I'm not sure, but I'll put my bias up front having spent my Infantry time as a Rifle PL/AT PL/HHC XO in the 101st and staff and CMD time in a SBCT. When I was in 1-24th as a staff guy we were of the light variety and about a year from when I got there we "transformed" and became an SBCT as I was transitioning from staff to command. As a commander I had a 170 man combined arms team with far better mobility, better firepower, better communications, better protection then I would have had under the the old MTO&E. It cost quite a bit, but it in terms of capability - we had allot of flexibility. The IOT&E process was very enlightening- the test and evaluation that OTC came up with put us through the ringer - constant distributed ops over a period of a couple of months (I think it was three iterations) at FT Knox - which is every bit as much Infantry country as anything else - very restrictive, and over very complex. After that I turned over the rifle company and took the HHC for our trips to NTC and JRTC as part of 1/25th's train up for OIF - they were to relieve 3/2 (the Army's first SBCT) in Mosul. At this time the CTCs were transitioning toward a COIN look - the Lancer's did well at both - able to use the ability to move allot of Infantry with reasonable mobility, good comms for reachback, enough firepower in the Armsroom concept to outgun most enemy - and with additional comms and mobility to bring in more Infantry quickly if needed.
When later I went to Mosul as an advisor I got to see the 172nd SBCT on its first deployment and 3/2 on its second rotation in Mosul (and a large chunk of Ninewa). The 172nd after its RIP with 3/2 went to Baghdad for a few months, and 3/2 RIP/TOA'd early to go to Diyala. I was not surprised to see them able to use the same TTP to good effect - CO CDRs had no problem employing big combined arms 170 man companies in COIN to great effect. The AVN component was mostly KWs and those guys are great to work with.
I've not seen a more versatile formation for Infantry then the SBCT- the closest I've read about was the big Armored CAV platoons in Vietnam - I've met a couple of guys who fought those there.
SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.
What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.
I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch)
A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.Out of the 43 AC (Active Component) BCTs we are going to require balanced capabilities that allow for roughly half of that force to be deployed while the other half is being refit, or ramped up for future deployments. The question of what types of modular BCTs provide the greatest flexibility across the spectrum of operations is also tied to what types of BCTs go into the RC (Reserve Component) forces. An AC breakout of the 43 BCTs might be structured around 15 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 16 IBCTs, this would allow for a commitment of up to 8 HBCTs, 6 SBCTs and 8 IBCTs at one time, provided the supporting elements are available to sustain them.
The AC BCTs would be backed up by RC BCTs. However the breakout between the USAR and ARNG correlate to what their primary missions are. The USAR would provide the additional combat power of 10 HBCTs, while the ARNG could provide 34 IBCTs which would provide their dual state mission with the manpower needed to better fulfill their Title 32 requirements. This would make for a total force of 25 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 50 IBCTs.
The overall rational for where capabilities are located at within the total Army (AC/RC) is based on balancing flexibility and sustainability with the types of missions those components are more likely to be tasked with. The Army must achieve consistent balance because the missions it will be assigned may call for formations to operate within the full spectrum over short periods of time and in some cases simultaneously. While many have called for greater specialization, I believe the key to our Army’s success lies within well trained, well led, adaptable GPFs (general purpose forces) that can be combined where needed based on the parameters of the mission. If the Army had an unconstrained force structure – meaning it had the resources and authorization to allow it to create and sustain an infinite number of specialized formations; we might consider alternatives to GPFs. However if we over specialize within the constraints of meeting our commitment to deploy and sustain 20 BCTs at a time, we might sacrifice our flexibility to staff HQs and afford leaders new education and experience; as well as man the institutions which allow us to evolve and provide strategic depth.
The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.
Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.
Best, Rob
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