Dave,

I look forward to your longer response. I still do not think we created al Qaeda or the former regime elements. I think a case can be made for the suggestion that the Iraqi rejectionist may have been reactions to our actions. I am not arguing that we did not make mistakes. I am still waiting for some author to take on the small footprint, large footprint debate that effected troop levels. I think the early belief that we needed better intelligence instead of more troops led to many of the problems, by encouraging large roundups of suspects and engaging in aggressive interrigation. Certainly the intelligence got better as more Iraqi troops came on line and improved the force to space ratio at the same time. A better force to space ratio should and did result in better intelligence.

However, the situations in Fallujah or Tal Afar could not have been resolved by being nicer to the terrorist. I think the reactive approach at Ramadi has resulted in not just slower progress, but may result in greater casualites and lower morale. Cobra II is still a deeply flawed book in my opinion. I look forward to reading Fiasco even if I don't care for the title.

My point about the insurgents making war against the people rather than the government or the US still argues against the hug an insurgent approach.