Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

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I am going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that the folks in the Harvard study did not see the gorilla is less due to the fact of “inattentional blindness” and more due to the fact of intentional focussing, AKA tunnel vision. If I am directed to look for a certain thing, I will tend to devote myself to that hunt. I will not attend to other things that might merit my attention because I have chosen to exclude them. Consider a “Where’s Waldo” picture as a case in point. In the back of Martin Handford’s books, one will usually find a list of other things to find in the pictures besides Waldo. When hunting for Waldo though, how often does one notice his dog Woof, his arch-enemy Odlaw, Professor Whitebeard, Wanda, or Wilma, not to mention all the other “punnily” described items in those lists?

Over and above the issue of selective attention, I suspect that we ought to consider some things like the nature of certainty, proof, and truth with more than just a passing handwave. The article’s single paragraph summations of Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology are massive oversimplifications, and therefore, distortions of some very detailed analyses. They set up the poles of a debate that still rages today. In that light, I’d suggest, as a minimum, that the work of a few 20th Century philosophers and mathematicians be consulted. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work, On Certainty is extremely insightful. In it he suggests that what often passes for verification of the truth is like buying several copies of the same newspaper and re-reading the same story (speaks to Rex's point about staying in the same agency). I heartily endorse R.G. Collingwood’s work on re-enactment in the philosophy of history as well as his consideration of absolute presuppositions and philosophical method. Godel’s incompleteness theorem is noteworthy for the fact that it shows the limits to proofs. I recommend reading the debate on the problems with translation and conceptual schemes between WVO Quine and Donald Davidson. The Confucian notion regarding rectification of names might be worth looking at too. And, while we’re at it, how about a look at a few Zen koans and the parables of Jesus to try to reframe the boxes in which we tend to do our conceptualizing?

One last point about using native speakers as translators: ever have anyone ask you if you want gravy on your spaghetti?*

Usually, one is a native speaker of only one language. Native speakers of Iraqi Arabic are English As A Second Language (ESL) speakers. They will have the same kinds of cultural disconnects when trying to get the words right for their English native speaking employers. And, that is without consideration for such things as idiolects, regionalisms, colloquialisms, and slang. My Nebraska-born father described a heavy rain storm as “a trash mover and a gully washer,” my New Hampshire-born grandmother talked about “ it raining pitchforks and hammer handles,” my Paris-born French teacher said it was “raining halberds” and most other folks I know say ”it’s raining cats and dogs.” While I might describe a certain car as “cool” or “hot,” my 10-year old describes it as a “sick” car. My brother-in-law might describe that same car as “the balls” or “the nuts.” We live within a few miles of each other and are, supposedly, speaking the same English. Now, that’s chaos!





*If you live in and around Chelsea, Massachusetts, "gravy" is what you probably call the tomato sauce put on pasta.