Colin Gray's New Article in SSQ

[Rob Thornton]

A thought provoking, and well written piece - I like DR. Gray's style, its almost conversational in how it invites mental interaction. I copied quite a few quotes out of it. I agree with most of what he said, but not all. There were quite a few observations in the article that really invite introspection on our part. I'll try not to duplicate any of the quotes already highlighted. Keep in mind, that these quotes are pulled out and to really discuss the article you should consider reading it, then thinking about it (maybe over a beer), then writing about it.

from Gray:

But it is not the American way to do things by halves. In Britain, we tend to use quarter measures when half measures are called for. In the United States, the error lies in the opposite direction.

This is what Ken White often refers to as the pendulum swinging too far when we try and compensate for our shortfalls. Another good analogy might be somebody hitting a patch of black ice while pulling a trailer - it could get ugly before you even realized it. I think its just who we are - it has allot to do with free speech and the nature of our political process (here I mean beyond those elected or trying to get elected, but to include those who take any kind of political action to make their point). There are some good things about it as well as bad I think, what matters is probably just knowing who you are and what you are prone to so that we identify over compensation for what it is. I don't think I've ever heard it summed up so well as Gray has.

from Gray:

When policy demands effectiveness in COIN, the government––the military in particular, naturally–– blows dust off its ancient manuals if it can find them; unearths “classic writings” by Charles E. Callwell, the US Marine Corps, David Galula, Robert Taber, Mao Tse-tung, Robert Trinquier, Frank Kitson, and T. E. Lawrence; and rediscovers what previous generations knew, even if they didn’t always practice it well

Of course, the contexts have changed, and every work of theory, founded on the experience of the life and times of its author, is stuffed full of inappropriate as well as much good advice. No matter, when COIN—or whatever is the challenge of the hour—is king, whatever is to hand is rushed to the front to serve. Every piece of fashionable jargon, every execrable acronym, every dodgy idea is hijacked for the bandwagon.

I think this idea is also worth thinking about. First, it means examining (thinking about) the context surrounding those COIN & IW thinkers' writings and the subjective nature of the wars they were writing about. I think it means questioning the causes for their successes, failures and observations - this might better help us to distinguish differences, recognize similarities and adapt those ideas/solutions which most closely resemble whatever conditions and problem sets are at hand. We have to avoid seeing every problem in the image of the template for the last good solution. I think this is a good lead in to Gray's next observation:

What I am suggesting, admittedly rather ungenerously, is that when we confront a truly difficult challenge, one that American cultural programming is not well prepared to meet, we look for the “silver bullet,” the big comprehensive solution. So today we learn, again, how to do COIN; we discover the virtues of cultural understanding; we rediscover that war and warfare is about politics; and we grasp the necessity for an integrated approach, otherwise long known as grand strategy. It would seem that in desperation we are liable to believe many extravagant promises. Why? Because we want to believe that there are solutions or, better still, that there is a single, dominant solution

I believe us to be generally predisposed to this, but that its most dangerous when it manifests itself in the policy maker - when they decide to employ military force to achieve a political objective, they tend to see it as a "silver bullet" - a one shot, fire and forget instrument of national power that is the final arbiter. What they don't see is as is the physics of pool balls on a table where the pockets keep moving around. A friend of mine currently working on an advanced degree in IR is taking a course where many of his peers are veteran DoS employees says that every time a difficult, time sensitive problem in their practical exercises comes up (they role play civ-mil members from JPGs to country teams to the NSC) - its the DoS folks reaching for the hammer - it happens predominately when those non-military folks are thrust out of their comfort zone and role play military or military appointee roles. To me this constitutes a fundamental lack of understanding about the consequences of using military force to achieve political solutions, and it also says something about how we view problems and conditions in other parts of the world. Consider our search for Arab/Israeli peace - maybe somethings can only be managed and not solved with finality - I don't know, but its worth thinking about.

From Gray:

To close this initial broadside on a slightly upbeat note, I will say that what matters most, indeed what should be adopted as a principle, is to “get the big things right enough because the small errors eventually can be fixed.” Rephrased, pursue the path of minimum regrets. May our mistakes be modest and correctable.

I like this as well, its in keeping that with our inability to predict the future. I'd also add that it fits well with why fighting a war is different then investing in the stock market. The more flexibility you have in terms of forces and material available, the more flexibility you have when things change for the worse, or when opportunity presents itself. The higher the probability that things will go wrong, the more flexibility you need.

from Gray:

Writing a century ago, Colonel Callwell of the British army employed the contemporary term of art, “small war.” He defined it thus: “Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops.”16 In other words, a small war is waged between state and nonstate adversaries. The legal and political status of the belligerents defines the irregularity.

A territory may be locked in a condition of permanent war and peace. That is conceptually—as well as politically, legally, and socially—confusing to tidy-minded academics and drafters of doctrine manuals.
For me, at least, the attractions of the broad church of irregular warfare include its ability to welcome regulars behaving irregularly. I must confess to some unhappiness with definitions that err on the side of exclusivity. Probably it is sensible to decline to choose.

Maybe the clearest distinction I've heard on what makes a "small war". Given the experience of the British, I like it. I also like Gray's 2nd paragraph where he considers the limitations of doctrine and academic literature to articulate complex ideas into something that balances retaining its true character, while being distilled enough for everyone to digest in practical fashion. The last sentence is wise advice.

from Gray:

Always be alert to the malign workings of the law of unintended consequences. You might wish to marry that law to the maxim that “no good deed shall go unpunished.”

When the American defense community makes a great discovery, in this case the phenomenon of irregular warfare, it tends to overdiscovery.

You might intend to go forth and do good, but I agree with Gray that because of the complexity and interaction in war that for every action, the probability is high that there will be unintended consequences, many of which will share the property of non-linearity - the effects will be out of proportion to the action - could be good or bad, but some will undoubtedly be bad.

The second sentence is another great way to make Ken's point about being out of balance.


I'll continue here in minute. Rob