Agility, Adaptability and Innovation: the Art of the Counter-Punch

[Schmedlap]

The degree traditionally has been required in order to ensure that the officer has the basic skills and knowledge (writing, grammar, vocabluary, history, etc.) Unfortunately, today most university degrees in no way give even a reasonable assurance of this.

In my opinion, ROTC should be trying to correct this (perhaps it is already attempting to do so? I hope so). Instead of simply requiring 4 years of military science, a minimum GPA, and the other trivial requirements, there should be some more rigorous safeguards to ensure that our cadets take a legitimate course of study to obtain the benefits of a liberal education.

Using history courses as an example - if State U allows students to fulfill their history "core requirement" by taking US Women's history, then Cadet Command (or whatever the governing body may be) may want to require cadets to take a comprehensive US history course that includes study of wars, significant political, diplomatic, and economic events, and the impacts of technological change upon society. This would seem to be more beneficial than a semester of learning about why America is bigoted, sexist, and oppressive. If the cadet has a sincere interest in Women's History, then that will remain an option - in addition to the required course - but the requirement for a more relevant study in history should be required to ensure that a course with an extremely narrow scope of questionable legitimacy is not the only course in history taken. Hopefully such measures have already been taken - there were no such standards that I was aware of when I was in ROTC.

[TT]

Ken,

I'm unsure of the comment that innovation fosters the climate that produces adaption and agility. What I do know is that innovation can encompass or lead to both abilities and can also stand on its own.

I have to agree with this. What I was trying to say is that in the case of innovating CIW, an element of it is to foster agility and adaptation. Innovation in and of itself does not foster agility and adaptation. As an example, as past of the adoption of maneuver warfare as a warfighting concept, the military should have fostered mental agility and adaptiveness, but I am not aware that it did this, or at least that it did this very well (or withthe persistence throughout a persons professional career that they need to in order to sustain agility in the face of bureaucratic friction and inertia).

Do not trust Coffee...

So you are right - coffee did let me down. I will try wine next....

The desirability of adaption and agility in IW or CIW are mentioned. They are desirable traits -- I'd say necessary -- in all levels of warfare and while we may well have to soon engage in another IW effort; we may just as well not need to do so. We should be careful not to plan for the next war based on the last (we have evidence that this is not wise), we must be full spectrum.

I agree that agility and adaption are always valuable at all levels of warfare. My reading of 'Complex Irregular Warfare' - as opposed to 'irregular warfare' - is that you need to be able to do conventional and unconventional (your 'full spectrum', I suspect) pretty much simulataneously as well as sequentially (and I have to cringe using the term 'sequentially', as war and warfare is non-linear). As I am not (yet) into the wine, I expect I have not explained this well.....

[Ken White]

It's just that as a wise old Gunny once told me; "Pour coffee down a drinker and you'll either ruin a good buzz or have a wide awake drunk, both things to be avoided."

Agree with your comment on all counts.

The adoption of maneuver warfare, at least in the US Army has been somewhat inconsistent. There have been sporadic attempts by many smart guys to encourage mental agility and adaptiveness. Some of it, IMO, has taken but it frequently gets beaten down by the system which does not encourage it (if often inadvertently). It's not that most senior folks would not like to see it; just that some and the system are afraid of it. So your point is quite accurate.

One contributing factor to this is our continued attempt to be fair and equitable and to produce interchangeable leaders and staffers. Schmedlap addresses that HERE (note particularly his 1. and 3.) and HERE.

It is inimical to the building of trust to place marginally competent people in jobs where one knows one will have to watch them like a hawk. That is one of the reasons the system discourages innovation and agility, lack of trust essentially engendered by a flawed personnel system based on 1920s precepts. In fairness to the mid level commanders who are literally forced to do that, most would change it if they could. They cannot, thus they are forced to live with a system that is prejudicial to their success in order to be judged successful.

That's not Catch 22 -- that's Catch 44 Magnum.

"I agree that agility and adaption are always valuable at all levels of warfare. My reading of 'Complex Irregular Warfare' - as opposed to 'irregular warfare' - is that you need to be able to do conventional and unconventional (your 'full spectrum', I suspect) pretty much simulataneously as well as sequentially (and I have to cringe using the term 'sequentially', as war and warfare is non-linear). As I am not (yet) into the wine, I expect I have not explained this well...."

No, quite clear. Not only simultaneously and sequentially but in rotation and in varying theaters with little reset time, even a direct move from one type in one area to another type in another nation. That and the distinct possibility that one can be confronted with no IW, just pure short sharp conventional combat for months, even years, on end and then suddenly have to pull out the COIN book and vice versa. All sorts of permutations and I'm not sure we're ready for it. We can cope, we generally do but coping is less than adequate...

We are a professional Army with some really sharp people at all grades. We ought to be able to do that and a few units can. The Army must be able to do it. That takes agility.

[TT]

Not only simultaneously and sequentially but in rotation and in varying theaters with little reset time, even a direct move from one type in one area to another type in another nation. That and the distinct possibility that one can be confronted with no IW, just pure short sharp conventional combat for months, even years, on end and then suddenly have to pull out the COIN book and vice versa. All sorts of permutations and I'm not sure we're ready for it. We can cope, we generally do but coping is less than adequate...

A great description!

One contributing factor to this is our continued attempt to be fair and equitable and to produce interchangeable leaders and staffers. Schmedlap addresses that HERE (note particularly his 1. and 3.) and HERE.

You point directly to a central problem, if not the central problem. That the system itself serves to mitigate against success is a problem that has been articulated to me by others over the course of my research. Schmedlap’s poignant observations identify a particular set of serious issues. Sadly, it would take a substantial change in the culture of the military just to adequately address his (and others) concerns……

We are a professional Army with some really sharp people at all grades. We ought to be able to do that and a few units can. The Army must be able to do it. That takes agility.

I agree that ultimately it is the entire service (and this includes all the services, not just the Army) that needs to be agile – and therein lies the rub. Whether it is even possible to transform the current organizations into agile ones is the great question, and I have real doubts about whether it is realistically possible.

[Ken White]

".... Whether it is even possible to transform the current organizations into agile ones is the great question, and I have real doubts about whether it is realistically possible."

the old saw about better to have tried and failed than to not have tried.

[Steve Blair]

In my opinion, ROTC should be trying to correct this (perhaps it is already attempting to do so? I hope so). Instead of simply requiring 4 years of military science, a minimum GPA, and the other trivial requirements, there should be some more rigorous safeguards to ensure that our cadets take a legitimate course of study to obtain the benefits of a liberal education.

Using history courses as an example - if State U allows students to fulfill their history "core requirement" by taking US Women's history, then Cadet Command (or whatever the governing body may be) may want to require cadets to take a comprehensive US history course that includes study of wars, significant political, diplomatic, and economic events, and the impacts of technological change upon society. This would seem to be more beneficial than a semester of learning about why America is bigoted, sexist, and oppressive. If the cadet has a sincere interest in Women's History, then that will remain an option - in addition to the required course - but the requirement for a more relevant study in history should be required to ensure that a course with an extremely narrow scope of questionable legitimacy is not the only course in history taken. Hopefully such measures have already been taken - there were no such standards that I was aware of when I was in ROTC.

ROTC isn't really touching this...at least not here. There is a military history course, but not much in the way of independent thinking or even wargaming. I'm trying to change some of that where I am (Air Force ROTC), and it's been successful on a local level. Still trying to get the Army to play (so we can have free playing ground forces and some joint experience), but have had little luck.

Another thing you run into is the offerings (or lack thereof) of the State U's history department. You'll see the block of generic world/US history, and then the rest really depends on the available faculty. Sometimes you get lucky, but with the trend toward "environmental history", women's studies, deconstructionalism and post-modern obsessions you tend to see some stuff that could best be described as "fluff."

Note for Rob: Still working on the CW/IW adaptability article idea...got a good list of officers (half volunteer, half West Point) and going from there. One of my factors for assessing adaptability is the officer's ability to "grow" skilled subordinates, so that's being taken into account.

[TT]

Ken,

the old saw about better to have tried and failed than to not have tried.

Definitely. In trying you would make some progress at least, which would improve the agility of some individuals and units if not the organization as a whole.

One of the keys is that you need continuity and persistance of any major innovation to change. By this I mean the implementation process takes more than one Chief of Staff to articulate and drive the implementation process (possibly as many as three sequentially), one probably needs most of the GOs to buy-in and support the innovation, and constant effort to ensure that the innovation, and the many attendent adaptations, are emerging as desired (so contant tinkering if necessary).

I would also suggest that, particularly with respect to the issue of agility and, more broadly, CIW, that within the junior officers through to combat commanders with substantial recent combat experience there very likely is a a large, natural constituency for a bottom-up driven change. Most will have had the unhappy experience of deploying and finding themselve not nearly as well prepared for the more unconventional aspects of the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq (and elsewhere?). With continuity and persistance of top down support and persistant bottom up support (organizational insurgency), signficant progress could made over time.

[Ken White]

a top down approach within the Army, my guess is that will not happen. I could be wrong, certainly have been before and I really, really hope I am.

However, a combination of "Nothing wrong, the system worked for me," plain old inertia, the massive bureaucracy and Congress will make such an approach problematical at best. It will also, if it occurs, be spotty in its effect because various nooks and crannies will go into pet rock protective mode and the cascade of directives will miss some who will emerge stronger than ever and plunk for a return to 'normalcy.'

I agree that the potential for a bottom up approach at this time is as good as its likely to get. That would have the advantage of a "back wash" effect on those nooks and crannies. If the LTs and CPTs push hard, it could happen. The junior field grades are likely to be passive for the most part but the Colonels will probably flock to the barricades. No insult to anyone intended; all will be going with their perception of what's right and best but the system is designed to be change resistant and the Colonels are the gate keepers.

Nobody wants to go to untried models that may be detrimental rather than improvements and surprisingly large numbers fail to realize the impact of Congress on the personnel and training systems...

[goesh]

you ain't gonna' get such flex and growth with ####ty pay and until you take nurturance/maternalism out of the warrior mold during the first 6 months of military training and indoctrination, you are stuck with half soldiers/half civilians for the duration. Who stays in camp unless they are broke or there is some kind of crisis pending and orders have been issued putting everyone on a leash? Army strong my a** - out of uniform, sucking on sugar, grease and alcohol running around in cars with they can ill afford in the civilian world. Put the knuckle pushups on gravel mind-set back in action with top pay, then you'll have Army strong.

[TT]

Ken,

a top down approach within the Army, my guess is that will not happen. I could be wrong, certainly have been before and I really, really hope I am.

The early signs certainly are not propitious. Casey seems to be articulating a view of a post-Iraq organizational ‘reboot’ (can’t remember who first used this term but essentially ‘back to the way we were’) for the Army (and for the purpose of equity, Conway’s recent public articulation of ‘we are too heavy’, need to get back to amphibious warfare, etc, also suggests the same). A hope is that the Army may take at least some heed of Gates articulation that ‘small wars’ were going to be a perennial mission over the next 20 or so years (but Gates is time limited, so he can be waited out, to see what are the views of the next Sec Def and President – a clear reason for trying to convince the Pres candidates).

However, a combination of "Nothing wrong, the system worked for me," plain old inertia, the massive bureaucracy and Congress will make such an approach problematical at best. It will also, if it occurs, be spotty in its effect because various nooks and crannies will go into pet rock protective mode and the cascade of directives will miss some who will emerge stronger than ever and plunk for a return to 'normalcy.'

All too true. Institutional inertia and friction are too often the death of institutionalizing innovation, resulting in only partial implementation, the complete derailment of innovation or the petering out of the implementation process over time with the organization eventually returning to its default position.

I agree that the potential for a bottom up approach at this time is as good as its likely to get. That would have the advantage of a "back wash" effect on those nooks and crannies. If the LTs and CPTs push hard, it could happen. The junior field grades are likely to be passive for the most part but the Colonels will probably flock to the barricades. No insult to anyone intended; all will be going with their perception of what's right and best but the system is designed to be change resistant and the Colonels are the gate keepers.

Your observation is spot on. Any bottom up ‘insurgency’ to have any chance of succeeding will require some degree of top down cover and support from some ‘visionary’ officers, both at the GO and Col level, and the Lts and Cpts you point to will need to have a long term view that sooner or later they may, when higher up the hierarchy, be able to exert greater influence. A mid range hope is if supportive Cols and Lt Cols are promoted up to GO: though I acknowledge that the career path needed to become a GO tends to mitigate against many of the supportive officers being promoted to GO, or their remaining supportive due to 'socialization.' And this points to the need for appropriate career paths/opportunities being created for those officers at all level who support change. All very long term, likely very episodic, and very, very uncertain.

Nobody wants to go to untried models that may be detrimental rather than improvements and surprisingly large numbers fail to realize the impact of Congress on the personnel and training systems...

Again, you are quite right with this point. One of the reasons why, as you say, ‘the potential for a bottom up approach at this time is as good as its likely to get’, is that it is possible to link the srotsf of changes desired/required to what they have experienced and they can perceive the potential benefits. As for Congress, well, it is the Congress…..

[Ken White]

...
... A hope is that the Army may take at least some heed of Gates articulation that ‘small wars’ were going to be a perennial mission over the next 20 or so years (but Gates is time limited, so he can be waited out, to see what are the views of the next Sec Def and President – a clear reason for trying to convince the Pres candidates).

I suspect some in high places will heed Gates but there will be those who simply wait him out. That's what they did with Shy Meyer and John Wickham. Interestingly, Meyer wanted to change the system and got only a few things done; Wickham wanted to change the culture and got most of his ideas through. Partly a function of the size of the bites of the elephant each elected to take.

...Any bottom up ‘insurgency’ to have any chance of succeeding will require some degree of top down cover and support from some ‘visionary’ officers, both at the GO and Col level, and the Lts and Cpts you point to will need to have a long term view that sooner or later they may, when higher up the hierarchy, be able to exert greater influence. A mid range hope is if supportive Cols and Lt Cols are promoted up to GO: though I acknowledge that the career path needed to become a GO tends to mitigate against many of the supportive officers being promoted to GO, or their remaining supportive due to 'socialization.' And this points to the need for appropriate career paths/opportunities being created for those officers at all level who support change. All very long term, likely very episodic, and very, very uncertain.

True but I see some signs of that top cover and believe we have a window. I'm doing my best to support it but I am running out of Newts to boil. And straight pins...

...As for Congress, well, it is the Congress…..

As the man said "Aye, therein lies the rub..."

[TT]

That's what they did with Shy Meyer and John Wickham. Interestingly, Meyer wanted to change the system and got only a few things done; Wickham wanted to change the culture and got most of his ideas through. Partly a function of the size of the bites of the elephant each elected to take.

Ah hah, potential subjects of reseach! Thanks.

True but I see some signs of that top cover and believe we have a window.

I agree that there is currently a window of opportunity. Time will tell who steps through the window (or is pushed through - positive defenestration? ) and who they are able to carry with them.

I'm doing my best to support it but I am running out of Newts to boil. And straight pins...

I for one am rooting for ya to 'defenestrate' a few.