Originally Posted by
Norfolk
Indeed. The Romans resorted to a more or less similar series of strategies to deal with external threats. But for the Western part of the Empire (and with serious but not fatal consequences for the Eastern part), that all failed in the end as the Roman economy started a long decline beginning in the 3rd Centruy (although Constantine did stabilize the situation for a time). Coupled to the collapse of the Roman birthrate, also occurring by the 3rd Century, and the large influx of immigration in general and barbarians in particular, and reliance upon units of Foederati became necessary from the late 4th century in order to make up for the lack of Roman manpower for the Legions.
Subsequently, the Roman preference for striking the enemy first in his own territory and then withdrawing, increasingly had to give way because of growing military weakness to allowing the enemy to actually penetrate and occupy portions of the Empire itself (not unlike much of Chinese practice over the millenia vis a vis the barbarians) before attempting the destruction of the invading forces. This of course resulted in progressive destruction of population, tax-base, and above all, the loyalty of the population to the Roman state. The Roman state proved increasingly incapable of protecting their lives and property, so local loyalties increasingly passed into acquiescence to the barbarians.
In sum, the Israeli Option is a short-term fix at best, and if the birthrate is low and the economy is unsound, it is unsustainable and has served only to aggravate the animosity of the enemy.
An alternative, that has already been suggested on another thread, is the resort to a strategy of engaging client-states. Preserve your own treasure and your own freedom to use military force by engaging local powers on your behalf. Subsidy (within reason) is a great deal cheaper and more efficient than bearing the burden entirely oneself. It also tends to enlist local expertise as a matter of course - though it may also engage local animosities as well. The client-state system has its dangers also - Iran being one example of this.
A key to successful resort to client states is being in a position of strength to begin with, vis-a-vis the actual or prospective client states. It is also important to be careful about whom you support, and how. If you are intent on engaging a prospective ally to be a client state, you have to be choosy. Much easier said than done in reality. There must also be a reasonable prospect for engaging the Government of a prospective client-state in internal self-reform to the extent that it is possible. This may requires decades of patience and stable policy on the part of the "Great Power" concerned. It may not work, but even attempting such is preferable to standing by more or less helplessly and watching a client-state sliding into implosion.
For the US to establish a worthwhile system of client-states, and within a strategy with emphasis on the resort to said, would take many years, and would require the US to recoup the military strength and the freedom to use its forces that it has lost through war in Iraq. Use of force results in loss of force; conservation of force results in ability to use force. Otherwise, operating from a relative position of weakness, the US may find any client-states that it may engage able to exploit that weakness, and the political concessions and cost of subsidies may become self-defeating.
The Israeli Option, while it is tempting and appears to offer benefits and efficiencies in the short term, is unsustainable and self-defeating in the long-term. Especially if you have a low birthrate and an unsound economic basis.
Bookmarks