I wonder how this thread would have run had Steve not titled it "The Israeli option on Strategy" and had not even mentioned Israel?

I generally agree with his prescription but would instead have called it the TR strategy, walk softly and carry a big stick.

Let's dump the 'Israeli' -- we are admittedly in an entirely different situation and any comparison is bound to be skewed. Our excessive (IMO) support for the Israelis is part of the problem but the strategic issue is far larger and it is also not restricted to the ME. We, like it or not, have a worldwide remit. One that is, at this time, irrevocable. In thirty to fifty years that may change but it'll be with us through the life of many on this board.

We should also discard any major discussion about 'premption.' That has been a facet of US policy for over 200 years, it is a worldwide military option and it will remain one. As for claims it is not nice; war's not nice.

One of the first respondents, Tequila, titled the strategy "Zeus thunderbolt." True in a sense but that does not mean that it is the only approach -- after all, any strategy HAS to be tailored to the situation and to be able to react to events. The stick, if used properly would rarely if ever be actually used. Tequila also said -- correctly IMO -- that:
"Also this idea seems to require foreign policy consistency across decades. I submit that this is pretty much impossible in any country and perhaps least of all with American democracy."
While there is much truth in that statement, there is also the fact that American foreign policy over a couple of centuries has been to strike at potential threats and that for the 45 years of the Cold War, we were pretty consistent. The only true exception being really, the Carter years. Which brings up an interesting point.

Had the strategy Steve espouses been in effect -- more correctly, the strategic policy -- I submit that after the hostages were seized had James Earl Carter gone to the UN, made a speech and said "Iran has invaded soveriegn US territory. When I return to Washington, I will active our Reserve forces and ask the Congress for a declaration of war and unless the hostage are released to US control by the 10th on November 1979 we will, unfortunately, have to invade Iran." I believe the bulk of the UN would have supported that because much as we were (and are) disliked in much of the world, and Embassy is an Embassy. I also believe that Khomeini would have folded in less than a day. Our army then was almost twice the size it is now and Iran was, as a nation, a basket case; they had no means to resist. Khomeini had essentially just taken over and had yet to consolidate his power. Other than moving carriers and some aircraft, little effort would have been required

Instead, he let Khomeini know that we would effectively do nothing, a sign in the Ayatollah's mind that we were weak -- and it is very unwise in the ME to show any weakness for it will certainly be exploited. That effective capitulation by us set the stage for many later attacks emanating from the ME.

Carry that forward using the policy. Lebanon was not a major concern to US interests so there would have been no intervention. Same for Somalia. There would have been no Khobar Towers bombing. Let's say the USS Cole attack may have occurred regardless. Do we take out Yemen? No, we spend scads of money to find out who did it and we get them (and we apparently did that...).

Alternative history is irrelevant, really. What matters is the here and now. Where we are is with a divided polity that is terribly indecisive but that is not likely to be willing to support any interventions in the near term. If we are not going to support interventions and go the COIN route -- which as we all know is fraught with pitfalls -- then we better have Plan B.

Many will recall that when Bush entered office he and Rumsfeld both frequently used the old TR phrase initially. Regrettably, their plans -- with which I agreed -- to draw back to CONUS and avoid nation building were overcome by events that unarguably had started with that Embassy seizure. Any attempt now to return to the Bush / Rumsfeld model is going to generate much heat and little light and a lot of that will be nothing but political theater. Yet, we have to have a policy of some sort; when you're the big guy on the block, you become a target and if the little bullies repeatedly kick you in the shins and you do nothing, eventually, you embolden them and they gang up on you.

The key to the strategic policy Steve recommends is, of course, distinguishing real threats from minor posturing. The latter can be dissuaded by a combination of diplomacy, bribes and minor efforts of force. The former require more drastic action and, if a long and costly intervention is not desirable -- and I submit it will not be to many -- than an alternative must be found.

Any alternative will have to be applied differently in differing situations and should be tailored to the degree of threat or response required. Proportionality, Balance and full spectrum capability. That's all we're talking about.

Penta then posits some good points and a question:
"1. The world hates us. (Us being America, Americans, so forth) This is unlikely to ever change, because even if we did accede to some demands, what is being demanded is, in a lot of cases, changes to the way the American people think and believe - seemingly to be imposed from Washington. (One sees this in the way Europeans deal with the US, in the way Middle Easterners deal with the US...In the way everybody deals with the US.)

2. The world would like nothing better than for us to pull back. Except that when we do, they freak out.

3. We're damned if we do, damned if we don't. In all cases.

So, maybe it's just me, maybe it's a generational thing, but...Why bother?"
The three points are all totally valid; the answer to his question is -- because we have to. Ignore the kids who have tantrums and they'll just keep having them...

I'd also suggest that his reading of American opinion and hopelessness differs markedly from mine and I just returned from a two week swing through much of the east coast. I talked to a lot of people, I'd estimate the down in the dumps contingent at no more than 10% -- interestinlgy, the further north I went, the more of them there were. Maybe it's the weather and gray skies.

Then Rank Amatuer hits a nail:
"Actually, I see the world moving to a form of détente. Cheap, effective, easily imitated asymmetric tactics like IEDs make it difficult and expensive for us to invade other countries. Our conventional superiority makes it cheap and easy for us to break stuff they need: bridges, parliament buildings, generating stations, airports, the leader's family, etc."
Totally true -- that's why the strategic policy is important, it will maintain that détente.

Then he misses one:
"The two main problems are that some of the bad guys have no interest in self preservation and a lot of people on our side want destruction instead of being content with containment."
Only partly true; there are some of those folks here but not many and those go-getters can generally be and almost always are contained. The more important point is that non-state actors cannot be contained...

And the attack on Iraq had nothing to do with WMD, Saddam, preemption or containment. It was to establish presence; all that other stuff was just minor synergy. Why presence? Check the latest Unclas NIE...

Is that presence a target? More importantly in terms of this discussion, will it remain a target? I think the answer to both questions is yes, YMMV.

Yet, if they were not there, they would unquestionably not be targets...