CSIS, 13 Nov 07:

Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry of the Interior So Hard?
In September 2007, retired US Marine Corps General Jim Jones led an independent commission to evaluate the state of the Iraqi security forces. His team concluded that:

“The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.”

Given that an effective and law-abiding interior ministry will be critical to Iraq’s future security environment and political evolution, this stark conclusion is disturbing. Moreover, it raises the question of why the heavy Coalition investment in recruiting, training, and equipping the Iraqi civil security forces and advising the Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2003 has apparently not had a more positive impact.

This paper examines the charge laid out in the Jones report, explains why institution building and reform at the MOI have proved so difficult, and notes flaws in the international capacity building effort that need to be addressed. The central argument is that Iraq’s political dynamics, combined with the unprecedented burdens being placed upon the MOI, will continue to make institutional development and reform terribly difficult. However, assessments such as the Jones report ignore the fact that the ministry is more functional than it may at first appear. Furthermore, there are signs of incipient, MOI-led reforms; these provide hopeful pointers. In order to take advantage of these incipient reforms, the international assistance effort needs to significantly raise its game. If this can be achieved, then, gradually and painfully, the ministry could become a more positive force in Iraqi society. However, even if technical institutional reforms are successful, it will be important to understand that the ministry will reflect Iraq’s political make-up; it cannot stand above national politics.....