My perception is that what was being done on the ground varied a great deal from unit to unit. That's based on comments from my son, a friend in the Rgr Regt who got around a bit and two other folks who were there at the time.
Agreed on all counts -- and I should've said the three detractors I listed in general order switched places almost on a daily basis with respect to which was most problematical. I did say that those detractors were based on that one Brigade but from here in an air conditioned house in Florida, it looked to me like the CPA easily was the biggest cluster of the bunch...1. Strategically there was still denial in the U.S. that there was an insurgency in 2004, which prevented a coordinated interagency strategy, and Mr. Bremmer made one strategic error after another because he and his bosses did not understand the nature of the fight. The biggest error was disbanding the Iraqi Army, and we didn't even properly demobilize them. Arrogance was our strategy then, now we're trying to clean up those mistakes.
True but again, it seems to have varied from unit to unit. Everyone I've talked to who was there at the time is pretty scathing in their comment on two units who apparently epitomized what you say. That includes one then MAJ who was in one of those units and was not a happy camper.2. The operational strategy focused on find, fix, and finish, because the assumption was the insurgents/trouble makers were a relatively small group, and if we killed them all, the troubles would stop. Sort of a mailed fist approach, but executed very weakly and it was doomed to failure from the start. What I recall in 2004 was several cordon and search activities, but very little clear, hold and build. We were taking areas, then giving them back to the enemy.
All true and, it seems, due mostly to MNFs concept of op and the CPAs inability to do much of anything right. As an aside, one guy involved in the initial ISF trainup attermpts under Eaton is still pretty livid over the flawed and half hearted approach at that time.3. The current approach, where we have sufficient troops, is to clear, hold, and build and then transition the area to a competent (relative) Iraqi Security Force. The clear and hold involves leaving Soldiers in those areas 24/7, not simply doing a cordone and search, then run off after the next target, leaving the area just searched to insurgent control, and oh my the way a bunch of p.o'd Iraqis. There may have been individual units doing some version of clear and hold on their own, but without an interagency approach, the build phase had to be very limited, since it would have been restricted to the tactical/operational level. This was 2004.
Good question. I'd add "or if we're invited but only half heartedly because we bullied or bribed the HN to 'invite' us."...The ISF is much better trained and equipped...
. . .
Unfortunately we don't have an occupying power doctrine, because it is politically incorrect, so when we find ourselves in the position of being an occupying power, we have to redefine the nature of conflict to make it platable politically, so we call it an insurgency (partially true), but is a our counterinsurgency doctrine effective, when we're not invited by the HN government?
I believe a series of techniques that will work can be found for this or any even more complex situation. All that's required is the time and fortitude to do that. The more important, even critical question IMO is will that time be allowed by US domestic political concerns?I think my real question is will a counterinsurgency strategy work for the multiple facet problem we're dealing with? Especially the so called British strategy? Killcullen addressed something along a similiar vein when he discribed the complex problem in Iraq as consisting of an insurgency, terroristism, and civil conflict (loosely paraphrased), and that the strategy for one often the made the other problem worse.
Can't win a COIN effort short of playing G. Khan, all you can do is achieve an acceptable outcome (and that's true of the over-touted and misused Malaya example). The level of violence is, I think, not a good indicator of the probability of that. Said acceptable outcome will vary in the eye of the beholder. I've long said there'll be decreasing (not an absence of) violence and a Troop drawdown five years after the start -- that means next summer; then a move by US units to the boonies and a few years of steadily declining and sporadic violence leading to a rule of (rough, ME type) law by the 2013-2018 time frame and a fully functional nation (in accordance with world, not western norms) by 2028-2033. Still looks possible even with all our screwups....Are we currently winning in Iraq because the level of violence is down? Can anyone define winning first, then we can try to answer that.
Oh -- and the oil keeps flowing to China and India...
Bookmarks