangerous to leave them fueled for long.

In conlcusion I have to say ther is NO way a liquid fueled rocket is practical nor economical. They require an army to maintiain and monitor thier functions. A second army to deal with it if something goes wrong. Modern solid fueled rockets are far more practical.

Adam

Adam

[Adam L]

What do you mean by this? They can't fly in rain? I am not trying to be a smart-aleck, I just never heard of this problem.

No, the skin coating gets dinged. All they will officially say is they will suffer damage in the rain (it is not easy to strip and replace this stuff.) I thousands of small dings would most likely result in aerodynamic problems, but I am not sure to what extent (if its minor the computers will take care of the instability.) Thousands of little dings would also decrease its stealth capabilities. I am unable to guess to what extent, but it would depend on the amount of damage. Moisture can also develop inside the airframe. This may cause mechanical and electrical problems whether or not it freezes. If it freezes it may take up to 24 hours to thaw. I also would speculate that its low heat signature design prevents it from de-icing itself effectively. Most jets simply use the heat of their engines in order to prevent and/or remove ice from the airframe. Certain planes (normally non-jets) utilize boots or electric heating systems. If it developed ice on its surface, it would greatly if not completley diminish its stealth capabilities. Also, the layer of ice changes the aerodynamics. Many planes (not certified and sometimes even those certified for icing conditions) literally lose all lift while flying in icing conditions due to even thin ice formations greatly effecting the planes aerodynamics.

Beyond this it must be kept in a climate controlled hangar in order to prevent the build up of moisture in side the plane which can lead to mechanical and electrical problems. It would be unfeasable to station them at foreign airbases for this reason.

These are some strong reasons why we stopped at 31. We needed them to deter and/or threaten the Russians (and everybody else), but they are not practical for general use given their limitations.



Adam

[Adam L]

For anyone who may not have noticed or remember, we discussed this a bit in Air Powers Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare.

Adam

[carl]

Adam L:

I will read up on the B-2's problems. I don't think airframe and wing icing at cruise speed would be much of a problem though. Jets normally cruise fast enough that aerodynamic heating (or something like that) keeps ice from from forming.

[Adam L]

Adam L:

I will read up on the B-2's problems. I don't think airframe and wing icing at cruise speed would be much of a problem though. Jets normally cruise fast enough that aerodynamic heating (or something like that) keeps ice from from forming.

Yes, normal jets do one hell of a job of keeping ice off of them due to both thier engine heat and at higher speeds the heat generated. The B2 is not a highspeed jet. Also, with the airflow so even across such a large surface, I doubt it heats up as much as a normal airframe. My concern about the potential for icing on the B2 is due to its abilty to reflect and not absorb heat. If the airframe is able to stay cool as to not be detected by infared at altitude (which is quite an accomplishemnt) it either is staying very cool or somehow is that effective at absorbing infared.

Adam

[MattC86]

. . .is the study of the competition for scarce resources. And this is fundamentally a question of economics. The United States, as a hegemonic power (and I mean that in a value-neutral way), has the unfortunate responsibility of having to be prepared to deal with all threats to itself or the supporting international system. I think the services fear that politicians or the public wont swallow the enormous costs of maintaining what amounts to dual forces - unchallengeable conventional forces and forces capable of all sorts of irregular warfare. As a result, there's intense pressure to prove their viability in both arenas (the Air Force in COIN, e.g.). Personally, I think Iraq has/is showing there's enough dual capability (like Army heavy or mechanized brigades have shown) to keep these costs from being prohibitive, but the services feel the budget cuts are coming once Iraq winds down and a new administration (particularly a Democratic one - and I say that as a liberal) comes into office, and thus feel the need to prove their worth.

Ken made the point on the first page that we go through these cycles where everyone gets all hot and bothered over the issue of the moment, and can lose long-term strategic foresight and perspective. I'd take it a step farther, with respect. I see this as the heir to the old American war tradition of being woefully unready, then kicking into enormous overdrive once war finally came. Not that the focus on COIN is unnecessarily overcompensating for our pathetic ignorance of it beforehand, but it is the hot "fad" of the moment, regardless of whether it becomes the mainstay of US operations in the future or not.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Friday we were working a tactical problem where a theoretical BCT (Brigade Combat Team) found itself 72 hours in front of the follow on BCT and had a limited opportunity to seize a bridge head and an enemy center of government. The situation quickly turned bad as we suddenly found out that this BCT had several enemy mechanized divisions between 12 and 24 hours out and the BCT only had 48 hours of ammo and fuel - OK staff make your tactical decisions. BTW the weather is bad and the enemy has relative air parity and their are no TLAMs (Tomahawk Cruise missiles) - you got what you got for 72 hours.

What is wrong with this picture? Well for starters since when did we go to war without our Air Force recently? Where are the all weather strike capabilities that would certainly be there under the conditions (be they from any of our war fighting services)? Who can claim even relative air superiority against us - anywhere? How about the satellites and J-Star type ISR assets that would have told us that a corps sized element was on the move further then 24 hours out - and the JFACC piece that would have ensured that these divisions were at least fixed (as in unable to move or reposition)

Now - I give you the point of the exercise was to stress the influence of logistics during tactical operations - but this is not the first time as a ground guy I've seen us assume away the advantages we know we will have because we have built the world's best air force (and I'd argue- the second and third best as well) for unknown reasons. Why do we do that? Is it because we don't own them and never want to rely or depend on the USAF? Because we believe that such conditions as those stated could happen? I don't know.

However, the USAF provides us (and our allies) an advantage across the spectrum of war that no one else enjoys. It often provides deterrence options just by being on the ground somewhere where the enemy cannot strike. In the past I have not agreed with everything USAF MG Dunlap has written, but I believe it is true that in the aggregate of our capabilities - the USAF as it exists offers us an asymmetric advantage that offers a wide range of possibilities throughout the spectrum of conflict.

One of the hard questions to answer these days for ground force construct/organizational planners is how much of what will we need in the future? One thing worth considering is that during a conventional phase of a war large, amounts of PGMS delivered by air, rocket artillery, cannon and missile fires combined with the means to target enemy C2, armor, artillery, mobility & CSS assets and clusters of ground forces are a sweet advantage that offers up options to ground commanders. While we've proved you need lots of ground forces to help secure a population beyond those required to terminate a regime, we also proved that ground combat power is exponentially enhanced when you combine it with the threat of air superiority. Is it reasonable to assume we will always go to war with our Air Forces and other advantages available? What does this say about the types of ground forces we can develop if we make that assumption?

I think acknowledging that the Air Force as it exists provides us incredible advantages during the high intensity - major combat operations phase of a war, and may offer us flexibility as we look forward in considering how much of what we require by type to meet our ground service commitments in other phases of a war - be it Phase 0 thru Phase 5. These advantages might allow us some flexibility in force design across the DOTLMPF (Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) spectrum that allow us to focus limited resources and better achieve our ends.

From a ground perspective - I never want to be without air superiority, and if the USAF can provide options that allow us to consider the future battlefield differently - then I'm all for those options too. We have to be careful about inferring the wrong lessons from the current conflict and applying them to the future - we also need to look at where are real shortfalls were, and how we can address those. Ken had mentioned we don't often consider things like balance and consistency of equal value with other attributes - more wisdom from a guy whose heard this tune a time or two (or 4)

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

General Gavin said it best I think "never send a soldier where you can send a missile."

My personal view is also Gavin's in that in the future the concept of Air Power, Land Power and Sea Power are obsolete. Everybody should be designed to work together as a "System" kinda like the Marine Corps figured out a while back be prepared to fight on the land,sea and air.

Which means let the Air Force keep their planes and give the Army back it's missiles!!!!

[slapout9]

Missiles in a COIN environment


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyP-Ub2st6s

[Steve Blair]

As he was about to step down as AF CoS, McPeak was proposing to hand CAS back to the Army and basically focus both the AF and Naval air on deep strike and air supremacy missions while the Army and Marines did their own CAS. His logic was that the Marines (who do their own CAS) were a "satisfied customer" while the Army (who had to depend on the AF) was not. McPeak came from a CAS background, and I think he understood that it was something the mainline AF didn't really want to do or couldn't necessarily do in the most effective way.

I don't think it's a matter of getting rid of the AF as it is looking at what it does (and perhaps more importantly what it really wants to do) and optimizing it for that mission. They'd have to resign themselves to losing some budget to bring both the Army and USMC up to full capability for CAS, but then they could go 'do' their bomber and fighter thing without worrying about CAS. They may also have to surrender some overall control of the air package in the bargain (which might cause some pain to one of the most centralized, over-controlling of the services), but it could be pitched so that the gains outweighed the losses.

Once again, as in so many discussions, I think we're seeing the "either/or" syndrome. You either have an AF or you don't. We've seen this a time or two (or four), but the constant thread going all the way back to Korea has been CAS and (to a lesser degree) tactical airlift. Maybe it's time we actually DID something about it instead of hiding behind either/or positions on it.

Just my $.02.

[Norfolk]

As he was about to step down as AF CoS, McPeak was proposing to hand CAS back to the Army and basically focus both the AF and Naval air on deep strike and air supremacy missions while the Army and Marines did their own CAS. His logic was that the Marines (who do their own CAS) were a "satisfied customer" while the Army (who had to depend on the AF) was not. McPeak came from a CAS background, and I think he understood that it was something the mainline AF didn't really want to do or couldn't necessarily do in the most effective way.

I don't think it's a matter of getting rid of the AF as it is looking at what it does (and perhaps more importantly what it really wants to do) and optimizing it for that mission. They'd have to resign themselves to losing some budget to bring both the Army and USMC up to full capability for CAS, but then they could go 'do' their bomber and fighter thing without worrying about CAS. They may also have to surrender some overall control of the air package in the bargain (which might cause some pain to one of the most centralized, over-controlling of the services), but it could be pitched so that the gains outweighed the losses.

Once again, as in so many discussions, I think we're seeing the "either/or" syndrome. You either have an AF or you don't. We've seen this a time or two (or four), but the constant thread going all the way back to Korea has been CAS and (to a lesser degree) tactical airlift. Maybe it's time we actually DID something about it instead of hiding behind either/or positions on it.

Just my $.02.

In 1961, then Col. Bill Depuy wrote a short article entitled "Unification: How Much More?" in which he dealt with the problems of service role and functions (part of "The Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy - Part I") pp. 33-42.:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo...swain3_pt1.pdf


Gen. DePuy particualry focused on how the Air Force, after its creation, was intent on gaining control of practically everything that flew, and that its fixation on aircraft as and end in themselves led them to seek to control practically every role and function that involved aircraft.

On page 35, Gen. DePuy listed a handful of essential criteria for determining the proper roles and functions of each service, particularly these two (repeating almost verbatim): - "basic functions should be not be split between two services"; and, - "service functions are the basis of service doctrine".

On page 41, General DePuy describes the proper roles and functions of the services, including that of the Air Force:

Quote:

The Air Force would be responsible for providing those forces and weapons systems required for the offensive and defensive aspects of strategic intercontinental air and missile warfare. Specifically, the Air Force would be responsible for providing forces for bombarding the enemy's homeland, and for defending our own against enemy bombardment.

-Unquote

I think Gen. DePuy's treatment of service roles and functions is the best that I have seen on the subject. Obviously, CAS would be transferred to the Army under such circumstances, along with fixed-wing aircraft for the purpose. The Air Force would deal with Strategic Air Defence and Strategic Bombardment (presumably Tactical Bombardment -as opposed to CAS - would also be included), etc.

[Van]

Steve-
You are refering to the same GEN McPeak that wanted to take Apaches and the MLRS away from the Army as the used the Air Force's airspace? I suppose the change in his tune would reflect the "All or nothing" mentality.

Re: DePuy's thoughts; the break between tactical air and strategic air seemed much more natural that the break between all air power and all ground power in WW II, and even in 1961 when DePuy was writing. But as air defence systems improved, the need to stay above ADA, or engage in a complicated, and resource intensive suppression of eneamy air defenses (SEAD) operation blurred the tac/strat line. Note that even in Viet Nam, B-52s (a SAC airframe) could frequently provide more responsive support to ground forces than conventional CAS aircraft, because of the reduced ADA threat for the high altitude aircraft. In Desert Storm, Apaches were essential to operational/strategic level SEAD because of their ability to fly below the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS).

Improvements in the sensor to shooter cycle, sensor technology, communications, combined with a global environment more inclined to Small Wars than maneuver warfare make the distinctions between strat air power, tactical air power, and CAS of limited utility. The distinctions are limiting the way we look at the tools availible to us, and discouraging innovative and flexible application of air power.

This having been said... Get rid of the Air Force? Why not take it one step further and return to the intent of the Constitution; only the Navy (and a subordinate Marine Corps under the Navy) as a standing service, and place all the combat power in the AF and Army back under the National Guards. Nope, both schemes are politically untenable despite good reasons for both. More logical and practical would be to legislate that the general officers of the Air Force be distributed consistantly with the distribution of rated (flying and operational officers), intel, and comm officers in the AF. 10% fighter pilots means no more than 10% Generals from the fighter community... Include intel and comm as GEN Jumper (fmr AF CoS) correctly identified these non-rated fields as being central to the future of air power as well as being the non-rated fields of greatest impact on DoD's capabilities.

[Steve Blair]

Steve-
You are refering to the same GEN McPeak that wanted to take Apaches and the MLRS away from the Army as the used the Air Force's airspace? I suppose the change in his tune would reflect the "All or nothing" mentality.

Yes, it's that McPeak. Not sure what made him change his tune, but he did talk about shifting CAS a fair bit when he was on his way out.

[Stevely]

So first, a little anecdote. Just last Friday, I was chatting with an office mate of mine who is an Air Force major. He was telling me about the big "force shaping" measures underway in the Air Force, and how he and many of his peers were very worried about being RIF'ed. I joked with him that he should look into Blue to Green Program, and he said he was seriously considering it. A bit later he mentioned that he felt uncertain as to the future viability of the Air Force, that it would both shrink from "force shaping" and from being strapped maintaining extremely high budget items like F-22 in a COIN era where defense budgets would shrink, and thus at some point it would become untenable for the Air Force to support this and maintain all the necessary logistical, administrative, etc. infrastructure and manning that enables it to be an independent service. At that point the Air Force would bow to the inevitable and consent to being folded back into the Army. I was surprised to hear this from an active duty AF officer, but there it is.

There does seem to be a strong tone of desperation, and Dunlap's absurd article about airpower and COIN certainly smacks of it. So maybe this idea is being taken seriously in the Air Force, in some quarters at least?

Of all the services, ISTM that it is the Air Force and only it whose existence as an independent service is not self-evident. People live on the ground; ships can stay at sea for months, even years. But an airplane can stay aloft for a day at most, usually a span of hours? It is entirely logical then to view airpower as an adjunct to the service that controls where it is based: the Navy at sea (and they kept their air force) and the Army on the land. The Air Force's aggressive budgetary behavior and its attempts to poach broad competencies from other services (air and missile defense; UAVs) could be seen as behavior driven by a sense of existential insecurity.

I think Dr. Farley's article has some merit, but unfortunately his proposal is so jarring to the defense status quo that many do not get past the "abolish the Air Force" part and seriously consider what he is saying. He certainly does not advocate fully dispensing with the capabilities that the Air Force brings to the fight, but that they find better homes under the purview of the other services. I think he has a strong analysis of the reasons the independent air force came to be and why those assumptions are no longer valid, if they ever were. And if those assumptions that go right to that service's reason for coming into existence no longer hold, then it is not unreasonable to question its continued independent existence. I don't think his argument should be breezily dismissed, in any case.

I think the existence of an institutional Air Force has had baleful effects on the development of American strategy since WW2 (not to mention the development of the military-congressional-industrial complex) and has whetted an appetite for the ill-advised and ill-considered exercise of military power since its advent. Its outlook does nicely track the popular tendency in our country to believe that at the end of every problem, no matter how profound, there is a gizmo waiting to be invented that will neatly solve it, but that tendency is bad enough without having so great an institution to promote it. Better perhaps to constrain the fly boys in institutions that at least partially look beyond strictly technological approaches to war and peace.