The overlooked, underrated, and forgotten ...

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

Could one really call the "democracies" in question a genuine "blunder" when the Afghan government still retains legitimacy throughout the country and the current Iraqi government in its present form was never the intended result of U.S. policy, but rather one they were forced into by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and which came about through a series of negotiations between Sistani, the U.N., as well as the U.S.?

I suppose it depends on how you define "blunder". I tend to use it in a way that is similar to "prat fall" - an embarrassing, and stupid, but not fatal action / event. US policy demanded a "democracy" of the republican form, something that caused a lot of problems in the 2003 Loya Jirga in Kabul when there was a legitimate government in exile. By forcing the royal family out of the equation (to a large degree), this served to reduce the overall legitimacy of the Karzai government, although that seems to be correcting itself over time. A parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy could have been easily established with quite a large reservoir of legitimacy since it was already part of the cultural matrix.

In Iraq, things were quite different, including the sources of legitimacy. The current form may not have been the intent of US policy, but that is, really, an "I didn't know it was loaded!" type of argument. We've had a lot of discussions on what went wrong, so I'm not going to rehash them, but I will point out that in order to make any democracy, regardless of its form, work, it really does require both cultural and structural legitimacy and, if you are going to try and build that de novo, it takes quite a while.

Marc

[Rex Brynen]

Could one really call the "democracies" in question a genuine "blunder" when the Afghan government still retains legitimacy throughout the country and the current Iraqi government in its present form was never the intended result of U.S. policy, but rather one they were forced into by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and which came about through a series of negotiations between Sistani, the U.N., as well as the U.S.?

Good point, tequila. It might be added that in both cases some effort at democratic politics was inevitable as soon as intervention took place, given both international and local expectations (especially in Iraq).

It also has to be said that we really don't yet have a good idea (despite all the political science energy that we put into this) as to when democracy will function, and when it won't .

Why didn't India--with its lack of democratic experience, extreme poverty, many ethnic, religious, and caste tensions (arguably the most of any country), and the extreme violence of partition--collapse into chaos and authoritarianism after 1947, the way most post-colonial countries did?

How has Mozambique sustained democracy since 1992, despite having experienced bitter anti-colonial (1962-75) and civil (1975-92) war that left left almost a million people dead through its direct and indirect consequences?

[charter6]

I think it's arguable that India was in fact a "real" democracy, as opposed to just having democratic form, at least until the end of Indira's emergency. Congress party exercised so much patronage power and had such an iron hold on politics at so many levels. A non-Congress Prime Minister doesn't get elected until 1977 after Indira had declared emergency and engaged in, amongst other gross offenses, a forced sterilization campaign.

I know I'm going to get jumped on here, but I think that basically India's form of government in the first three decades of its independence was essentially that of a one-party authoritarian state, not a real democracy.

[Norfolk]

I think it's arguable that India was in fact a "real" democracy, as opposed to just having democratic form, at least until the end of Indira's emergency. Congress party exercised so much patronage power and had such an iron hold on politics at so many levels. A non-Congress Prime Minister doesn't get elected until 1977[]

I know I'm going to get jumped on here, but I think that basically India's form of government in the first three decades of its independence was essentially that of a one-party authoritarian state, not a real democracy.

I find myself rather inclined to agree with you with here, charter6. The Congress Party did have "extra-parliamentary" means available to it that were not necessarily as available to other parties, even the BJP. However, I would add the vital qualifier here that what was perhaps at least as important was a "dynastic" element to the appeal of the Congress Party.

In many countries, "royalty" has a sort of natural appeal to many people, combining as may an image of a strong, established leadership that will look after the people through a parent-child relationship of sorts. "Royalty" has an organic, rather than an abstract, appeal, as it mirrors in a manner the natural family order; the "Royal" holds the role of Father/Mother of his/her people, and they are his/her children after a fashion. Many people may not understand other forms of government, but practically everyone readily grasps Monarchy. And just as inheritance is the most common formal system of succession in monarchy, reflecting as it does the passage of generations within the family, people may be inclined to cling to the hereditary successors of someone whom they admire - thus the "dynastic" appeal of the Congress Party so long as a Gandhi was at or near the helm.

Even in the U.S., the Kennedy family is still very much considered to be its natural "royal dynasty" so to speak, and many Kennedys have entered politics aided in no small part by virtue of their belonging to that family. Even in the American Republic, "Royalism" has a strong, natural appeal. It is certainly no different in India, amongst many other countries.

At the very least, the role of the "Gandhi Dynasty" may have gone a long way to preventing India from utterly disintegrating or falling into outright dictatorship. The Hashemites do not enjoy such a position in Iraq. It is difficult to even conceive of any Iraqi analogue that even begins to approach a sort of "Royal Dynasty" in modern times.

[Rank amateur]

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

Indian Wars TTP quite often worked because the future of the various tribes was irrelanent to the endstate. Eventually, "real 'merkins" were going to dominate all of the natives and totally subjugate them permanently. For colonial powers, the endstate was similar, even if not so extreme -- UK, France, NL intended to administer colonial areas indefinitely, so their relationship to the indigenous populations and their development of enduring institutions was different than it was in, say, Malaya, where the intent to grant independence was declared relatively early on.

This is also one of the critiques I have for LTC Campbell's excellent paper on Making Riflemen from Mud. What works in situations where you want to leave may be different from those situations where you want to stay.

Sorry for the ramble.

Hope this makes sense.

U.S. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — With American military successes outpacing political gains in Iraq, the Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.

Like I said, I believe that the end goals are being changed to something that is achievable according to COIN doctrine.

[Griz882]

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

[Rex Brynen]

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I don't doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model

[Cannoneer No. 4]

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I doubt doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model

Anybody remember this guy?

[tequila]

Steve Blair should be along in a few moments to deconstruct the Crook myth.

I'll tell you a major difference between the Pashtun and the Apache - there are millions of Pashtun and they are not just marginalized, uneducated tribal warriors in the FATA and the tribal areas.

[marct]

I'll tell you a major difference between the Pashtun and the Apache - there are millions of Pashtun and they are not just marginalized, uneducated tribal warriors in the FATA and the tribal areas.

Add in their strategic position and the fact that everyone with an interest in the area has tossed technology at them, which hey have integrated and made their own, a 2500+ year history, and a feuding tradition that makes the Scots of old look like a bunch of pacifists....

I suspect that there are really only two Indian wars that come even close: the ongoing alliances fights with the Iroquois Confederacy, and the fights with the Cherokee (and allies). Even then, you have to consider the relative demographic pressures.

[Gian P Gentile]

Understanding Bleeding Kansas and the underlying conditions that brought it about in the mid 1850s can be instructive for a clear understanding of Iraq today.

American political leaders in the Compromise of 1850 believed that they had staved off a complete sectional breakdown, and thought that that compromise might produce existential cooperation between the north and south. A few years later when Stephen Douglas crafted the Kansas/Nebraska Act he was hoping to do the same. The idea that if you can just get the western lands organized into territories and then into states that economic and social development that would come about would further the "hard-wiring" between the north and south and bring the two close together.

Yet both of these compromises did not solve the underlying political and social problem of the day: slavery and more specifically in the 1850s what to do with slavery in the territories, or white freedom versus black freedom. Douglas's Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854, although designed to compromise, brought about a small civil war between southern proponents of slavery in the territories and northern proponents of the territories being completely free of slave labor. The end result was a violent confrontation in Kansas from about 1855 to 1858 over whether or not slaves should be allowed into Kansas. The underlying political problem of the day, as a prelude to the American Civil War, was fought through violence and death on the rolling hills of east Kansas. Ultimately the issue of slavery in America would be decided not by compromise but by the American Civil War.

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

[marct]

Hi Gian,

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

Good example, and there certainly does seem to be an analog. I'm hesitant about how to extend it to Iraq, however. In the period you are talking about, there are significant demographic and economic differences between the North and the South. Slavery, qua slavery, was more of a hot button, rhetorical and emotional issue than a causus belli, and the real root was in the differences in productive and distributive economic systems (and their products)l a difference between two modes of production to use the Marxist term.

How does this play out in Iraq? Well, there is a rough analog between oil production and the Southern Agrarian economy (the analog shows up in the Lorenz curve but not in the technical production skills of the workers or in the numbers required). This type of economy, a resource export economy, is a tricky one to diversify even when you have quite a few resources that are in demand (look at the Canadian economy as an example). With Iraq mainly operating on oil revenues, what are they going to produce especially given the infrastructural decline over the past 20 odd years?

Then we've got the hot button issues; not slavery but "religion" / ethnicity / tribalism. These issues will tend to be exacerbated as long as you are dealing with a resource export economy, at least in the sense of there will be a continuing fight over access to and division of the economic pie. Without an alternate economic structure that can produce and distribute goods and services, and generate significant revenue, you don't have much backing for alternate social structures. Again, this is a significant difference with the case you are pointing to.

This very difference might point to one, potential, way out of the "hardening the sides" model. Since you don't really have a major conflict between economic systems, a revenue sharing model that was generally agreed to even if it is not generally agreeable may be enough to create a breathing space for multiple new economic systems to develop. If this is tied in with either a centralized development plan, such as Dubai or Brunei have used (as, BTW, did Canada and Japan), then that could reinforce the central government, at least in the short term (speaking as an Anthropologist, so 15-30 years ).

[wm]

Understanding Bleeding Kansas and the underlying conditions that brought it about in the mid 1850s can be instructive for a clear understanding of Iraq today.

American political leaders in the Compromise of 1850 believed that they had staved off a complete sectional breakdown, and thought that that compromise might produce existential cooperation between the north and south. A few years later when Stephen Douglas crafted the Kansas/Nebraska Act he was hoping to do the same. The idea that if you can just get the western lands organized into territories and then into states that economic and social development that would come about would further the "hard-wiring" between the north and south and bring the two close together.

Yet both of these compromises did not solve the underlying political and social problem of the day: slavery and more specifically in the 1850s what to do with slavery in the territories, or white freedom versus black freedom. Douglas's Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854, although designed to compromise, brought about a small civil war between southern proponents of slavery in the territories and northern proponents of the territories being completely free of slave labor. The end result was a violent confrontation in Kansas from about 1855 to 1858 over whether or not slaves should be allowed into Kansas. The underlying political problem of the day, as a prelude to the American Civil War, was fought through violence and death on the rolling hills of east Kansas. Ultimately the issue of slavery in America would be decided not by compromise but by the American Civil War.

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

Funny, but the story I heard in Lawrence, KS when I was a grad student there was a little bit different. They viewed most of what happened in Bleeding Kansas as outlawry, pure and simple. Folks from over in Missouri were able to use the "slavery" issue as an excuse to commit rapine, loot, and plunder. Of course, having your town burned twice by "ruffians" in less than 10 years can change your outlook significantly and make you much less sympathetic to others' concerns. I suspect that folks in Independence, MO have a different view of what happened with things like the Pottawatomie Massacre, John Brown, and the Jayhawkers.

Moral of the story for me is that Tip O'Neil was right(I'm agreeing with a Massachusetts Democrat ): All politics is local and you can't legislate a solution from afar.

[tequila]

Given Lawrence's history and that of your own educational institution, that sounds pretty much like what you would expect. Delegitimization of the "other" side's activities as little more than criminal violence is one of the more historically common propaganda tactics. Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

Actually, I think Gian's point and the historical example of Kansas show just how much local politics can be influenced by national disputes. Kansas would never have bled at all, and likely Lawrence would never have been founded, if not for the Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854 and the nullification of the old Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850.

[Tom Odom]

Given Lawrence's history and that of your own educational institution, that sounds pretty much like what you would expect. Delegitimization of the "other" side's activities as little more than criminal violence is one of the more historically common propaganda tactics. Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

I would offer the Outlaw Josey Wales as proof

[marct]

Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

Don't you mean "Abolitionist Crusaders" .

[Steve Blair]

Funny, but the story I heard in Lawrence, KS when I was a grad student there was a little bit different. They viewed most of what happened in Bleeding Kansas as outlawry, pure and simple. Folks from over in Missouri were able to use the "slavery" issue as an excuse to commit rapine, loot, and plunder. Of course, having your town burned twice by "ruffians" in less than 10 years can change your outlook significantly and make you much less sympathetic to others' concerns. I suspect that folks in Independence, MO have a different view of what happened with things like the Pottawatomie Massacre, John Brown, and the Jayhawkers.

Moral of the story for me is that Tip O'Neil was right(I'm agreeing with a Massachusetts Democrat ): All politics is local and you can't legislate a solution from afar.

This is certainly true, although Jennison's Jayhawkers did their fair share both before and during the war. Although if memory serves the bulk of the initial aggression did come from elements within Missouri. It was at least a staging area, and then the process was accelerated by elements from outside both Missouri and Kansas.

Where it took a nasty turn was after the outbreak of the shooting war proper.

And never fear, Tequila, I'm watching the Crook stuff closely.... Crook was successful, but in very limited situations and circumstances. Many also don't understand that by the time he arrived in Arizona most groups aside from the Apache (Yavapai and Hualpai, with Navajo elements thrown in) had been subdued and commanders like Thomas Devin had built rough wagon roads into some of the interior regions and (perhaps more importantly for Crook) mapped many areas that had before been uncharted by whites. It's also worth remembering that Crook didn't do so well when confronted by the Sioux and Cheyenne.

And that's my mandated Crook deconstruction for the day....

[Griz882]

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

Gian is absolutely right. Any consideration of "small wars" must consider issues beyond tactical considerations. A failure to address (and I don't mean solve) the root problem will result in a failure of tactics. As Gian points out, "Bleeding Kansas" offers an excellent case study.

The same applies to many of the longer campaigns of the "Indian Wars" which is why Rex Bryman is absolutely wrong. As historians, soldiers (airmen,...) we can not let the perceived "discomfort" of our past limit where we look for learning examples. The US military professional education system has a real problem in this area which, IMHO, leads to stagnant thinking.

[Gian P Gentile]

Good example, and there certainly does seem to be an analog. I'm hesitant about how to extend it to Iraq, however. In the period you are talking about, there are significant demographic and economic differences between the North and the South. Slavery, qua slavery, was more of a hot button, rhetorical and emotional issue than a causus belli, and the real root was in the differences in productive and distributive economic systems (and their products)l a difference between two modes of production to use the Marxist term...This very difference might point to one, potential, way out of the "hardening the sides" model. Since you don't really have a major conflict between economic systems, a revenue sharing model that was generally agreed to even if it is not generally agreeable may be enough to create a breathing space for multiple new economic systems to develop. If this is tied in with either a centralized development plan, such as Dubai or Brunei have used (as, BTW, did Canada and Japan), then that could reinforce the central government, at least in the short term (speaking as an Anthropologist, so 15-30 years ).

Hello Marc:

Agree and which is why i used the word insight from history rather than analog or lesson because as a historian i shy away from making direct links from past to present; too many mediating things in-between that always seems to obliterate such clear links.

Actually Marc i think the fundamental cause of the American Civil War when you peel it all back was slavery and not the differences between the two sections' economic systems. Clearly slavery was what produced such distinct systems but slavery was the root and necessary cause of the War. So this is why I used the case of Bleeding Kansas when thinking about Iraq because if the fundamental issue in Kansas was economic differences between north and south then Douglas and the Kansas/Nebraska act should have been a durable compromise. But it was not because the Act did not address the root problems in America--slavery--which as WM highlights played itself out on the local level in Kansas.

In Iraq we think we are softening the root causes or problems by "hardwiring" the tribes to the national government. But, using Bleeding Kansas as an insight, that "hardwiring" does not address the fundamental political and social problems in Iraq today which are still there and sadly will, I think, produce much more violence and fighting in the days and months ahead.

gian

[marct]

Hi Gian,

Agree and which is why i used the word insight from history rather than analog or lesson because as a historian i shy away from making direct links from past to present; too many mediating things in-between that always seems to obliterate such clear links.

Agreed; it is always a problem and direct parallels are exceedingly rare. On whether or not to use analogs (and how), I think we are dealing with a disciplinary difference; Anthropology (and Sociology) are both more "engineering" in their orientation than History.

Actually Marc i think the fundamental cause of the American Civil War when you peel it all back was slavery and not the differences between the two sections' economic systems. Clearly slavery was what produced such distinct systems but slavery was the root and necessary cause of the War. So this is why I used the case of Bleeding Kansas when thinking about Iraq because if the fundamental issue in Kansas was economic differences between north and south then Douglas and the Kansas/Nebraska act should have been a durable compromise.

I think we will have to agree to disagree on this. I don't think there is much evidence to support the idea that slavery created the differences between the two systems, at least in a causal, economic sense. I do think that slavery was supported by the specific crops grown in the South, cotton being particularly labour intensive (don't forget that a mechanical cotton picker wasn't developed until the early 1950's; Wm J. Wilson has some interesting insights on this in When Work Disappears).

Still and all, by the 1850's slavery was pretty much dying out (I can hear you choking on that ). Take a look at what the number one US internal export "crop" for Virginia (and North Carolina I believe) was around 1855, I think you'll be surprised . The particular geography required for cotton was also disappearing as the US moved further west so, unless the US expanded into the Caribbean, you weren't likely to have many more slave states appearing.

Of course, you also had a rather precipitous "balancing act" going on between the slave and free states (hence some of the suggestions to annex Cuba as a slave state in the late 1850's), and that political problem certainly centered around slavery.

Marc