Manging the Barbarians

[Tom Odom]

Tom

What you say might be true, but I equate that to not taking sides at all.

Sun Tzu said "The ancient philospher Master Guan said, "Go forth armed without determining strategy, and you will destroy yourself in battle."

Ski,

There is a real difference between not taking sides as in remaining neutral and taking all sides in the interest of appearing to be balanced. The first is the peackeeping mode and is tough to do but it can work. The second is even harder and rarely succeeds. It does however tend to piss all sides off when poorly executed. We have over the past four years tried to do the latter in a sequenced fashion in considering the Shia and the Sunni. In the first phase, the Sunni certainly felt we had sided with the Shia. In the current phase, Shia leaders have made their concerns about our courting of the Sunni well known. Meanwhile we have to a large degree let the Kurds do as they please. The ultimate outcome has yet to emerge.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

Steve Metz said:

In my Rethinking Insurgency monograph (I know, I know--but I haven't plugged it for several days), I contend that our inclination to identify "bad guys" and "good guys" in counterinsurgency is a legacy of the Cold War (and of the difficulty Americans have dealing with ethical ambiguity) that serves us badly today. It complicates any resolution short of outright victory which is, itself, unattainable against networked, self-funding, terrorism-based insurgencies. Moreover, when we sell a counterinsurgency campaign to the American public as one that pits good guys against bad guys, public support erodes when, as invariably happens, our partners turn out to be less than pure of heart.

(Emphasis added / kw)
Seems to me the terrible truth of the item I placed in bold added to the fact that our egos in high places insist on reinventing the wheel instead of learning from history that this approach:

Hence I think that either a "managing the barbarians" or, to put a softer edge on it, a peacemaking/peacekeeping approach is more attuned to today's realities than is the kind of 1960s conceptualization of counterinsurgency that we still cling to.

Would be no more likely to succeed. The American psyche is perfectly prepared to slam anyone onto the mat and jump on their rib cage; it is not prepared for classic wrestling with the world media as a referee. As Steve points out, in a tag team match with everyone in black trunks, we'd have difficulty sorting out who to slam.

Not to mention that our national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either. Add to that the facts that we have to be a full spectrum force with multi mission capability, that we are not going to develop an advisory corps, SOF is not likley to undergo an expansion and the Defense budget is going to get whacked and we had better look at a way to use the GPF to max advantage...

Ski said:

Tom

What you say might be true, but I equate that to not taking sides at all.

Sun Tzu said "The ancient philospher Master Guan said, "Go forth armed without determining strategy, and you will destroy yourself in battle.

Adding that to Steve's thoughts and given the fact that taking no side is, in a great many if not most cases, the best approach (due to all the factors Steve cited among others), it would appear to me the best strategy would be to avoid entanglements in most forms unless there is absolutely no alternative because as Tom said:

There is a real difference between not taking sides as in remaining neutral and taking all sides in the interest of appearing to be balanced. The first is the peackeeping mode and is tough to do but it can work. The second is even harder and rarely succeeds. It does however tend to piss all sides off when poorly executed.

Given several failures in foreign policy over the last 60 or so years plus the fairly good strategic idea in Iraq that was badly flawed in execution and therefor is not likely to produce a result as good as might have been hoped (Tom's "...even harder..." approach), our ability to interject in the affairs of others for the near future might be better curtailed and a strategy of some small but highly effective direct action, area tailored advisory and assistance capabilities -- say a MilAssistAdvisoryCom for each CoCom, working with the SOComs -- plus low key SF led ID and, most importantly an announced policy of "We'll play nice as long as everyone else does. If someone elects not to, we'll come in and smash everything, a process at which we excel. Oh -- and we don't do windows and we don't house-sit but we may help pay for the clenup" might be a far better approach.

Diplomatically worded, it would sound better, but I tend to get long winded so that's the country version.

The foregoing should be considered not only on the premise of domestic political probabilities but on the realities of todays rapid and efficient worldwide communications capability, the international scene and the globalization effect on commerce and the world economy. We no longer drive that train...

[tequila]

Not to mention that our national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either. Add to that the facts that we have to be a full spectrum force with multi mission capability, that we are not going to develop an advisory corps, SOF is not likley to undergo an expansion and the Defense budget is going to get whacked and we had better look at a way to use the GPF to max advantage...

Great post, Ken. I remember when expanding SOF was trendy - that appears to have faded amidst the political din to expand the entire AD force. And to what end, exactly? To fight more Iraqs? Which systems will get the chop to pay for it, or we will just disband divisions again ten years from now?

[SteveMetz]

Great post, Ken. I remember when expanding SOF was trendy - that appears to have faded amidst the political din to expand the entire AD force. And to what end, exactly? To fight more Iraqs? Which systems will get the chop to pay for it, or we will just disband divisions again ten years from now?

I've been running around all over the place arguing that we're once again preparing to fight the last war.

[SteveMetz]

national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the two year rule, but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever. So rather than kind of ease ourselves in, we need the capability to surge early (both military and political/economic efforts) and count on diminishing our role in three years. That one of my critiques of 3-24: it sort of assumes that we'll stay involved until "success." I think that's politically unrealistic.

I believe, for instance, that the current "surge" in Iraq is a good idea three years too late. If we'd done it in the summer of 2003, it might have made a decisive difference.

What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

[Rank amateur]

but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever.

I think it depends on casualties. Like Ken says, if people shoot at us, the public wants them crushed. If the Iraqis stop shooting at us, I think the public would support staying there until Jesus comes back.

What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

[SteveMetz]

Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

Funny you should mention that. Well, not funny funny. There is nothing funny about German MPs. But I did touch on it at the end of Rethinking Insurgency and Learning From Iraq (which, let the record show, I've gone two whole days without mentioning).

The point I made was that we need to drop the term "counterinsurgency" in general. To many potential partners, it smacks of Cold War episodes of propping up friendly dictators. And, since Odom got out of the military, we don't do that any more.

But where I was going with that is to drop counterinsurgency and instead focus on developing doctrine and concepts for a more holistic notion like stabilization which is less likely to scare away potential allies and better reflects the multidimensional nature of the conflicts we are now facing. (I.e., we could have doctrine and concepts. for dealing warlords and militias as well as insurgents).

[Tom Odom]

And, since Odom got out of the military, we don't do that any more.

there you go, again, telling the truth and exposing my lies...

truth be known that with my reconstructed body and subsequent arthritis, I can barely prop up myself

so Steve, tell me again what was the title of that latest work? Learning from E-rock?

And as far as dictators go, you must admit Le Guide Mobutu a eu le style de lui-meme, n'est pas?

[Rank amateur]

But where I was going with that is to drop counterinsurgency and instead focus on developing doctrine and concepts for a more holistic notion like stabilization which is less likely to scare away potential allies and better reflects the multidimensional nature of the conflicts we are now facing. (I.e., we could have doctrine and concepts. for dealing warlords and militias as well as insurgents).

You've convinced me.

[tequila]

Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

Hasn't worked so well in Afghanistan - the Germans were in charge of training the Afghan police and notoriously short-stroked the job - see this thread.

[Ken White]

Good comment.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the two year rule...

Year or so ago, I read a blurb by, IIRC, a northern Virginia HS History teacher whose name I regrettably don't recall who said he told his students that his study convinced him that about 1/3 of all Americans tended to be opposed to a particular war, ideology or party dependent, while another third supported it (again ideology dependent) and the remaining third could be swayed, mostly depending on how well the war was going. He also said that typically, the voters would support the effort for two years and then started losing interest and support would wither.

He acknowledged that seemed facile but posited it as a rough rule of thumb. I gave it some thought, went over our history and decided the guy had a good idea.

... but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever. So rather than kind of ease ourselves in, we need the capability to surge early (both military and political/economic efforts) and count on diminishing our role in three years. That one of my critiques of 3-24: it sort of assumes that we'll stay involved until "success." I think that's politically unrealistic.

Totally agree!

I believe, for instance, that the current "surge" in Iraq is a good idea three years too late. If we'd done it in the summer of 2003, it might have made a decisive difference.

Agree but would add that had we been better prepared going in (training and doctrine wise) there may have been no need for a surge at all...

What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

Again totally agree.

As has been said before, parts of the Armed Serices have been at war off and on over the last 60 years -- the USG and DoD -- and the Army -- have not. I suggest a big part of the problem is applying peacetime rules (everything from the way the Pentapod asylum, to congress, ALL the OGA and the contracting system work) in such situations is a big part of that crank up problem. That really needs to be fixed. We are masters at cobbling together solutions to problems -- most of which we create ourselves...

As to two years or three, I think he's got the low end but agree with you that three years should be the absolute top. Planning for more than that is an invitation to major domestic political problems.

I still say the Police training bit would best be served by dedicated ARNG/USAR MP Bns, located in metro areas converted into the Police training role -- those units already have a host of serving cops a members...