Quote Originally Posted by JeffC View Post
....--- It is a pervasive problem according to Johnston's study and many more critiques of Intelligence analysis over the years. I could have filled a page with just references to that one issue....

....If the problem were simple, it would no longer be a problem. Clearly, for anyone who reads the literature, that's not the case....


As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".

There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.

Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.

The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.

In any case, even if a brilliant analyst produces a truly insightful and timely product for national-level consumption, there may still exist yet another obstacle at the national strategic decision making level. The personal beliefs, biases and perceptions of a given policy maker make cause him to simply reject outright the conclusions, judgments and recommendations of the analyst. Then when everything goes tango uniform, "intelligence" is blamed. But the greater public rarely learns that the "intelligence" at fault was cherry-picked to conform to the policy-maker's predilictions, while the good intel that did exist was ignored or dismissed.

Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.