Quote Originally Posted by Danny View Post
I have argued in the air power posts here at the forum and over comments to the blog entry by Major General Dunlap that the country never again will give us ten to twelve years to conduct COIN operations, although I was castigated for saying so.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...terinsurgency/

And I have also argued that timeliness was missing from the campaign, extending it and strengthening the insurgency to the point that we fueled the fire rather than extinguishing it.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/...l-wars-manual/

The rest of your paper is interesting, and I am not per se commenting on it or your other theses or arguments in it. But I am mentioning that I agree in the superlative with you that the David Galula ten year COIN operation (these were not your words, they are mine and mine alone), while interesting, is an artifact of history. Professionals might like to think about it and train on it and read about it and wish for it -- but modern day America will never support a campaign through two and a half Presidential administrations. Things have changed too much. Pie in the sky, says I.

This is why I have been so interested in the campaign in Anbar (and in particular, Fallujah, Operation Alljah), because it has occurred as if on steroids -- in three years as opposed to ten.
What I've tried to suggest is that the public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major, direct involvement. It will tolerate a long period of advisory, support, and indirect involvement. To me that says we need to be able to really surge a massive capability quickly because the clock is running. In Iraq, we didn't get serious until the three year window of opportunity had passed.

My feeling on Dunlap's argument is that there is a lot of truth and value to it. My problems are: 1) it comes close to equating strategic success with servicing targets; 2) it as much a barely camouflaged ploy to retain service budget and force structure as it is a idea for a more effective American strategy.

I've literally screamed at my Army colleagues when they use the word "Army equities." I contend the Army has no business having "equities." That's like talking about the accounting department's "equities" in a corporation. I often suspect that idea would be met with utter comprehension within the Air Force.