attempt to compress five to six generations worth of change at a 'normal' pace or using the flawed idea of containment and / or diplomatic processes into two or three generations by forcing accelerated change.

Those are ME generations of around fifteen years. So you're looking at 30 to 40 years, six of which have already passed. I'd expect another three to five years of low to moderate conflict -- the ME doesn't so major conflict well and will try to avoid it and then a gradual tapering to an acceptable level.

Some success should be obvious within the next three to five years and much of that will be achieved in the efforts that are going on behind the scenes that most people are unaware of. Cutting funding networks, pressure on the Islamic nations to disavow terrorism; the low key law enforcement and intelligence stuff that must by nature (and is) hidden from view and that has been successful to a fair degree thus far and that goes on every day. Friend of mine's been working those issues an he's been in nine countries in the last six years. A lot of that is missed because many are focused on Iraq and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.

Thus the long war strategy is there -- and Iraq was and is just a small part of that strategy; it's just the most visible. By design, I'm pretty sure. The strategy is working, its practical application just isn't visible.

The COIN strategy was visible to many in the Armed forces at the outset -- and even before. Obviously you've never tried to turn the behemoth bureaucracy around and may be missing the political correctness that pervades DoD. Sanchez was put in place, custom and the PC effect meant he had to remain in place for the first year or so, regardless of screwups. He was a senior General raised through the PC Army who had absorbed the "Big War" mantra. He was replaced by another, similarly minded General. Took 18 month to recognize the screwups (far better than the seven years it took in Viet Nam) and another 18 months to turn the elephant in a new direction (far more than it took in Viet Nam because the institution had absorbed another 30 year of Bureaucracy building). Then it took about 18 months to get those changes embedded (about the same time as it took in Viet Nam). The Army deserves praise for figuring it out, changing the training regimen and getting down to business.

That PC effect also is the element that seems to obscure the identification of the real motivator. It known, just unstated for a variety of really excellent reasons. If it weren't known, we wouldn't be where we are doing what we're doing. If you cannot seal the borders and guarantee no strikes in this huge, diverse nation with very leaky borders, then you must go to the source of the problem and work on the root issue. To work on root issues, you have to be where the roots are located.