Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
Steve,

I can't open your paper from my work computer, so I'll read it this weekend. I don't disagree with what you're saying, but as Slapout pointed out on another thread we are still left with a void when it comes to a solution...
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I tire of hearing that the American people don't have the political will to stick with COIN. There are many cases where COIN has been successful throughout our history, because the cost has been relatively low in dollars and blood (Greece, Philippines in the 1950s, El Salvador, etc.). I don't hear the American people clamoring to pull out the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and numerous other locations where professionals are quietly doing their job. In the few cases where America lost their political will to endure, we employed large conventional forces at great expense (blood and dollars), and pursued the wrong strategy. By the time we got the strategy right such as GEN Abrams did in Vietnam, and now GEN Petraeus in Iraq, the will of the American people was already wore thin.
While I very much agree in principle, I offer some thoughts.

Most of the American people will stick with COIN as long as two factors are heeded; the commitment needs to be low with respect to the number of Troops committed; and some success most be attained. The polity does a cost-benefit analysis and as long as the case is honestly made and the public perceives that the ratio is in our favor, the majority will be supportive.

Changes in society have impacted the problem of support; as a collective we are more inclined to reject harshness or excessive force in any vein and we are more impatient in demanding quick results. Failure to acknowledge this can have deleterious effects.

The wrong strategy statement is valid, too valid, Aside from the obvious and well discussed flaws, the inter service rivalries and parochialism that prevailed -- and still do -- have a crtical and adverse impact and that situation must be somehow eliminated. That, IMO, is the job of DoD and they've never addressed it well. Left to their own devices, the services and SOCOM will not reconcile themselves to each other. This is a critical failing, is embedded and Congress is not helpful. It impacts everything from force structure to strategic choices and it needs to die. Unfortunately, human nature mitigates against a solution but such a solution, while difficult, is not unattainable.

We need full spectrum capabilities and balance and we cannot afford to tilt too far toward either COIN or 'big war' -- we've got to be able to do both and do them well. We can do that, easily -- if the will is there.