Fear as A Political Motivator

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While I agree to a large extent with Norfolk's take on Hobes, I have some other issues about it and with MarcT's earlier post, quoted below. For those who want to cut to the chase here's my bottom line (which I justify eventually down further):
BLUF: Perhaps a Rousseau-like myth seems a better place to start in the Middle East. After all, through the insistence on using Shari'a as the basis of government and justice, the opponent is advocating for a "divine right" state of sorts .

What is the social cost to an actor of engaging in a fear / terror campaign in Iraq? If the social benefit to the actor is higher than the social cost, then the tactic is "effective" and will, in all probability, be used (this is based on a simple variant of the Prisoners Dilemma game). The relative social weighting of a given tactic, in terms of social cost/benefit, is based in part on the social acceptance of that tactic and the fear that someone who uses that tactic will be slapped down by the rest of the social actors. This, BTW, appears to be hardwired into our brains

I am somewhat confused by this post. What variant are you talking about? The usual application of the Prisoner's Dilemma is to show a fundamental inconsistency in acting egoistically. It purports to show that acting in what appears to be your unique self-interest results in an outcome that is least in your self interest. I'm not sure how that plays into the Hobbesian myth from Leviathan about how and why we form governments. Another use of the Prisoner's Dilemma is an attempt to show how Adam Smith's hidden hand makes for the best outcomes for all in a laissez faire market--another interesting myth, IMHO.

I view the Hobbesian position as fundamentally opposed to that of Locke--Hobbes' view of human nature is that we are basically bad while Locke thinks we are basically good. Hobbes also views our resources as constrained--there isn't enough to go around for everyone while Locke seems to think we have more than enough natural resources to turn into "property." For Hobbes, we need an outsider to keep us in line and make sure we share the limited resources. For Locke, we appoint a special agent to allow us to get on with enriching ourselves and keep those who would acquire property the easy way (by theft) from doing so. BTW for Hobbes revolution is not a right of the governed; it is a right in Locke's view, which probably explains why Jefferson and Co. look much more Lockean than Hobbesian in their efforts.

This all has little to do with the real world I think (except perhaps for the division of labor piece). BTW, I'm pretty sure most of the post-American Revolution uprisings/rebellions/ revolutions (and revolutionary writings, like Marx's and the modern Frankfort School folks, e.g.) are based, philosophically, on Rousseau, who is at odds with both Hobbes and Locke in important ways. Rousseau's hidden agenda/ interest is to justify getting rid of a government based on "divine right." (He didn't have a Henry VIII to break him from the Catholic guilt trip about obeying the duly annointed sovereign. Nor did he have a John Wesley to advocate for a missionary spirit vis-a-vis the urban poor, which kept England from undergoing the post-Congress of Vienna tumult that the Continental states experienced). Rousseau creates his social contract myth to explain why divine right is the wrong model for understanding how and why "man is born free yet is everywhere in chains."