Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Ski]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch)



A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Excellent points Ski. I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.

[J Wolfsberger]

Where we got in trouble in OIF was having a SecDef who was addicted to glitzy techno fixes. (His addiction goes all the way back to the 1970s.) The structure, equipment, TTPs, etc. may have created problems for us, but nothing as severe as the insistence that the services would somehow pull a quick fix out of the hat if their advice was ignored.

What should have come first is the mission to be accomplished, in context. I don't recall any discussion of the fact that the state of Iraq was created from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, for the convenience of the British and French negotiators, and represented no underlying nation. But that has been one of the major drivers of subsequent events. Instead, we had "regime change" followed by "nation building," none of which, at the time, was defined in the context of who we would be dealing with. What we did not have was any sort of accurate picture of who would emerge as the significant power wielders, what their relationships were, who the significant groups were, how they differed, what they agreed on, etc. In fact, I don't think the decision makers even realized it was necessary.

Given that the mission is correctly defined, the second step is determining what is required to accomplish it. In OIF it was boots on the ground, which didn't accord with the SecDefs desire for a techno fix, and was ignored. (And if I recall correctly, the messenger, Shinseki, was "shot.") Part of this step is also looking at what equipment is available or can be developed, and how it contributes to accomplishing the mission.

I think the proper approach to answering the thread topic, and the larger questions behind it, is to ask the right questions. Do my missions in Iraq require the troops to have mobility, some protection and occasionally a base of fire? If the answer is yes, then at a minimum you need Stryker, Bradley, LAV, M113, Warrior, or some other APC/ICV. Does my enemy have the potential to bring in heavy ATGM on occasion? If the answer is yes, then you need Abrams, Leopard, Challenger, etc.

Mechanization, per se, neither contributes nor detracts from performing the mission. Fixing on it as a solution in and of itself leads to the same sort of problem our Air Force counterparts face - flying around with 2000 pound bombs and no one to drop them on.

[Rob Thornton]

. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

I'd agree with you for the most part.

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Ski]

Rob

Sorry if I wrote my response in a snotty tone - didn't realize it until I posted it...

My point about how units are deploying is exactly the problem. The force structure we've built is not what is being used in theater, and since we've had to buy Billions worth of HWMMV's (and possibly MRAP's), and we've been forced to change how we fight and train for the current wars, I think we've created a force for an enemy we aren't fighting now (and who knows if the structure we've created will be used any time in the future). We've borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars to sustain military operations that is going to have to be paid back - at some time. We may not have the fiscal flexibility in the future...

Yeah - 21 IBCT's now...lots of good reasons why the force changed...

It'll cost more to move the Heavies into the USAR than its worth, and all the issues that surround the HBCT's in the ARNG will migrate over there...but you'll have all the individual augmentees you want from the USAR.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

As I said, we live in interesting times.

"Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.



I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.



What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.



My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.



Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

I'd agree with you for the most part.



Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.



And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.



Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - no worries - I believe a little passion in a discussion is a good thing - keeps us from getting too comfortable in our ideas.

Good point about the MRAPs - I've heard the Marines are considering shrink wrapping a portion - while the MRAPs has degrees of utility in OIF (based on where and which MRAPs get fielded and what units use them for (Joe will probably find a good use for any piece of equipment) - In Afghanistan conditions create different requirements - I don't suspect you'll see to many heavy MRAP in the high altitudes. So maybe our answer is like the Marines - and coincides with Ken's point about Multi-Purpose forces vs. GPF on the "Retooling the Artilleryman" thread - if a BCT was going to be tagged with working a COIN mission set in supportive terrain - maybe they get fielded a supporting package to include among other things a suite of MRAP vehicles as opposed to going with what is on there books. I don't know - but that might work.

Agree with you about the fiscal flexibility - particularly when t applies to supplementals - we need to make some decisions about where we're turning this super tanker pretty soon - I did read something today ref. justification for a larger % of the GDP toward Defense and other security related stuff.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

This is something we're going to be struggling with for awhile I think - at least until we can regain some flexibility that allows for better planning - hard to do with a limited strategic reserve - maybe that will change over the next year.

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

Largely agree with you here as well - I think the big value that will come out of this to us is contingent on how we view its utility. If its viewed as a program to test and field useful tech to enable the soldier then we're probably in good shape - the moment we view it as a panacea or as a replacement for people - we've lost sight of how war is different then anything else. Allot of what is under the FCS umbrella of tech makes it to the Force in other ways - I think in the end - no matter if we call it FCS or not - it will be a gradual evolution of stuff that better equips the Force - in some cases it will just come across as some new LINs with a NET program, or maybe it'll be even more transparent. I worried allot about the FCS MGVs when I sat in a mock up - however I know the EBCT CDR down at Bliss and have enough faith in him a leader to believe he will not mortgage our future - personalities matter and he is the right 06 - one that understands well how to tell more senior leaders why something does not work, and how Industry might be trying to hide it. Honestly, among the best leaders I've ever known.

As I said, we live in interesting times. "Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Agreed - ultimately its comes down to our ability to play a better game with the cards we've been dealt then the other guy - and to hope his hand sucks more then ours
Best, Rob

[Coy R. Greer]

Sirs and Senior NCO's
Normally in a forum such as this, I would just read and learn. However, for a long time and in a quite a few articles that have been published surrounding the units that responded to and fought in Sadr City on April 4, 2004, one unit who attacked straight through the middle of the city has either been overlooked completely or Identified as something it was not. That unit was C Troop, 1st Squadron 2D ACR. We went right through the middle of the city, leapfrogging intersection to intersection, 2 platoons at a time. After a couple of unsucessful assaults by Militia while halted and defending in the intersections, the troop made linkup with a tank company from 2/37 at the Sadr Bureau. A platoon from this company took the lead, and the 4 Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR Scout platoons along with the Mortar platoon continued to run and gun right up the middle of Sadr city. We then went over towards Al Rasheed and Hit a few enemy combatants there as well. This Assault through Sadr City was conducted from Unarmored Humvee's with no doors! In the case of the Mortar Platoon, they piled in the back of 1SG Semerena's 6 pack and one of their own 6 packs, ripped off the covers, and took a knee back to back facing and engaging with M203, Saws, and M16s. Our troop was awarded 8 Arcoms w/V, numerous more Arcoms, and I believe 2 Bronze Stars. In spite of this, the Article listed here https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/c.../6moore04c.pdf
claims that the force that attacked into Sadr City was pure Armor with NO Infantry or Scouts. It was NOT pure Armor and there were Scouts and Infantry Assaulting forward, mounted and dismounted, capturing terrain, and sucessfully holding it. On top of that, accounts of the units involved in the counter attack into the city to reach the cut off troops and recapture key infrastructure claim ONLY Task Force 2/37 tank companies were sent into the fight, and this is simply not true! Coincidentally that was the SECOND time that half of C Troop 1/2 ACR went into the City during the fight. The first time was at 1800 with COL Mark Calvert,( at that time LTC Calvert). Two platoons of Scouts from C Troop, in 8 unarmored Humvees, and a Squadron Commander went in, maneuvered, engaged enemy combatants,captured one of Sadr's Leaders, and came back out, all alive, all vehicles operational. However, everyone, every account, every article written, acts like none of those things ever happened. Can anybody tell me why? I mentioned the awards received by the unit earlier because the orders for the awards received through out the Scout and Mortar Platoons are verifiable and undeniable proof of the involvement of the Troop with date, times, and actions. What I cant understand is why Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR participation on April 4 2004 is either omitted or complete denied all together? How can 120 Scouts and Mortars in unarmored humvees, shooting their way up the middle of the city, linking up with Armor, and continuing the attack, be "forgotten or denied"? And my biggest question is, why? Is it because we did something that we shouldn't have been able to? Is it because it would raise some questions it shouldnt? Is it perhaps because a unit that light doing what it did would steal the thunder from someone's "Pure Armor COIN Fight" concept? Or does the admission of C Troop 1/2 ACR in that fight open some kind of Pandora's box I don't know about?

[Ski]

Interesting points about Canadian Strykers/LAV III's - did not know they were having stress issues on the frames due to combat operations.

The Army Reserve was also formed as a medical reserve in WWI for docs and nurses. As the country went to a total war capability in WWII, the USAR was expanded to become a fully structured component of the Army with combat, combat support and combat service support functions. In 1993, the USAR gave up all of its combat structure in order to get more CS/CSS from the ARNG and everyone has been happy-ish since.

Excellent points Ski. I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.