Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
As he was about to step down as AF CoS, McPeak was proposing to hand CAS back to the Army and basically focus both the AF and Naval air on deep strike and air supremacy missions while the Army and Marines did their own CAS. His logic was that the Marines (who do their own CAS) were a "satisfied customer" while the Army (who had to depend on the AF) was not. McPeak came from a CAS background, and I think he understood that it was something the mainline AF didn't really want to do or couldn't necessarily do in the most effective way.
I don't think it's a matter of getting rid of the AF as it is looking at what it does (and perhaps more importantly what it really wants to do) and optimizing it for that mission. They'd have to resign themselves to losing some budget to bring both the Army and USMC up to full capability for CAS, but then they could go 'do' their bomber and fighter thing without worrying about CAS. They may also have to surrender some overall control of the air package in the bargain (which might cause some pain to one of the most centralized, over-controlling of the services), but it could be pitched so that the gains outweighed the losses.
Once again, as in so many discussions, I think we're seeing the "either/or" syndrome. You either have an AF or you don't. We've seen this a time or two (or four), but the constant thread going all the way back to Korea has been CAS and (to a lesser degree) tactical airlift. Maybe it's time we actually DID something about it instead of hiding behind either/or positions on it.
Just my $.02.
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