Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[MattC86]

. . .I'm writing a research paper right now (or, perhaps, I should be writing) for my agricultural development class on counter-narcotics and development strategies in Colombia.

Most of the stuff I've seen from development groups is that they consider Plan Colombia a pretty big failure. The combined approach of alternative development and forcible eradication has alienated a lot of small farmers (whose marginalization over the last sixty years is the cause of the Colombian insurgency) and seriously undermined development. The guerillas are on the run, but coca production is not down, and the development people are even more wary than ever of working with the Colombians, and charge the US with putting too much pressure on Colombia to attain coca crop reduction targets, and too little emphasis on sustainable long term development. Simple eradication is not sustainable, and unsustainable "development" is really just relief. . .

Matt

[Jedburgh]

BBC, 23 Jan 08: Colombia's Campaign to Win Rebel Minds

As the hostage crisis continues in Colombia, the government is stepping up its efforts to bring another group of people back from the country's jungles: the guerrillas themselves.

New figures show that a record number of illegal fighters - nearly 3,200 - demobilised last year under a government scheme which offers immunity and benefits.

In the words of Colombia's deputy defence minister, Sergio Jaramillo, "Some countries have had amnesties for a few months, but Colombia is perhaps the only one with a permanently open hand."....

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 17 Jun 08: Colombia's Crossroads: The FARC and the Future of the Hostages

In the wake of the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, co-founder of the FARC, and his succession by Antonio Cano, longtime FARC political wing leader, Colombia stands at a crossroads. FARC spokespersons have renewed their vows to carry on their deceased leader’s fight and Cano may seek short-term military victories to bolster his internal support. However, a window of opportunity for peace with the world’s oldest guerrilla fighting force may simultaneously be opening.....

The Economist, 12 Jun 08: The End of Illusion and the Last Guerrilla

....The tough line Colombia has taken with the right-wing warlords makes a peace deal with their left-wing counterparts harder. The FARC's leaders, too, have committed crimes against humanity, and some of them traffic drugs. So they now have little incentive to demobilise. Some Colombians say the best place for the FARC's leaders is jail. That is true, but the best can be the enemy of the good. Though the FARC can no longer destroy Colombia's democracy, fighting to the last guerrilla is in nobody's interest. Ending this conflict will require compromise as well as continued military firmness.....

[MattC86]

. . . I know we are a very (and probably rightly) ME-focused community, but I think the Betancourt rescue has some serious implications for the future of the Colombian Civil War:

- Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? FARC was long considered nearly impervious to the type of infiltration that pulled off this operation. They have rapidly wavering support among the villagers in the ever-shrinking areas it controls, it has taken big hits in 2008 (Raul Reyes KIA; the discovery of its Chavez ties; Sureshot dead) already, and it is widely considered a vestige of political movements gone by (even though it always was a Marxist-lite operation). Usually infiltrations of guerrilla groups lead to major counterintelligence purges and witch-hunts in the group itself; FARC is slipping so much it may not be able to afford an overzealous purge.

- Uribe's popularity - no longer just in Bogota but nationwide is extraordinarily high (70% + in many areas), and likely to continue to rise in the coming months. The support for his continued prosecution of the war is at an all-time high, and concerns over continued corruption in Bogota, the struggles against the coca crops, and his increased centralization of power in the presidency (plus coming Constitutional issues as he contemplates messing with the election cycle) will likely fade for a time, particularly among the international community.

- The Colombian military would not have been capable of this operation 10 years ago. Maybe not even 5. The OPSEC required for this kind of operation simply didn't exist in a military riddled with both leftist and paramilitary informants. It also shows a good deal of daring, planning abilities, and - perhaps most importantly - patience on the part of Colombian command. Probably makes Chavez glad he didn't pick a fight earlier this year.

So, what is the future outlook? Particularly, 3 questions:

- Latin American geopolitics. Colombia has faced a lost of ostracizing within the Latin American community, particularly as it has grown closer to the US while the rest of LA moves away since 9/11. It's appearance as the US local lapdog may not change, but it becomes harder to ignore the fact that it is a capable and powerful "lapdog" that is winning its civil war. Do the pro/anti Washington dynamics at work change as Colombia becomes recognized more and more as it's own, viable state?

- What impact will this have on the drug trade? FARC's shrinking support base is a great opportunity to take control - not just spray and fly away - of many coca-producing areas. But if the Colombians aren't prepared to administer the alternative-development assistance that these small farmers will require, they never will gain their true allegiance to Bogota.

- Will the US follow up its massive and apparently effective military aid with a new developmental assistance program? "Plan Colombia" was proposed by the Pastrana administration as largely an economic aid program, a "Marshall Plan" for Colombia, as it were. It became, thanks to the Republican congress (and later the Bush administration) a largely military aid program. Washington, I believe, needs to be prepared to (1) provide a large amount of economic development aid if the war continues to go Bogota's way, and (2) renew pressure on Uribe's administration to respect human rights, fight the corruption in Bogota, and not take advantage of the political moment to fiddle with the Constitution.

Looking at that, it looks kind of like a call that the war is over - it most definitely is not, so my apologies if it sounds so. But I think we need to start thinking about the next stage; after all, our involvement in Colombia has always been predicated upon counternarcotics - and defeating the FARC may not put much of a dent, at least immediately, on the drug trade.

Regards,

Matt

[Jedburgh]

ISN Security Watch 7 Jul 08: FARC's Revolution is Over

.....FARC has lost international political support from Chavez and Castro, its two most outspoken supporters. Chavez will likely not make any public overture to support the FARC again.

Its support base inside Colombia has long been lost. The guerrilla army clearly struggles with attrition, facilitating the infiltration of Colombian commandos with enough swagger to wear Che Guevara t-shirts during their rescue operation. But they earned it. Not one shot was reportedly fired.

The FARC of old, of even two years ago, is forever lost. What was once a formidable, organized and confident rebel army has ebbed to nearly half its size and operational strength.

Its high-water mark will never again be reached, a reality that possibly has FARC leader Alfonso Cano considering options for downsizing into a smaller group, one specifically focused on the drug trade and avoiding any confrontation with the Colombian military or government installations.

What was once a glorious rebel army with a clear socialist conscious came relatively close to its ultimate goal, overthrowing the Colombian government. Now it must embrace its reality as simply another Colombian drug smuggling organization....

[Wildcat]

ISN Security Watch 7 Jul 08: FARC's Revolution is Over

What was once a glorious rebel army with a clear socialist conscious came relatively close to its ultimate goal, overthrowing the Colombian government. Now it must embrace its reality as simply another Colombian drug smuggling organization....

I think I just threw up a little bit in my mouth...

[Wildcat]

I want to attempt to address some of the things MattC86 brought up:

Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? ... Yes. They're on their last leg, even before the hostages were rescued, even before they put Marulanda on ice, FARC was reeling from Plan Colombia and Democratic Security (Uribe's domestic policy). I was pretty critical of some parts of Plan Colombia, mainly the use of chemical defoliants which seemed to exacerbate the plight of IDPs (internally displaced persons), but it allowed the CAF to finally come into their own, to the point where they were able to pinpoint FARC leaders for strikes, and to pull off the Betancourt rescue. In my mind, Plan Colombia has been vindicated, and I hope this generates some interest in Congress for broadening our avenues for trade and investment with Colombia. I also hope it may serve to convince some people of the need for patience and political will when it comes to defeating insurgencies. There's still a ways to go, though. Demobilizing the rest of the guerrillas, reintegrating them into society if possible, as well as not forgetting the presence of the paras and the ever-present drug trade.

I would say the real winner here was Democratic Security, and, as a result, Uribe. He's been maligned by a few neighboring heads of state, but he has shown Latin America the true meaning of "staying the course." He got tough with the guerrillas and paras, but he also go smart. Offering them chances to demobilize and reintegrate were critical in taking the wind from their sails. If I were him, I would go out gracefully once his term is up. I know a lot of Colombianos are pushing for him to take another term, but he needs to quit while he's ahead. Continue to root out corruption (which some of his own family have been involved in) and do as much damage to the guerrillas as he can before his successor takes over.

The Colombian military has matured quite well. Not really much else to say. I wish I knew more about Operation Jaque, but on the surface it looks like a pretty sophisticated plan, and they pulled it off without a hitch, and without a shot fired in anger. They are disciplined veterans at this point. Chavez and Correa would do well to avoid tangling with them, I think.

As to the Washington dynamics, like I said, I hope it changes. Congress has been blocking some initiatives based on concerns over Uribe's human rights record, and probably out of a sense that Plan Colombia was going nowhere. Hopefully recent events will turn some heads. Several Latin American countries are modernizing and enlarging their militaries. I saw a recent Economist article that cited huge defense spending boosts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. It's probably in our best interests to see Colombia stay on top of the heap.

I don't think Washington's involvement in Colombia has always been predicated on drug interdiction. We've had our hands in Colombian affairs since the Panama Canal was being built. We were assisting the CAF in counter-guerrilla operations as early as the 1960s, before the drug trade really blossomed, because that's when communist revolutions were in vogue. The drug trade merely became a nice pretext for escalating our involvement since it just happened to coincide with the rise of the FARC in the late 60s and early 70s. I think it's always been about keeping a stable democratic ally in a region that is prone to violent political upheavals. Realpolitik, my friends, realpolitik...

That being said, it will be tough to uproot the drug trade. One need only take a glance at Afghanistan to see the obstacles. The good news is that Colombia already has the infrastructure needed to pull it off. It's just a matter of locking down security for those areas by pushing out the FARC, and then letting NGOs fill the vacuum to start alternative development projects.

I think the war is winding down. Chavez and Correa can't afford to be implicated any further in supporting the guerrillas, and the FARC themselves have ceased to be a threat. It's time for them to either melt into the jungle, or melt back into civil society.

[MattC86]

Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? ... Yes. They're on their last leg, even before the hostages were rescued, even before they put Marulanda on ice, FARC was reeling from Plan Colombia and Democratic Security (Uribe's domestic policy). I was pretty critical of some parts of Plan Colombia, mainly the use of chemical defoliants which seemed to exacerbate the plight of IDPs (internally displaced persons), but it allowed the CAF to finally come into their own, to the point where they were able to pinpoint FARC leaders for strikes, and to pull off the Betancourt rescue.

Agreed. It does serve to reinforce the value of high-visibility, propaganda victories like the Betancourt rescue - most of the world was not particularly aware of the state of the Colombian Civil War. Coverage has gone from the "intractable" struggle between rebel groups and the government to a widespread perception that FARC is dying. Like I suggested, I think this will give Uribe a lot more breathing room in the international community - far less pressure for a settlement or anything of the sort.

In my mind, Plan Colombia has been vindicated, and I hope this generates some interest in Congress for broadening our avenues for trade and investment with Colombia. I also hope it may serve to convince some people of the need for patience and political will when it comes to defeating insurgencies. There's still a ways to go, though. Demobilizing the rest of the guerrillas, reintegrating them into society if possible, as well as not forgetting the presence of the paras and the ever-present drug trade.

Here's where it gets dicey. Once again, suppressing the symptoms (i.e., the armed rebellion) will prove easier than curing the disease. The landless and peasant classes, in many parts of the country, have been hostile to the governments in Bogota since Gaitan's assassination in 1948. Just because they no longer support an ideologically obsolete (and never particularly pure) rebellion any longer does not mean their complete support for the state, nor ensure against further rebellion or illicit behavior if allegiance to Bogota does not improve their economic state. A development package along the original lines of Plan Colombia, at least, is going to be needed. Perhaps finally all the disciples of "alternative development" who've been crying their programs don't work because of security conerns will get their chance to make good. But the cash needs to be there, from Bogota and internationally.

And as far as trade, the neo-protectionism in the Democratic party right now (which I believe will win both the White House and maintain considerable majorities in both houses) along with knee-jerk anti-Bush reactions means not only is the Colombia FTA DOA right now, but I doubt you will see it passed in the next four years. That's a big hit for the Colombians.

And Lord knows what will happen with the paramilitaries. One would hope that the demise of FARC leads to their buddies in the CAF abandoning this marriage of convenience, but I fear it will not be so. And the paras have their fingers as deep into the coca trade as FARC ever did. . .

I would say the real winner here was Democratic Security, and, as a result, Uribe. He's been maligned by a few neighboring heads of state, but he has shown Latin America the true meaning of "staying the course." He got tough with the guerrillas and paras, but he also go smart. Offering them chances to demobilize and reintegrate were critical in taking the wind from their sails. If I were him, I would go out gracefully once his term is up. I know a lot of Colombianos are pushing for him to take another term, but he needs to quit while he's ahead. Continue to root out corruption (which some of his own family have been involved in) and do as much damage to the guerrillas as he can before his successor takes over.

Concur, particularly on the corruption issue.

The Colombian military has matured quite well. Not really much else to say. I wish I knew more about Operation Jaque, but on the surface it looks like a pretty sophisticated plan, and they pulled it off without a hitch, and without a shot fired in anger. They are disciplined veterans at this point. Chavez and Correa would do well to avoid tangling with them, I think.

The US should take some serious lessons from its aid to the Colombian military - the turnaround has been dramatic, and relatively rapid. I've spent a few cursory moments looking for more complete information on US military aid, but haven't found exactly what I'm looking for.

As to the Washington dynamics, like I said, I hope it changes. Congress has been blocking some initiatives based on concerns over Uribe's human rights record, and probably out of a sense that Plan Colombia was going nowhere. Hopefully recent events will turn some heads. Several Latin American countries are modernizing and enlarging their militaries. I saw a recent Economist article that cited huge defense spending boosts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. It's probably in our best interests to see Colombia stay on top of the heap.

I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.

I don't think Washington's involvement in Colombia has always been predicated on drug interdiction. We've had our hands in Colombian affairs since the Panama Canal was being built. We were assisting the CAF in counter-guerrilla operations as early as the 1960s, before the drug trade really blossomed, because that's when communist revolutions were in vogue. The drug trade merely became a nice pretext for escalating our involvement since it just happened to coincide with the rise of the FARC in the late 60s and early 70s. I think it's always been about keeping a stable democratic ally in a region that is prone to violent political upheavals. Realpolitik, my friends, realpolitik...

Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.

It's just a matter of locking down security for those areas by pushing out the FARC, and then letting NGOs fill the vacuum to start alternative development projects.

I think the war is winding down. Chavez and Correa can't afford to be implicated any further in supporting the guerrillas, and the FARC themselves have ceased to be a threat. It's time for them to either melt into the jungle, or melt back into civil society.

Indeed.

But like I said, the fear is thinking the hard part is over. I think Africa shows that a bunch of NGOs running around the countryside doing their own alternative development is not going to be effective. The money is going to have to come from a lot of places, and the development strategy needs to be cohesive, which is not a traditional strongsuit of NGO-designed development projects. The US has poured billions into assistance for the Colombian military - it is vital that we continue to give generously for economic or "alternative" development.

Regards,

Matt

[Wildcat]

I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.

Whether or not it's beneficial to them, the Latin American states have already started the arms race (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...73&postcount=3). Chavez recently acquired some new Sukhoi fighters, and apparently he's looking for more from the Russians. Regardless of the fact that his people are still struggling to make ends meet, he's going to buy weapons and boost his domestic surveillance programs. He's got a country flush with oil revenues and he's got a whole lot of ambition. He wants to stick it to The Man, that being the United States and its "puppet," Colombia. Just because it's the proper and prudent course of action doesn't mean that a man like Chavez is going to follow that path.

Remember, this is IR we're talking about. Regional hegemons wax and wane, and states always compete to enhance their power and influence. An arms race was easy to predict in this case. It was inevitable, IMO.

Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.

Oh, don't get me wrong. If the FARC evaporates tomorrow I don't expect us to pick up and leave. Drug interdiction is still a huge reason why we're there. But I will counter by saying that if the FARC and the drugs disappear overnight, we will still have a considerable presence in Colombia and we will still shower money on them, because the overarching reason for our involvement in Colombia is based on its importance as a strategic and democratic ally in that region.