Zenpundit,
That's an interesting question. From my perspective as a junior field grade officer, the theories and concepts you outlined help me grasp how and why things may be happening around me, like procurement decisions, but they do little to assist in developing my own art of war. I admit that the "those who do not do...write" statement holds some water, but only so far. For example, the current fight in Iraq, given all its complexities, is better served by AARs and lessons learned, not dissertations by a fellow who has not spent a day (better a month) on the ground and outside the wire.
I've gained more from the 3/5 AAR (subsequently reprinted in the MCG) about urban combat in Fallujah than trying to make sense of a 4GW graph. If it takes someone 50 pages to make and argue their point, they've lost me. As a case in point, I lurked on a 3 month thread about 4GW at another forum, and the posters were commenting basically on how they interpreted matters. If something is subject for interpretation, it's value is diminished for me. I don't want to understand the nature of battle as much as I want to fill my tool box with implements for winning the fight.
Another example of what I mean is this text, written by a Sgt, CPT, and Maj in Nov of 2003: http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/03alexander.pdf. I did not find it during a cursory glance at the SWJ reference library, but that pamphlet continues to serve as my hip pocket reference to things tribal in Iraq. Pre-deployment reading lists when I was at 3d LAR covered a wide range of subjects, but when copies of this showed up (printed at 1 MARDIV?) I was relieved. I also still think that those three soldiers had it right when they wrote this abstract (and it only took 30 or so pages to do it):
Issue: A successful insurgency is preventing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force –7 (CJTF-7) from providing a safe and secure environment in Iraq.
Discussion: The reason that CPA initiatives have not yet caught the imagination or secured the participation of the Iraqi people is due to cultural, not ideological factors. Iraq’s cultural environment represents a challenge not easily mastered by Western ideological models and crisis management
techniques alone. The Tribal Ethos remains the basis for most security, economic, and political discussions in Iraq and must by default be considered in long-term security and stability solutions.
Recommendation: This new Restorationist insurgency movement (against Western occupation) is using a hybrid method that incorporates urban (terrorist) and protracted (popular) insurgency strategies and exploits the tribal ethos to create crisis and instability to isolate CPA / CJTF-7 from the
Iraqi populace. A strong synchronized Tribal Leader engagement policy is a more effective means of achieving CPA / CJTF-7 strategic goals. We must create a committed local population in targeted areas, to include the local and provincial leaders in security, social and economic affairs; concurrently
the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) must be empowered to ensure stable national level governance. Establishing trust and confidence between Coalition and tribal groups will neutralize the insurgents and create the conditions for CPA assisted political, economic, and social programs to shape anew the nation of Iraq.
I would like to think that the coalition is well beyond the learning curve when it comes to understanding tribal matters, or interacting with Iraqi security forces, but I'm a pessimist. A meager 3 1/2 hours dedicated to Iraqi cultural and ISF issues in an 8 day military advisor training program, leads me to believe we still have hurdles.
Before I stray further off topic, I gain more from direct observations/writing from someone who has "been there, done that" under a blazing sun than anyone else.
A historian holds more weight than a theorist, but their scholarly pursuits must be relevant or I won't take the time to read, ponder, and form my own thoughts. It's too tough when there are more important TTP cards, X-files, and MCLL and CALL products to read.
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