Fighting Ideas with Ideas

[Brian Hanley]

No Brian, it absolutely isn't. Nothing in the Koran outlines a system of government. The Hadith and Sunna are unclear on the matter (with the former, at times, pointing in the direction of democracy: "My community will not agree on an error," while practice in Medina in the Prophet's time during his absences varied). Indeed, it was the absence of clear directives on issues of governance that gave rise to the Sunni-Shi'ite split.

You think that's what gave rise to the Sunni-Shia split? Check again. http://islamfortoday.com/shia.htm

I'll spare you quoting chapter and verse on the form of government being specified as one man rule of the Khalifa. (Hey! That's what bin Laden's about! Gosh!) But yes, it's most definitely there. The argument between Shia and Sunni is about who should have been that one man, not whether there should be one or not.

I think what you mean by government is form of succession specification. There is a huge difference. One can find many authors who discuss that and its roots in the "strong man" culture of the Bedu that Mohammed came from. Go to a library and pick one up that discusses his life.

[Rex Brynen]

[QUOTE=Brian Hanley;30548]You think that's what gave rise to the Sunni-Shia split? Check again. http://islamfortoday.com/shia.htm

You link adds nothing, other than to confirm that the split revolved around perhaps the most core issue of governance: the selection of leadership.

For Shia, a hereditary principle was to be applied from among the ahl al-bayt. For Sunni, Abu Bakr's role as prayer leader (and community consensus) were the initial operative principles.

The principle of the Caliphate was developed AFTER Prophet, and soon developed into a self-serving concept to support the claim to power of the individuals and the dynasts of the time. It has much support among traditional Sunni theorists--hardly surprising, given that medieval Christian theorists had no difficulty in justifying absolute monarchy either.

It is true that Bin Ladin has a particular view of the Caliphate, and that many radical islamists support its reestablishment based on the model of the rashidun. This is hardly a majority view among Muslims.

At various times Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan (under Zia al-Huq) and Afghanistan have all claimed to be "Islamic" systems of government. The ruling AKP in Turkey is an Islamist political party. The absence of any common thread among these highlights the absence of a single mode of governance.

One can find many authors who discuss that and its roots in the "strong man" culture of the Bedu that Mohammed came from.

Actually, tribal leadership in Bedouin society is traditionally rather more complex and accountable than all this (although it grew less so with the impact of first Ottoman and British indirect mechanisms of local governance, and later oil revenues).

Thanks for the suggestion, however, that I go check out some library books. I somehow missed doing this while earning the PhD in Middle East politics

So far on SWC I've seen you pronounce on the trade in illegal US visas (until Stan and Jedburgh called you on it), your proximity to Bin Ladin, the need to convince Muslims that their core religious beliefs are wrong, your intimate knowledge of the CIA and the intel community, the value of dating foreign women as a military and intel community training method, and your efforts to warn the FBI about Hizb al-Tahrir and avert 9/11, and the secret Iranian plan to take white orphans from Georgia and train them as spies for insertion in the West.

'nuf said.

[Steve Blair]

I'm not seeing much of value in this discussion...at least anything that couldn't be found or pursued on any number of political and/or religious boards (fringe and otherwise). Kindly relate this to this history of small wars or we'll be a'lockin' this one.

[Stan]

I'm not seeing much of value in this discussion...at least anything that couldn't be found or pursued on any number of political and/or religious boards (fringe and otherwise). Kindly relate this to this history of small wars or we'll be a'lockin' this one.

Hi Steve !
Jeez, yet another thread 'locked up' for bad behaviour.

Rex, loved the summation

[JD]

Getting back to the original question...

The US at the moment has a military superiority that is arguably as dominant as any in the history of man yet it is having enormous difficulty in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I look back and compare these relatively small areas to the massive tracts held by Alexander and the Romans and wonder how on earth it was all held together. I can't help believing it was not all about military expertise. There must have been a large degree of consent from these proud and often unruly people of the conquered lands. Surely, then, there must have been a desire to belong, an attractiveness about the idea of being part of the Empire. Is this overcoming the enemy with the power of the 'idea' of Rome / Macedonia? Is it a lesson for the now? I don't know whish is why I find myself in the history part of the smallwarsjournal.

Your thoughts?

[nichols]

Your thoughts?

I think multiple differences between now and then play into this. The largest differences are literacy, information exchange, and finally escalation of force.

[marct]

I think multiple differences between now and then play into this. The largest differences are literacy, information exchange, and finally escalation of force.

I'd like to play off this a bit, specifically on the idea of information exchange. First off, if we look at Rome, Macedonia, et al. the dominant mode of communications was face to face (aka oral communications). Only about 10% of Romans were literate (refs available on request ), and the number was lower for the Macedonians. Furthermore, "community" tended to be defined by geographic proximity and by kinship.

If we look at today, we have anywhere from 70-95% literacy (depending on where and how you define it), the increasingly dominant mode of communications is electronic (CMC, telephone, etc.) overlying a print mode, and community is increasingly defined by shared interest rather than by either geographic proximity or by kinship.

Alexander could assert a royal legitimacy by marrying a Sogdian "princess" but, while the image may be humourous, I doubt that President Bush could do the same by marrying an Iraqi .

[wm]

Getting back to the original question...

The US at the moment has a military superiority that is arguably as dominant as any in the history of man yet it is having enormous difficulty in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I look back and compare these relatively small areas to the massive tracts held by Alexander and the Romans and wonder how on earth it was all held together. I can't help believing it was not all about military expertise. There must have been a large degree of consent from these proud and often unruly people of the conquered lands. Surely, then, there must have been a desire to belong, an attractiveness about the idea of being part of the Empire. Is this overcoming the enemy with the power of the 'idea' of Rome / Macedonia? Is it a lesson for the now? I don't know whish is why I find myself in the history part of the smallwarsjournal.

Your thoughts?

As I noted here, I suspect it has less to do with military superiority and more to do with some form of symbiotic relationship. BTW, I have a real tough time with the historical truth of the solidity of Alexander's empire; it splintered almost immediately after his death.

The Diadochi (Gk. Diadochoi, Lat. Diadochi) are the successors of Alexander the Great. . . . Since Alexander had no suitable heir, his generals struggled to gain his throne and the initial arrangement for the administration of the empire, the so-called Babylon settlement, did not last long. The most important of the Diadochi were Antipater and his son Cassander, Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes, Craterus, Eumenes, Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Perdiccas, Ptolemy and Seleucus.

Alexander had no true successor, as none of the generals was able to defeat all his rivals and acquire the entire realm. Antigonus Monophthalmus came closest. Scholarly consensus holds that some of the Diadochi, especially Cassander and Ptolemy, never aimed at universal rule, but were prepared to settle with part of Alexander’s legacy. Nonetheless, it is not really accurate to say that the Successors divided the empire; it rather fell apart because they all wanted to eliminate all their rivals but none of them achieved this. (http://www.ancientlibrary.com/wcd/Diadochi)

Success does not always follow from having military power and dominant force. Remember what Princess Leia said to Governor/Grand Moff Tarkin? Folks like Martin Luther, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King show how much (or how little) one needs physical force to hold the field at the end of the day.

[ProfessorB]

The original posting in this thread asked about the idea of "war of ideas."

Presumably there are far more wars of ideas than wars -- the Enlightenment was a war of ideas. Prohibition was a war of ideas.

But of course we're interested here in something different -- not wars of ideas, perhaps, but Ideas in Wars.

Which returns us to the original question prior to side-tracking into the truth-value of Islam -- to what extent can one prevail at the strategic level of operations by having a "better" set of ideas.

My initial response, which I will repeat (regurgitate?) here is that at the end of the day ideas don't matter in war -- they may matter in the politics of getting us into war, but don't produce wins or losses. This would suggest that the "hearts and minds" meme gets its wrong.

So a historical question -- when has an occupying power (choose your poison, France in Spain, US in Iraq, Britain in South Africa) been able to put a local resistance movement on the strategic defensive by having a better set of ideas? The question is important, I think, not least because there is this recurring theme in discussions of the Iraq strategy that we need to "show" the insurgents that political reconciliation is "better" than resistance.

[marct]

So a historical question -- when has an occupying power (choose your poison, France in Spain, US in Iraq, Britain in South Africa) been able to put a local resistance movement on the strategic defensive by having a better set of ideas? The question is important, I think, not least because there is this recurring theme in discussions of the Iraq strategy that we need to "show" the insurgents that political reconciliation is "better" than resistance.

How about the Union over the Confederacy, or Britain (Canada) over Quebec and the Metis?