Retooling the Artilleryman

[wm]

I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary.

Ken,

If we do that to the King of Battle (which we know got that name because it has balls and puts them where the Queen (AKA the Infantry) wants them, then who will bring class to the brawl? CAS???

[120mm]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

[Norfolk]

I agreed and still think that's a good idea. However, I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary.

I can't believe that you said that Ken! Double! Now you're scaring ME! I LOATHE the entire Constabulary concept! Uh-uh, re-role FA and Armour to Infantry if you have to for COIN, but NOT to Constabulary roles. Draft policeman if you need MP's.

[Ken White]

on mission requirements, discard the parochialism ("too hard," "lengthy training," "too many tasks" and so forth) and not get wrapped around the semantic axle (the choice of words, terms or branches as opposed to the other, philosophical 'semantic' axle).

Makes no difference if you re-role the FA as Infantry, Military Police, Constabulary, Imperial Strom Troopers or Plerztbarginfers -- what will make a difference is that they're productively employed.

FWIW, I've been briefly an Artilleryman, a Radio Section Chief and a Tanker, for a longer period Cavalry, SF and MI and for a far longer period, an Infantryman. I've "advised" two Armies (at Bn and at GHQ level) and served alongside almost a dozen more. Having also been in the Marines as a Tanker and a Scout Swimmer I'm the very soul of eclecticism (new word). Point of all that is not a brag but to lend credence when I say most branch "difficult, constant training, etc." noise is turf protection and parochial bias, no more (before anyone flames, this applies at the entry and basic military tasks application levels, not to full spectrum operations and the coordination and conduct thereof). All those jobs are difficult and all do require some specialized training -- but todays troops are capable of a whole lot more than a 1970 Project 100,000 model -- for whom our training system was designed (and which is only now starting to change).

A change resisted by many who like the old ways...

Which are gone, never to return.

Anyway, we can discard the Constab term and go with Plerztbarginfers, which we can abbreviate as PBI.

[Ken White]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

There were no MPs, there was beaucoup Infantry and the Infantry just went to work. Some Cavalry also very little FA. Life was simple. The guys did everything from public sanitation, to school teaching to road building to combat ops...

Here's a good book, read it early this year but it belonged to a Friend so i don't have a copy. The review at the link is a good abstract. LINK

[Jim Rodgers]

Ken said,

"Totally true -- thus a selective set of tasks and missions is a necessity. That's why we have a Deployment mission task list. As we also saw at Abu Gharaib, the wrong folks doing the wrong mission with no supervision can be problematic..."

"Makes no difference if you re-role the FA as Infantry, Military Police, Constabulary, Imperial Strom Troopers or Plerztbarginfers -- what will make a difference is that they're productively employed."

Ken - if you believe these things, then we disagree less than you seem to think. Sorry to make you want to "give up". I do think the labels matter, though - at least a little. I have no interest in branch parochialism. I have something of a reputation of shooting WAY outside of my lane to try (haven't gotten very far yet) and train my soldiers in other areas of expertise. I'd be more than happy to sit down and help plan training to temporarily re-role soldiers to perform my, or anyone elses, METL tasks (at a level of proficiency tbd by the amount of time and resources we're willing to throw at it). Soldiers are soldiers, and can handle alot, usually faster and better than we expect. None of those things devalue subject matter expertise, though.

[Jim Rodgers]

Rex,

Re doctrinal and other changes to the MP Corps -

First - alot of new MP units are being stood up, particularly, but not exclusively, in the reserve component.

One of the key issues of the last few years is that MPs usually aren't set up to own battlespace. There are exceptions, but its fairly common to be parceled out to the manuever commanders. That's not all that controversial - just something to keep in mind when assessing the role of MPs on the battlefield.

Re doctrine - in the last few years, the MPs have added Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) as a battlefield function\METL task (now a total of 5). It's more controversial than it should be, usually because it's either misunderstood or the intel guys think we're trying to horn in. PIO supplements IPB, it doesn't replace it. It does allow for some great opportunites, e.g. our MP school teaches a dedicated link analysis course. There are some unclassified briefings available - PM me if you're interested.

The biggest other changes I can think of are the addition of a MP platoon and a MP captain to every manuever brigade, and the gradual deemphaisis of on post law enforcement. There are some second order effects from both of those. Anyone with AKO access might be interested in the 89th MP Brigade PIO AAR, which addresses the impact of the latter on situational awareness - it's FOUO, so it can't be posted here.

[Rex Brynen]

Jim:

Thanks for the information (and ditto everyone else).

I suppose the issue that is of particular interest to me is the current and potential use of MPs for the training/mentoring of indig police and security forces.

If there is one thing we know from the record of past multilateral stability and PKOs, it is that CIVPOL and rule-of-law development is one of the hardest part of governance capacity-building, partly because it requires enormous cultural understanding (policing techniques being far more culturally embedded than warfighting), and partly because assistance to local police development makes little difference unless judicial and legal reforms, anti-corruption measures, etc. are undertaken in parallel. A case in point is Haiti, where many good intentions and large amounts of aid and technical assistance has had depressingly little positive effect over the years.

To get back to the "retooling" issue that began this thread, it seems to me essential that if artillerymen (or anyone else) are being retooled to perform MP-like duties, we be clear on what tasks are relatively easily learned, and what are much more specialized and challenging.

Second, I wonder where primary responsibility for indig police mentoring ought to "lie" within the USG. In Canada we have very little real capacity in this area within the Armed Forces, but we're fortunate to have some capacity in the RCMP (which has cross-cultural policing in northern and aboriginal communities as a key part of its normal activities).

Rex

[Ken White]

has been addressed briefly on other threads but for the US, there is no easy resolution. The RCMP and AFP in Austraia are in far better position to support their governments, do so and do it well. Our solution in the past was USAID -- but that got curtailed in the 90s and since, we have relied on contractors, mostly DynCorp. as you can guess, the performance is spotty, some great cases and some disasters.

Lacking any police organization of national scope, it seems to me our best bet is to use the MPs who could, with just a couple of selected Bns, pick that up as a primary mission. The use of civilian police academies and training to get them adapted to the LE versus the tactical role should be no problem. Even more advantages would accrue with some ArNG / USAR MP Bns as those near large urban areas generally have a high number of older, experienced police officers in their membership, those guys would love that mission. Not to mention that said cities have a lot of cultures in the mix...

RE; Jim's comment on Police Intel; the close hold mentality of the Intel community is long standing, they are ultra source, information -- and turf -- protective to a fault. Virtually every Advisory Detachment in Viet Nam found they had to develop their own agent net due to that failure to share. My son's unit in both Afghanistan and Iraq '04 to 06 did the same thing.

That issue really needs to be fixed...

[slapout9]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.

Hi Jim, no you haven't missed anything you are tracking right on. My comment dealt strictly with the fact that between EBO and D3A...D3A is better and it is a lot simpler and will still achieve the same effect(pun intended) that is all I meant by it.

Having said that, when EBO was first conceived it had several steps to it not just targeting. These steps in the process are pretty much gone so I wouldn't worry to much about it ( based upon the J9 EBA unclassified manual I read). To review the history though for something to be a true EBO operation you would have to have great intelligence,Precision Guided Munitions, the ability to attack all targets in parallel. All that had to be there or it was not likely to work out as it was originally conceived.

It is no longer published but if you can find the Air Command and Staff College student handbook on planning the Air Campaign you would see how simple it really was. I have checked and the old handbook is no longer on line


Point two and it is a big one EBO is based on systems theory (not chaos theory) if you don't believe in this it will not work. The hybrid theory of combing EBO with D3A will just make things more complicated in my opinion. D3A is already integrated in the MDMP and that would be a better choice. The worst thing is to make things more complicated which EBA is doing IMO. Hell I don't even understand that anymore. When did the military start attacking "Nodes" thats just non-sense IMO. They should have left PEMSI(I keep wanting to say Pepsi) as the 5 rings it has the same effect

Final point. EBO in one word is why? Why will attacking this target lead you to your final objective. If you can't answer that... it might work out... but it probably want.

Hope this helps or do you have more questions? Slap

Here is a link to one of the best papers I ever read on the subject.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...szafranski.htm

[selil]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

I'm thinking every cop, and former cop on the board just groaned. There's no difference between law enforcement of today and a decade ago. Really.

[Ken White]

COIN, given the "...after the Spanish American War" dating...

[selil]

COIN, given the "...after the Spanish American War" dating...

Maybe I missed something. I gotta admit I've got an axe to grind in this discussion. I've spent a lot of effort trying to get small departments trained up and making the case that good training results in excellent cops. The number one thing I fight against is the "anybody can be a copy it's not that big of deal". Then you have to clean up after them.

[Ken White]

Maybe I missed something. I gotta admit I've got an axe to grind in this discussion. I've spent a lot of effort trying to get small departments trained up and making the case that good training results in excellent cops. The number one thing I fight against is the "anybody can be a copy it's not that big of deal". Then you have to clean up after them.

any argument from me on that score, I'm with you 100+% on that. Got two sons, one on each coast, who've been on the job for over 35 years between 'em and I'm along with some others fighting Florida's IMO too lax training time requirement trying to get it to model the GA POST requirement with respect to standards, length and in-service requirements. Plus in most posts here, I'm beating the training drum for more and better of the military variety, all levels.

I think the issue here, though, is troop training requirements for COIN...

[slapout9]

Cops and COIN go together. In just about anything I have read on COIN they always talk about Police type operations. They always talk about heavy patrolling on foot near the people. So I think one is tied to the other. If you don't have enough Cops the closest military equivalent is the Infantry. So with proper training it would be easier to cross train them than Artillery.
What we call the modern Police officer is only about 150 years old before that is was usually handled by the Military. COIN was just putting down the rebellion.

[Ken White]

Cops and COIN go together. In just about anything I have read on COIN they always talk about Police type operations. They always talk about heavy patrolling on foot near the people. So I think one is tied to the other. If you don't have enough Cops the closest military equivalent is the Infantry. So with proper training it would be easier to cross train them than Artillery.
What we call the modern Police officer is only about 150 years old before that is was usually handled by the Military. COIN was just putting down the rebellion.

Yes, Cops and COIN do go together -- so do Infantry and COIN and even more so. Cops and Infantry are very different creatures; MPs in the modern US Army sense are a blend and a good one. The two Cop sons both served, one as an MP and he had no trouble adapting to civilian police work; the other as an airplane infantry type -- and he had trouble scaling back...

Foot patrolling is indeed a COIN requirement and I'd submit that the Infantry is -- or should be -- far more about foot patrolling than are police officers OR MPs. Any Army or military force is always likely to have far more infantry available than MPs. I'm not at all convinced that training the FA for dismounted COIN work is at all difficult -- and I don't really think it makes much difference what you call 'em in that re-roleing... . No cross training of Infantry should be needed, COIN is a mission, one that has always existed and one that should be trained from the start.

Consider the fact that had we not neglected that mission for many years, there'd be no reason for this Board to exist. Krulak tried to tell everyone but egos got in the way and no one listened.

COIN has always been more than putting down the Rebellion, lot of historical examples as far back as Alexander in the west and ol' overquoted Sun Tzu in the east of doing it right -- and wrong. ..

[slapout9]

I am going to post this here because it bears on the posts related to D3A. This is from the new edition of the Air and Space Power journal.
Covers the subject of Dynamic Targeting about mid down it discusses some of the D3A problems form the writers viewpoint. It is a little off the general discussion of this thread but does relate to some of the posts.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...n07/brown.html

[Griz882]

All in all I think this a fascinating thread and it brings to mind an idea I once floated concerning the structure of the Army National Guard (of which I am a member).

Most of you may recall the strange days following Hurricane Katrina in which no one could fix the blame for a poor/late NG response. Political hay-makers tried to say it was the "Back Door Draft" had taken the NG away from the states (a bogus issue). Others blamed the loss of equipment to the war effort (a real issue). At the same time US ground forces are using their units well outside described doctrine, training, and TO&E capabilities. I propose that both items could be solved by restructuring the reserve forces (USAR/ARNG) as follows:

1. eliminate USAR, roll soldiers into ARNG
2. eliminate existing force structure of BCT's, MEB's, Sustainment BDE's and so forth
3. have each state establish a number of "Peace Enforcement Regiments" based on their available manpower with small states like New Hampshire providing something like three battalions to the structure and larger states providing multiple regiments.

The structure of each regiment/battalion would be MOS skill based, but the unit would not be branch based. Thus, a PEB would look something like this:

HHC - HQ Plt - Sig Plt - Lift Plt (helos) - Med Plt - Log Plt - Civil Affairs Plt
A Co - Infantry
B Co - MP
C Co - Engineer
D Co - Transport

Every battalion would have the same TO&E thus avoiding the current structure that has artillery units in some states with no ranges and heavy truck units in major urban areas that don't have motor pool space.

The end product would be an element that could function in both local emergency stabilization situations like Katrina and overseas in the post-combat stabilization stage. Imagine if the force planners could reach into a pool of over 400 "peace enforcement battalions" for duty in places like Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and so on. More over, they would be able to do so without the requirement of re-tooling the unit training. ARNG training could then focus on a stabilization/COIN/enforcement operations training cycle that would continuously feed into real world missions be it fighting fires in California, rescuing stranded flood victims in Louisiana, or providing stabilization in Iraq.

I recognize that that many "branch disciples" would be aghast at the type of force mixing I am recommending here, but I believe it brings the strength of branch training and a unit mission-focused training cycle together in the positive way. On my last Iraq tour I can’t tell you how many ersatz units I encountered that were made up of armor, engineers, infantry, MPs, artillery, and ADA (just to name a few) – most of whom spoke a common language separated by branch dogma and doctrine.

I say leave artillery to their mission. Leave infantry and armor to theirs. The same goes for ADA and MP. In short, create a force you can use in multiple ways (and at necessary times) while maintaining army for the bigger fight.

[Ken White]

I am going to post this here because it bears on the posts related to D3A. This is from the new edition of the Air and Space Power journal.
Covers the subject of Dynamic Targeting about mid down it discusses some of the D3A problems form the writers viewpoint. It is a little off the general discussion of this thread but does relate to some of the posts.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...n07/brown.html

Good article. Two minor comments. I have no problem with EBO or with Boyd's ideas but I would posit two thoughts with respect to EBO, the critical action is asking the right questions to determine what effects you need. With respect to Boyd; some folks can work inside an OODA loop rapidly and succesfully, not everyone can. The point in both cases is that, in my observation, our one size fits all personnel system is inimical to the concepts.

Thus I think the concepts are too advanced for the culture or, far more likely, the culture is not advanced enough for the concepts...

Though it easily could be.

Secondly, as I said, good article but I'd also suggest that if the USAF dropped their intransigence in refusing to freely allow the Army to control Air, what he recommends could occur quickly and easily. I understand the AF whys, I just don't agree with 'em.

[Ken White]

All in all I think this a fascinating thread and it brings to mind an idea I once floated concerning the structure of the Army National Guard (of which I am a member).
. . .
...I propose that both items could be solved by restructuring the reserve forces (USAR/ARNG) as follows:

1. eliminate USAR, roll soldiers into ARNG
2. eliminate existing force structure of BCT's, MEB's, Sustainment BDE's and so forth
3. have each state establish a number of "Peace Enforcement Regiments" based on their available manpower with small states like New Hampshire providing something like three battalions to the structure and larger states providing multiple regiments.

The structure of each regiment/battalion would be MOS skill based, but the unit would not be branch based. Thus, a PEB would look something like this:

HHC - HQ Plt - Sig Plt - Lift Plt (helos) - Med Plt - Log Plt - Civil Affairs Plt
A Co - Infantry
B Co - MP
C Co - Engineer
D Co - Transport
. . .
I recognize that that many "branch disciples" would be aghast at the type of force mixing I am recommending here, but I believe it brings the strength of branch training and a unit mission-focused training cycle together in the positive way. On my last Iraq tour I can’t tell you how many ersatz units I encountered that were made up of armor, engineers, infantry, MPs, artillery, and ADA (just to name a few) – most of whom spoke a common language separated by branch dogma and doctrine.

I say leave artillery to their mission. Leave infantry and armor to theirs. The same goes for ADA and MP. In short, create a force you can use in multiple ways (and at necessary times) while maintaining army for the bigger fight.

It is a good idea. I and others proposed variations on that theme many years ago. Big differences were a Medical Company instead of a Platoon and two Rifle Companies (for the manpower as much as anything); like your proposal apparently, they didn't fly. There are three problems that then impacted the idea and all are still valid:

1. The USAR isn't going away for a number of reasons. Mostly political but also practical. Having a title 10 Reserve structure gives DoD and the Army a lot of flexibility that could never exist with the Guard

2. While your idea has merit IF future war is OEF / OIF-like, what do we do if it's a mid to large size conventional war? The ArNG isn't going to give up the Combat role and even if NGB and the States were willing, Congress would be unlikely to go along. That's probably prudent.

3. The major benefit to the AC in having the RC is the ability to rapidly reinforce said AC with like units and it's far cheaper, easier and quicker to do that with the RC than it is to recruit off the street and build up to equipment issue. We did that in 1940 and the institution that is the Army of the United States doesn't want to have to do it again -- particularly with the speed at which things can occur today. That is akin to but not the same as number 2, above.

Having said all that, I think that the organization of one to half dozen Battalions along the line you suggest in each State should be fairly easy to do and is within manpower capability if some combat brigades were to go to cadre strength (which TAGs will fight ) -- which many are, practically speaking, today at any rate. Man those Composite Bns with the older more experienced guys in the State...

Idea has merit, you ought to work on it. Remembering to tailor your Compo Bns so they can advise /assist a Host Nation Brigade or even two or three...