Counterinsurgency, Denial, and Iraq

[Rank amateur]

Because the country is in Civil War over fundamental political and social issues, the war will not be resolved until certain sides win out through fighting over others.

I'm glad you've joined our group. I was one of the few council members holding that point of view. It's very nice to have support from West Point.

During the vital first year of the insurgency, the 2004 American presidential election loomed. This made it almost impossible for the Bush administration to make the sort of admission of guilt that would have allowed it to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy. So all it could do was downplay the challenge, deny policy failure and, to an extent, lay the blame on the military, at least until after the election.

As a spin doctor, this was obvious to me at the time. I felt that as more and more people realized the spin didn't match reality in Iraq the administration's support would fall steadily, but wouldn't get below 50% until after the election. In retrospect, I got that one right.

The other thing denial did was allow the administration to go on the political offensive and create a wedge issue. We're for victory. Democrats are for defeat. The strong on defense positioning is always a winner for Republicans. It worked.

But does your argument go on to state that therefore since the Administration did not have a coin strategy that army units on the ground were not using Coin tactics and methods?

Steve doesn't need my help, but many of the tactics that contributed to the awakening - paying off tribal leaders, using "concerned citizens" instead of IP or IA - weren't allowed by the administration in 2004 because those tactics were considered harmful to the Iraqi state. I'd say that the answer to your question is no, but it did mean that soldiers were prevented from using COIN tactics that were later proven to be successful. (Ken's comment that soldiers were frustrated with the CPA would support this point of view.)

I was sort of flummoxed by the "is Iraq an insurgency or a civil war?" debate last year. I view insurgency as a strategy. Every time I can think of that it has been used, it was within the context of an asymmetric civil war.

I think people like me are using the term "insurgent" incorrectly. I think the debate is: should we limit our objective to defeating AQI (which people are incorrectly calling the insurgency) or should we try to keep Iraq a single functional state (which people are incorrectly calling preventing a civil war.)

With respect to Iraq, I also agree with your "functional drunk" metaphor -- and suggest that it is highly likely if not certain to apply to any future incursions. That is or should be a strong cautionary

I agree too. We're enablers. If I were doing Hillary's spin I'd urge her to call Iraq the world's largest welfare recipient and have her promise to reform it. (Which again ties into an issue that has been successful before.)

Have to also agree with MarcT that not all insurgencies form, consolidate, and continue because the state has fundamental shortcomings.

I've always felt that crazy people are only able to attract a large number of followers if they attach themselves to a legitimate grievance. Manson had a handful. When Germany had many legitimate grievances, Hitler took over an entire country.

RA's theorem, presented for critique. When we intervene in a foreign country, without wide spread popular support, it makes it possible for violent anti US extremists to position themselves as freedom fighters, and under those conditions extremist groups can grow their membership and influence.