Merv,
Agreed. But sometimes making something "new" is a way to get attention drawn to old lessons. Gratefully the article did go on to relate how surprised some of tthe students were to learn that we had been doing this since "Roger's Rangers" were in the field during the French and Indian Wars.
I too tire of simple references to "Cold War" thinking as if the Cold War was actually a cold affair with massive ground forces in a "sitzkrieg" standoff alone the inner German border. The most excellent 1962 Rand Study that Jedburg posted this week touches on some but not all of those Cold War conflicts, some of which continue in various forms today.
Teaching Soldiers and Leaders to think has always been a base plate of military art.
And from the sameThere is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign. This is largely because our peacetime training in tactics tends to become increasingly theoretical. In our schools we generally assume that organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war many or all of these conditions may be absent. The veteran knows that this is normal and his mental processes are not paralyzed by it. He knows that he must carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and regardless of the fact that the tools with which he has to work may be imperfect and worn. Moreover, he knows how to go about it. This volume is designed to give the peace-trained officer something of the viewpoint of the veteran.
By the use of numerous historical examples, the reader is acquainted with the realities of war and the extremely difficult and highly disconcerting conditions under which tactical problems must be solved in the face of an enemy. In so far as there was material available, these examples pertain to American
troops and have been drawn from the personal experience monographs on file at The Infantry School. The combat experience of other armies, however, has been utilized to supplement that of our own. This work does not purport to be a complete treatise on minor tactics of infantry. The aim of its authors has been to develop fully and emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated by concrete cases rather than to produce just another
book of abstract theory.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Colonel, Infantry.
May 1, 1934.
From Infantry in Battle
BestChapter I: Rules
Combat situations cannot be solved by rule.
THE ART OF WAR has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits.
It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formula that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.
The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feeton a well-traveled road to ruin.
Tom
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